# Neg

## 1NCs

### Generic – Feminist Security Studies

#### Security cooperation with NATO enforces global hegemonic masculinity through recreation of military masculinities and imperial violence

Wright 22

Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK. “Challenging civil society perceptions of NATO: Engaging the Women, Peace and Security agenda.” Cooperation and Conflict. April 2022. Pg 3-4. LJS

NATO is a political-military alliance built on consensus decision-making. Moving beyond its Cold War origins, the alliance’s remit has expanded significantly beyond a sole focus on collective defence to include crisis management and cooperative security. This has seen NATO’s focus enlarge from a regional one to a global one, with recent engagements in Afghanistan, Libya and Kosovo, for example. Its status as a multilateral institution means it is limited by its members’ priorities and therefore sensitive not to implicate NATO or NATO member states in wrongdoing (Hebert, 2012). In centring NATO as an ‘institution of international hegemonic masculinity’ (Wright et al., 2019), in this analysis, it is possible to shed light on the peculiarities of NATO’s WPS work to date, against which engagement with civil society takes place. This has two co-constituting elements, first, internally, existing gender norms and expectations of masculinity and femininity reflective of a hierarchical military institution are (re)created and (re)enforced through NATO’s engagement with WPS (Wright et al., 2019: 71). For example, men working on WPS at NATO navigate both the trivialisation and the feminisation of such work and must (re)negotiate their own identities. Yet in so doing they reinforce the importance of men speaking to and listening to other men (rather than women) reinforcing the gendered status quo (Wright et al., 2019: 93; see also Hurley, 2018a). Second, externally, as a transnational military alliance, NATO acts as a ‘teaching machine’ in which member and partner states learn the value of WPS as a ‘military tool’ through socialisation with each other (Wright et al., 2019; see also Enloe, 1981). This means perpetuating an understanding of WPS as a means to support operational effectiveness through ‘the role of masculinist protector which reinforces hegemonic4 Cooperation and Conflict 00(0) militaristic, masculine ideals and norms’ (Wright et al., 2019: 34). This patriarchal logic puts ‘women and children, in a subordinate position of dependence and obedience’ to justify the waging of war (Young, 2003: 2), for example, NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan (Wright, 2019). It is reinforced through the stories NATO tells internally about its WPS engagement (Hurley, 2018b) and externally in public diplomacy (Wright, 2019) and to support partnerships with other states but also celebrities (Wright and Bergman Rosamond, 2021) and now civil society. Thus, interrogating civil society perceptions of NATO in this context adds an additional dimension to understanding how NATO seeks to legitimise itself as a WPS actor, further constituting its role as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity.

#### This androcentric world order makes extinction inevitable—war and environmental degradation

Nhanenge 2007[Jytte Masters @ U South Africa, paper submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of master of arts in the subject Development Studies, “ECOFEMINSM: TOWARDS INTEGRATING THE CONCERNS OF WOMEN, POOR PEOPLE AND NATURE INTO DEVELOPMENT”]

The androcentric premises also have political consequences. They protect the ideological basis of exploitative relationships. Militarism, colonialism, racism, sexism, capitalism and other pathological ‘isms’ of modernity get legitimacy from the assumption that power relations and hierarchy are inevitably a part of human society, due to man's inherent nature. Because when mankind by nature is autonomous, competitive and violent (i.e. masculine) then coercion and hierarchical structures are necessary to manage conflicts and maintain social order. In this way, the cooperative relationships such as those found among some women and tribal cultures, are by a dualised definition unrealistic and utopian. (Birkeland 1995: 59). This means that power relations are generated by universal scientific truths about human nature, rather than by political and social debate. The consequence is that people cannot challenge the basis of the power structure because they believe it is the scientific truth, so it cannot be otherwise. In this way, militarism is justified as being unavoidable, regardless of its patent irrationality. Likewise, if the scientific "truth" were that humans would always compete for a greater share of resources, then the rational response to the environmental crisis would seem to be "dog-eat-dog" survivalism. This creates a self-fulfilling prophecy in which nature and community simply cannot survive. (Birkeland 1995: 59). This type of social and political power structure is kept in place by social policies. It is based on the assumption that if the scientific method is applied to public policy then social planning can be done free from normative values. However, according to Habermas (Reitzes 1993: 40) the scientific method only conceal pre-existing, unreflected social interests and pre-scientific decisions. Consequently, also social scientists apply the scientific characteristics of objectivity, value-freedom, rationality and quantifiability to social life. In this way, they assume they can unveil universal laws about social relations, which will lead to true knowledge. Based on this, correct social policies can be formulated. Thus, social processes are excluded, while scientific objective facts are included. Society is assumed a static entity, where no changes are possible. By promoting a permanent character, social science legitimizes the existing social order, while obscuring the relations of domination and subordination, which is keeping the existing power relations inaccessible to analysis. The frozen order also makes it impossible to develop alternative explanations about social reality. It prevents a historical and political understanding of reality and denies the possibility for social transformation by human agency. The prevailing condition is seen as an unavoidable fact. This implies that human beings are passive and that domination is a natural force, for which no one is responsible. This permits the state freely to implement laws and policies, which are controlling and coercive. These are seen as being correct, because they are based on scientific facts made by scientific experts. One result is that the state, without consulting the public, engages in a pathological pursuit of economic growth. Technology can be used to dominate societies or to enhance them. Thus both science and technology could have developed in a different direction. But due to patriarchal values infiltrated in science the type of technology developed is meant to dominate, oppress, exploit and kill. One reason is that patriarchal societies identify masculinity with conquest. Thus any technical innovation will continue to be a tool for more effective oppression and exploitation. The highest priority seems to be given to technology that destroys life. Modern societies are dominated by masculine institutions and patriarchal ideologies. Their technologies prevailed in Auschwitz, Dresden, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Vietnam, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan and in many other parts of the world. Patriarchal power has brought us acid rain, global warming, military states, poverty and countless cases of suffering. We have seen men whose power has caused them to lose all sense of reality, decency and imagination, and we must fear such power. The ultimate result of unchecked patriarchy will be ecological catastrophe and nuclear holocaust. Such actions are denial of wisdom. It is working against natural harmony and destroying the basis of existence. But as long as ordinary people leave questions of technology to the "experts” we will continue the forward stampede. As long as economics focus on technology and both are the focus of politics, we can leave none of them to experts. Ordinary people are often more capable of taking a wider and more humanistic view than these experts. (Kelly 1990: 112-114; Eisler 1990: 3233; Schumacher 1993: 20, 126, 128, 130).

#### Prioritize a Feminist Security Studies approach to IR – gender analysis represents a crucial and central aspect of conceptualizing war and requires a complete overhaul of how we normatively view IR

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Sjoberg, British Academy Global Professor of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway University of London. “The (Genderless) Study of War in International Relations,” Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War, Columbia University Press, 2013.

What war theorizing shares is a lack of, and a lack of commitment to, gender analysis. This is, of course, a broad and sweeping generalization that is more accurate and applicable to some theorists and paradigms than others, but is generally fair when applied to war studies.320 For example, between 1945 and 2006, the five highest-ranked security journals published articles with gender analysis in them in less than one-quarter of 1 percent of their content.321 Much of the ground-breaking work in critical security studies mentions gender marginally, if at all, and generally fails to adopt gender analysis into its work.322 In Levy and Thompson’s recent (otherwise excellent) book summarizing war theorizing, “gender” makes an appearance twice—in two footnotes.323 The first one problematizes the “over-aggregation” of human nature in first-image analyses of war, given that they treat “the male and female as indistinguishable and neglect any possible impact of gender on the causes of war.”324 The second discusses “demographic trends” such as “surpluses of men” and “youth bulges” as causes of war.325 Neither do serious gender analysis in the terms this book intends to engage. This is not to say that mainstream war studies has never paid any attention to gender, or that gender has been completely absent from critical theorists’ work on war and conflict. It is, instead, to make two distinct (and hopefully more modest) claims. The first is that, to the extent that gender has been taken up in war theorizing, it remains peripheral and has not become a central part of research programs outside feminist security studies considering the nature, constitution, causes, and consequences of war(s).326 The second is that, to the extent that mainstream studies of war have considered gender, they have actually been largely talking about a partial and limited idea of gender that involves women as a biological sex being imbued with characteristics gendered feminine for the purpose of analyzing war.327 This second claim will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2, when I lay out this book’s feminist approaches to studying war ontologically, epistemologically, and methodologically. For now, it is the first claim—that gender theorizing remains absent from (and when not absent from, marginal to) both mainstream and critical war theorizing—that lays the foundation for this book’s work. In the remainder of the text, I seek to analyze and problematize “genderless” war studies. In calling war studies genderless, I am not implying that it is somehow gender neutral or without gender implications. Quite the opposite, I am arguing that it is impossible to think about war well without gender analysis and that doing so obscures the empirical operation of and normative consequences of gender in the nature, causes, performances of, and consequences of war(s). Gender is necessary, conceptually, to understanding the nature of war(s); empirically, to understanding wars’ causes and consequences; ethically, to understanding its implications; and prescriptively, to understanding how to stop wars. Gender does “analytical and normative work” and serves as a “resource for thought” in almost every aspect of how we fight wars and how we read them.328 War, wars, and the study of both are fundamentally (if not unalterably) gendered and, therefore, feminist theorizing about war is not only a part of, but a crucial piece of, the war puzzle.329 Feminist theory “raises the question of what kind of politics and theory would be possible without the work accomplished by gendered logics” in war theorizing.330 Also, when I call war studies genderless, I am not arguing that the work I outlined in this chapter does not have a relationship with gender theorizing—I am arguing that its relationship is (normatively and empirically) negative, problematic, and untenable. These relationships between gender theorizing and security or war studies have variously been called “impossible,”331 “awkward,”332 “uneasy”333 “limited,”334 and akin to “exile.”335 While (many in) IR generally and security studies specifically have conceded that feminist scholarship may exist at the margins, gender analysis “does not simply ‘add’ gender to an unchanged object of study, but . . . force[s] a more radical rethinking of what properly constitutes I/international R/relations to begin with, transforming the boundaries and conceptual basis.”336 This work starts with the feminist analysis of and deconstruction of war theorizing. It requires showing the gendered nature of that theorizing, of the meaning, causes, and consequences of war(s) at each level of analysis. The logics, tools, and insights of the approaches to war(s) in this chapter will be used, melded, critiqued, reformulated, called out, and engaged throughout the rest of this book’s theorizing of war through feminist lenses. Engaging the genderless study of war is a crucial part of the project of feminist war theorizing, because, as Kimberly Hutchings argues, “one can hope . . . to loosen the hold of masculinity on meaning and life only once one has first appreciated how much work is accomplished by masculinity’s logical structure.”337 Chapter 2 introduces the feminist theory tools to begin to see, and deconstruct, the influence of masculinity’s logical structures on war theorizing.

## Links

### China

#### The 1AC’s portrayal of China as an aggressive masculine threat serves as a reductionist view of Chinese culture to justify U.S. “Just Warrior” saviorism

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Sjoberg, British Academy Global Professor of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway University of London. “Gendering Power Transition Theory,” Gender and International Security: Feminist Perspectives. 2010.

Power transition theorists found that “occupation of a high position in the international hierarchy is associated with war involvement, irrespective of other attributes (ideology, etc.) of the state occupying that position.”88 Even if those states at the top of the international hierarchy are more likely to be involved in wars,89 feminists question the assumption that this is because nations with the capacity to fight wars are necessarily more likely to fight. Feminist reformulation (R1) (see Table 5.1) posits that the content and salience of a state’s hegemonic masculinity will be a factor in its bellicosity. The feminist argument is that the more competitive a state’s hegemonic masculinity, the more likely that state is to make war; this risk is compounded by high salience. In World War II Germany, a competitive form of masculinity was very salient. George Mosse’s study of the ideal German man90 in the 1930s reveals him as: Tall and muscular, he has no fat on his body and no hair anywhere but on his head. His broad, contoured shoulders narrow to a thin waist. He has a fine colorless chiseled face with a strong prominent square jaw. He is the flawless man … , not only did he embody the older aristocratic values of bravery, courage, and chivalry, but mirroring bourgeois values, he was also disciplined, orderly, and restrained … The perfect man, therefore, was committed to sacrifice and heroism, in other words, soldierly values that put the nation ahead of the individual.91 This German masculinity “increasingly came to be linked to ideas about nationalism.”92 This idea of masculinity became increasingly salient as “the nationalist press often portrayed Jewish men as the exact opposite of the manly ideal in looks and behavior … jittery, restless, greedy, selfish, and … ugly—nearly deformed.”93 In the 1930s, “German fascists … took the notion of masculinity to its awful, ghastly, and seemingly logical extreme.”94 Perhaps this can be contrasted with the case of a rising China. Kam Louie, a scholar of Chinese masculinities, explains that while “Western stereotypes of the ‘real man’ have described the Occidental male as forming his notion of male-self within images of toughness, courageousness, and decisiveness, … in the Chinese case, the cerebral male model tends to dominate the macho, brawny male.”95 The Communist Revolution in China has further demilitarized Chinese masculinity,96 since, while “the core meaning of wen-wu97 still revolves around cultural attainment and martial valour … [ideal-types of masculinity have been shaped by] Communist insistence that able-bodied citizens work [which] … has generated idealized images of workers and peasants” rather than soldiers.98 Louie suggests that the current Chinese hegemonic masculinity is less aggressive and militaristic, and that it is both more open and less salient now than it has been previously.99 Given these two examples, the feminist reformulation (R1) would expect bellicosity from 1930s Germany rather than contemporary China. The same empirical evidence that PTT uses could instead support a feminist argument that Germany’s level of interest in aggressive masculinity made Germany a belligerent state, and that a dissatisfied China would have less interest in war than the 1930s Germany. A feminist reinterpretation would expect that Germans’ hypercompetitive hegemonic masculinity in the 1930s would motivate German leaders and citizens to try to subordinate other masculinities, while the Chinese government, following their more cerebral hegemonic masculinity, would place less priority on competition with other states.

### Continuum of Violence

#### The 1AC’s focus on violence as the event of war recreates everyday forms of violence

Wibben 19

Annick T.R., Professor of Gender, Peace & Security at the Swedish Defence University. “Everyday Security, Feminism, and the Continuum of Violence.” Journal of Global Security Studies. 2019. LJS

Innovative work on global security issues comes not just from different traditions within security studies (global or not), but by talking across fields of study. This might include engaging peace and conflict studies, geography, anthropology, and more. Feminist security studies (FSS) is a case in point: whereas it is often read as a subfield or particular approach within security studies, it was certainly not conceived as such since “feminist aims and the scope of their concerns explodes its confines at every possible turn” (Wibben 2011, 113; see also Sjoberg and Lobasz 2011; Shepherd 2013; Elias and Roberts 2015; Chisholm and Stachowitsch 2017). From the outset of feminist engagements with global politics, security issues were a key concern—whether in the 1980s when feminist international relations (IR) scholars began to make their mark on the field (see Wibben 2017 for an overview of FSS) or in their much earlier engagements in attempt to first prevent World War I and, later, to mitigate its effects (see, e.g., Confortini 2012; Owens 2018; Tickner and True 2018). Feminist scholars would maintain that gendered (security) relations, while instantiated differently across the globe and over time, could fulfill Jon Western’s (2016, 100) litmus test for being both global in scale, “worldwide in either cause or effect,” and global in reach, though “their impact is usually local or regional.” Hence, traditional security scholars ignore gender relations and feminist scholarship and uncover their role in relation to security studies at their own peril—traditional security scholars are, as Cynthia Enloe (e.g., 2015) would formulate it, not being particularly realistic. Paying attention to gendered (security) relations often involves moving beyond states, even as state practices are also deeply gendered (Peterson 1992; Parashar, Tickner, and True 2018). Consequently, the space provided by journals such as JoGSS is crucial to push the conversation forward. Of course, many critical security scholars have long questioned the state as the primary referent object of security studies: debates about broadening and deepening security in the 1990s (see, e.g., Lipschutz 1995; Krause and Williams 1997) opened up conversations about the study of security as fundamentally a political project (Wibben 2016a), thus making room for scholars to look not just at individual and human security, but everyday and vernacular security as well (VaughanWilliams and Stevens 2016; see also Benzig, this issue). At the same time, feminist scholars in a variety of disciplinary traditions also increasingly started to frame their conversations about peace, violence, and the war system in terms of security (e.g., Tickner 1992; Reardon 1993). Noting that, “until women have control over their own security, a truly comprehensive system of security cannot be devised” (Tickner 1992, 30), feminist scholars tend to pay close attention to the impact of security policies on the everyday lives of people (see, e.g., Sylvester, 2011, 2013; Wibben 2016b; Gentry, Shepherd, and Sjoberg 2018; Ní Aoláin et al. 2018). Departing from a large part of traditional security studies research, feminist scholars challenge common sense notions that wars are fought to protect vulnerable populations and show that civilians are, especially in ethno-nationalist wars, explicitly targeted (Enloe 1998; Hansen 2000, 2001, 2006; Carpenter 2005; McLeod 2016). Rather than offering security for all their citizens, states may threaten their own populations through direct or structural violence reflected in war-fighting priorities embedded in a variety of state institutions (Reardon 1985; Peterson 1992; Tickner 1992; Enloe 1993, 2000; Young 2003). Feminists contribute to debates about the increasing import of sophisticated technologies into the practice of war, from nuclear strategy to drones, which asserts that it depersonalizes killing, offers the illusion of clean warfare, and obscures accountability (Cohn 1987; Masters 2005; Wilcox 2015; Bayard de Volo 2016; Clark 2018). Some scholars also directly engage traditional theories of security (Sjoberg 2010, 2013; Wibben 2011; Detraz 2012) and security policy (Stachowitsch 2012; MacKenzie 2015). An ever-increasing amount of research looks at the impact of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions (Shepherd 2008; Gizelis and Olsson 2015; McLeod 2016), as well as efforts to address sexualized violence in war (Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2013; Cohen 2016). Other scholars have made important contributions to the study of private military companies from a feminist perspective (Stachowitsch 2012; Eichler 2015). While many traditional sciences assume gender neutrality, feminists make gender, that is, the socially constructed femininity/masculinity distinction that shapes our perception of, and response to, the world, a central category of analysis. They are concerned, above all, with gendered power relations and also note how they are molded by intersecting axes of oppression (Collins 2000). Consequently, feminist scholars argue that concepts and ideas about security, as well as security practices and institutions, are shaped by gender: gender (along with class, caste, race, sexuality and more) structures the hierarchies that dictate what and who is taken seriously. To analyze these power relations, feminist security studies “includes approaches, for instance, that pay attention to the workings of gender in order to ask questions about security; it also includes scholarship that refuses any line of distinction that separates ‘security’ from the workings of gender” (Stern and Wibben 2014, 2). Journals such as the International Feminist Journal of Politics and Security Dialogue as well as, more recently, Critical Military Studies and Critical Studies on Security have published excellent work in this area, which should be included in more global security syllabi. This past year brought us two new handbooks on gender and conflict/security (Gentry, Shepherd, and Sjoberg 2018; Ní Aolaín et al. 2018), joining previous efforts to provide an overview of the field (e.g., Detraz 2012). A key theoretical contribution feminist peace and conflict studies scholars have made to feminist understandings of security is the notion of a continuum of violence between peace and wartime that also transgresses the boundaries of private/public and international/domestic realms (see, e.g., Moser 2001; Cockburn 2004). Violence against women, as feminist scholars have pointed out with increasing frequency, is part of a multidimensional continuum of violence (Cockburn 2004; see also O’Rourke 2013; Pratt and Richter–Devroe 2014) that “extends from violence in the home, to the structural violence of poverty, to the ecological violence associated with the depletion of our planetary resources and natural disasters, to the violence of war and its aftermath” (True 2012, 5; see also Tickner 2001). Working with these notions, and paying attention to gendered (and intersecting) power hierarchies, has allowed feminist scholars to note important continuities from the pre- through the postwar environment (Jacobs, Jacobsen, and Marchbank 2000; Meintjes, Pillay, and Turshen 2001; Moser and Clark 2001; Giles and Hyndman 2004; Cohn 2013). For example, as Henshaw also notes in this issue, existing societal expectations about gender roles shape not only women’s positions during wartime, but also significantly mold war’s aftermaths. Importantly, while there are always conflicting notions of femininity, the way in which gender roles (for women, men and trans\*, given that gender is a relational category where changes always affect the full spectrum) change during and after wars is not straightforward. While the disruption of violent conflict offers new openings, for example, for women to take on roles as combatants or new positions in the formal economy, it simultaneously can lead to greater scrutiny of their activities, such as their sexual relations (Sylvester 1993; Pettman 1996; Ahäll 2015 ˚ ; Gentry and Sjoberg 2015). Literature is accumulating regarding women’s participation in fighting forces (e.g., Stiehm 1996; Alison 2009; MacKenzie 2012; Sylvester 2013; Parashar 2014; Gentry and Sjoberg 2015; Henshaw 2017; Vastapuu 2018), which provides manifold insights into the ways in which these venues of participation in war are shaped not just by gendered expectations, which influence whether women take on only support or also combat roles, but also by age, race, class, indigeneity, and more. Leena Vastapuu’s (2018) study of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes in Liberia is a case in point: she examined how young women, who were fairly empowered during their time in the fighting forces despite their often traumatic entry into this life, found the aftermath difficult to navigate. Paying attention not just to gender, but also to social status (class) and differences in rural and urban locations, provides for greater insight into everyday (in)securities and the need to account for these in interventions by the international community. What we learn from Vastapuu (2018), and what other scholars have also described (MacKenzie 2012; Mazurana and Cole 2013; Basini 2016; Mazurana, Krystalli, and Baaré 2018; Henshaw, this issue), is that peace negotiations and settlements that structure war’s aftermaths leave much to be desired when examined from a feminist perspective. Crucially, a focus on armed actors in violent conflicts often exclude women from the negotiating table to begin with. What is more, if little attention is paid to gender and its intersections with class or race, “peace” tends to imply a “return” to prewar societal relations (which can reinforce societal exclusion as Benzig notes in this issue), or, worse, it may institute new fundamentalisms. This postwar gender anxiety, as Henshaw (this issue) calls it, can have dire consequences for women who took on varied new roles during the violent conflict. At the same time, it has proven impossible to put the genie back in the bottle in its entirety, so to speak: many women will refuse to return to their old roles in postwar societies (Berry and Rana 2019). Indeed, permanent shifts in societal norms can be expected. Paying attention to these conflicts at the everyday, microlevel is important to understand complex contemporary global phenomena such as the ability of extremist movements to recruit young men to enact violence as a way of (re)asserting their masculinity in the face of (perceived or actual) threats to their traditional livelihoods (Parpart and Zalewski 2008; Kimmel 2018). Deeply contextual historical case studies by area experts, which are a traditional strength of feminist scholarship, are needed to most accurately assess specific security environments, as Emy Matesan (this issue) shows in relation to Islamist movements (for a feminist take, see Brown 2011, 2018; Eggert 2016). This kind of research requires the inclusion and, indeed, promotion of a variety of methods (see also Fiona Adamson, this issue) to capture the experiences of people from all walks of life in order to name, as well as challenge, the long colonial histories of their grievances (Chowdry and Nair 2004; Agathangelou and Ling 2009; Tuhiwai-Smith 2012; Rutazibwa 2016). Using innovative methods like autophotography (Vastapuu 2018), narrative analysis (Wibben 2011; Shepherd 2012; Mehta and Wibben 2018), or poetic reimaginings (Sylvester 1993; Zalewski 2013; Ling 2014) should become as much part of the toolbox of global security scholars as survey research or experimental methods. What is more, being curious about what has heretofore been taken for granted and also being willing to be surprised, as Cynthia Enloe (2004) urges, can lead to the production of new knowledges, as Bettina Benzig (this issue) finds when challenging overly optimistic assessments of vernacular security. Similarly, studying sexualized violence in the Congo, Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern (2013) developed a “methodology of unease” when “little was as we had (unwittingly?) expected it to be, and the unease that ensued from then on served as our methodological guide and compass”(Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2016, 124).

### Cybersecurity

#### Technology designs spill out to create gendered cybersecurity that causes violence and victim-blaming

Millar, Shires, and Tropina 21

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Over and above the specific context of cybersecurity, technology design is gendered: it misunderstands, omits and consolidates certain gendered uses, it privileges perceived masculine practices over feminine ones, and it stereotypes femininity in problematic ways.25 These gendered aspects have direct impact on cybersecurity. Many technology designers are aware of the gendered implications of their work, and there are entire subdisciplines, including user experience and user-centred design, that seek to improve technology design along gendered lines.26 The following are select examples of gendered technology design: » Virtual reality prototypes have, like many technologies, omitted women almost entirely as their intended users.27 » The choice of women voice assistants for phones, smart speakers and devices, and satellite navigation has been shown to reinforce harmful assumptions about gendered power relationships.28 » The design of technologies directly marketed to women, known as “femvertizing”, often “prey[s] on women’s assumptive need to correct problematic behaviors or unacceptable physical deviancies”.29 Gendered assumptions about what is “normal” are deployed in advertising material to encourage women to purchase products that enable them to conform or minimize “abnormal” physical and personal characteristics. » There are gendered differences in academic and industry research on technology, as in other fields, including in citation practices.30 These broader gendered aspects of technology design influence cybersecurity in several ways. Most basically, the conception of cybersecurity employed in technological design is gendered. For example, the design of smart household devices has not adequately included intimate partner violence in the “threat modelling” phase of design, meaning that supposedly secure smart devices increase gendered risks.31 Even services designed to prevent this problem, such as online resources about leaving abusive relationships, can themselves be a risk to individuals if the abuser discovers the tool. Therefore, the designers of such tools – such as emergency “exit” buttons on the websites of victim organizations – have to take these risks into account in their threat models.32 To reduce the occurrence of these inadvertently dangerous blind spots, it is thus important that the design and threat-modelling processes include diverse perspectives and people from minoritized groups.33 Another example can be found in contemporary cybersecurity measures aimed at protecting individuals from privacy breaches or identity theft, which rely on the use of personal information as the backup for passwords and online account access. These assume that the “bad actor” is a stranger without other access to the middle name of a parent or the name of a first pet – an assumption not met in instances of intimate partner and family violence.34 The design of online identity-verification procedures thus has gendered effects due to the conception of “threat” they employ (and, in this case, omit). The burden of cybersecurity work is also gendered. Privacy settings on social media are more likely to be activated by women, especially for images.35 Women are expected to exercise near-total control over their own digital footprint (such as changing passwords and deleting social media accounts, etc.) in order to reduce their vulnerability to digital coercive control.36 Failing to act as a perfect digital user – due to a lack of time or literacy, or a reliance on technology for support and social connections – becomes a source of victim-blaming.37 There is also a trade-off here between different cybersecurity goals: permitting companies to design applications that access location and other data can be a way of preventing other privacy threats, even though the companies use this data commercially, which can itself be a threat. Finally, the advertising of cybersecurity technologies is gendered. Software that can remotely monitor phones and other devices is marketed as designed for child protection, enabling families to track the movements of their children online.38 But this software is also used in situations of intimate partner violence (and is often termed “stalkerware”).39 Google has banned all advertising of stalkerware to combat this dual-use problem.40 Overall, cybersecurity design inherits the gendered omissions, biases and reinforcement of gendered assumptions that are evident in technology design. The threat models, reporting and user-control procedures, and advertising of cybersecurity technologies mean that women (or the most vulnerable gender groups in a particular context) are more likely to have cybersecurity threats downplayed or omitted; more likely to have additional security burdens; and more likely to be affected by disingenuous cybersecurity advertising.

#### The field of cybersecurity reinforces patriarchal norms through threat construction and constraints within the industry

Millar, Shires, and Tropina 21

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How we think about defence – that is, what it means to defend and the common-sense actions we take to defend – is gendered. It reflects a series of norms associated with masculinity (e.g. protection, technical competence, autonomy, etc.) that derive from military understandings of national security.63 This is often positive since it makes cybersecurity intelligible for a wide range of non-experts through the use of parallel concepts and language. It can also, however, have negative effects. Many of the challenges associated with gender and cybersecurity defence derive from a mismatch between conventional understandings of national defence and cybersecurity, which is premised upon mitigating and managing, rather than eliminating, risks. Masculine norms and expectations that relate to using force to produce physical safety, for instance, may lead policy makers to downplay nonphysical harms in cybersecurity.64 Masculine gender norms around vulnerability can make admitting error, seeking help or working cooperatively more difficult.65 This can lead to reluctance to actively pursue cybersecurity defence or to be adequate transparent about failures to clients, employees or citizens. Such norms can also lead to the prioritization of some individuals and organizations – often those seen as socially prestigious or valuable for defence and protection (such as the State, the military or large corporations) – over others (such as civil society organizations and individuals, notably women and LGBTQ+66 people).67 A full gender perspective on cybersecurity defence recognizes that civil society and groups representing women and LGBTQ+ people have a need for, and a right to, cybersecurity defence – including the State resources (in terms of capacity-building, expertise and enforcement) needed to provide it. More specifically, different elements of cybersecurity defence raise separate gender issues. Threats need to be monitored through the continuous evaluation and analysis of networks, infrastructure and devices for potential intrusions or deliberate disruption.68 Following from this, at a basic level, what is considered to be a threat is gendered. Cybersecurity is typically concerned with military and corporate security (and thus threats relating to espionage and economic theft). A gendered understanding of cybersecurity threat, however, recognizes that those “traditional” threats, such as denial of service attacks on State services, have gendered outcomes.69 It also recognizes that intimate partner violence, doxing, cyberstalking and the non-consensual dissemination of intimate images (i.e. “revenge porn”) are also threats that can arise from the intrusion into or disruption of personal devices and networks.70 In terms of technical processes, insofar as threat monitoring relies on machine learning it is vulnerable to importing the gendered issues that typify the machine learning field, including gendered assumptions built into algorithms and biased data.71 Even this largely automated process rests on human judgments about organizational priorities, allocation of resources and capacity building – all of which open the potential for the creation or intensification of inequalities. For instance, an automated email filter that identifies potentially harmful emails should flag romantic scams as well as phishing emails and financial scams.72 The processes of preparing for and responding to threats are also gendered. Threat simulations, for instance, such as the common practice of fake phishing emails, often involve gender stereotyping (e.g. a woman in an assistant role, a man as CEO).73 There is a lack of gender-disaggregated data on phishing victims, which makes the gender consequences of phishing difficult to assess. But such an assessment is essential since, if many cybersecurity breaches result from human error, policy makers need to have a variety of approaches to the “human” making the errors. Bug bounty programmes, which are a spectrum of ways for “friendly” hackers to identify an organization’s vulnerabilities and defence responses through digital, social or physical vectors, raise associated issues. As these contests are designed to be anonymous, only pseudonymic data (i.e. pertaining to hackers’ aliases) is available on prolific bounty hunters and their payments. The consequences of this anonymity are unclear: it may make it easier for women and LGBTQ+ people to participate or it may exacerbate the gendered inequalities of cybersecurity and hacking culture more generally (see the case study below). Furthermore, the characterization of threats themselves, from the hooded hacker popular in media portrayals to code names and pictures used in cybersecurity technical reports, also often include gendered qualities and harmful stereotypes.74 Finally, attempts to protect organizations (and, to some extent, individuals) from the costs and harms arising from cybersecurity attacks, predominantly through cybersecurity insurance policies, should also be assessed for gender implications.75 As with all insurance, it is important that threat assessments include gender analysis; that the criteria for being insurable can be met by women, men and non-binary people; and that pricing for organizations and individuals does not rely on gender stereotypes or produce discriminatory gender outcomes.76 4.1 Case study: talent and expertise Talent and expertise is a widely recognized issue in the cybersecurity industry. Although the question of talent and expertise obviously pertains to all aspects of cybersecurity, we focus here on the practice of “defence” (i.e. implementing security) since it is typically understood as cybersecurity’s central activity. Issues around talent and expertise are often expressed as a “gap” in cybersecurity expertise, meaning that the number of positions available is greater than the number of people qualified to fill them.77 As demonstrated by research by organizations such as the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise, this talent gap is global, although pressures are expressed differently in different local contexts.78 Many States have taken steps to incentivize people to join the cybersecurity industry and improve their level of skill once there. This is frequently complicated by competitive pressure between governments and the private sector, as government positions struggle to compete with private sector salaries.79 These issues with talent and expertise are exacerbated by gendered inequality, harms and visibility. Due to space constraints, this section discusses these dynamics quite generally. Understanding how and why gendered gaps, inequalities and harms operate in context, however, requires intersectional gender analysis that looks at how gender, race, sexuality, class, and rural or urban location, among other factors, interact to support the participation of some groups in cyber fields while marginalizing others. A recent survey by the International Information System Security Certification Consortium indicated that 24 per cent of cybersecurity professionals worldwide are women.80 The 2017 Global Information Security Workforce Study found that this lack of representation was accompanied by various forms of inequality, with 87 per cent of women reporting unconscious discrimination and 19 per cent overt discrimination.81 This is a widely recognized problem, with many websites and social media accounts creating “women in cybersecurity” networks and events specifically for women.82 Similar events, networks and capacity-building initiatives also exist to support the equality, equity and participation of queer people in cybersecurity.83 Following criticism of a lack of representation and visibility in cybersecurity conferences,84 events such as the RSA Conference – a prestigious series of international information technology (IT) events – have sought to ensure gender parity in keynote speakers and to increase the participation of women overall.85 We split the gender issues for cybersecurity talent and expertise into three separate areas: the broader gender dynamics in science, technology, mathematics and engineering (STEM) professions; gender in computer science and coding; and gender in the cybersecurity industry specifically. We recognize that not all cybersecurity positions are STEM or “technical” positions; the prominence of these positions within cybersecurity reflects a gendered valuation of jobs understood as “masculine” above others. These positions are also, however, where gender disparities are most evident, and so we focus on these positions in this section. 4.1.1 Gender dynamics in STEM Gender issues within STEM professions – again understood as a “gender gap” between men and women – are well-researched and typically understood in terms of pipeline and retention.86 It should be noted that much of this research and policy follows a binary, often heteronormative understanding of gender; much more needs to be done to understand the experiences and support the equitable participation of non-binary and queer people within STEM and cybersecurity. The causes of the “gender gap” are complex and context specific. Generally, barriers to gender equality in STEM include (a) disparities in access to infrastructure and education; (b) individual- and family-level financial constraints and priorities; and (c) the persistence of sociocultural and institutional gender norms that suggest STEM professions are predominantly for men.87 In some contexts, such as Malaysia and the Middle East, women’s participation in STEM education is considerable but is not translated into STEM careers.88 In the United States of America and the United Kingdom, in contrast, girls remain less likely to be encouraged to pursue study of STEM subjects and less likely to regard themselves as holding STEM talent or expertise.89 Many of the policies aimed at increasing the participation of women in STEM can also be applied to the cybersecurity industry. These include greater incorporation of STEM skills into girls’ education;90 the promotion of STEM university programmes to girls and women;91 actively recruiting women through campus visits and social media campaigns;92 offering mentoring and continuing education to women and girls already employed within organizations; and altering human resources policies to prioritize hiring and retaining women (e.g. by requiring that at least one woman be interviewed for all open positions; by improving parental leave policies, etc.).93 Disparities are often found in senior positions in STEM and technology start-ups and, given that cybersecurity is a young and fast-evolving field, the gendered dynamics of entrepreneurship are highly relevant.94 4.1.2 Gender in computer science and coding Fields that centrally involve computers and “coding” (an unsatisfactorily generic term for a wide range of distinct skills) have well-documented gendered problems. Although, again, it differs across contexts, there is a global digital literacy gap95 between women and girls and men and boys.96 Worldwide, “327 million fewer women than men have a smartphone and can access the mobile Internet”, while women are four times less likely than men to be IT professionals.97 It is worth remembering that early computing was relatively open to women and came to be seen as a masculine profession only as it rose in social prestige through its increasing importance to the economy.98 Research has demonstrated that some online communities arranged around coding – including gaming and hacking – demonstrate a masculinist culture that emphasizes aggressive language and individuated approaches to problem-solving and technical mastery, while devaluing characteristics perceived to be associated with femininity, such as empathy and the expression of emotion.99 These cultures can be explicitly misogynistic and homophobic, referring to women primarily as sex objects and to LGBTQ+ people in hateful and exclusionary terms.100 As these communities are often seen as a talent pool for cybersecurity expertise, there is a risk that cybersecurity recruitment will import anti-feminist and exclusionary norms (i.e. attitudes and practices that oppose and devalue gender equality and racial, ethnic and sexual inclusivity) into the workplace.101 This makes work environments uncomfortable (or hostile) to those who do not conform.102 The 2017 Global Information Security Workforce Survey found that 51 per cent of women in the field had experienced discrimination, compared to 15 per cent of men.103 This primarily affects women and marginalized groups, but may also affect men who do not identify with such norms.104 Workplaces that do not have an explicitly anti-feminist culture may still be organized and operated on the assumption that most workers are men and that values and practices associated with masculinity are neutral or “normal”.105 Although often without discriminatory or conscious intent, this perpetuates the gendered structure of cybersecurity expertise and thus influences hiring, opportunities for promotion and the ability to determine policy. Where women do enter these fields, their contribution is often framed with reference to essentialist characteristics such as emotional and social skills. Although these are positive attributes, framing women’s contributions predominantly in terms of, for example, empathy or caring solidifies gender stereotypes without necessarily increasing the value attributed to emotional, social and caring aspects of cyber expertise.106 A greater presence of women (and other members of marginalized groups) working in cybersecurity is believed to have two benefits. First, it can contribute to creative problem-solving and better policy governance and implementation through the introduction of diverse perspectives.108 Second, it is believed that these perspectives will lead to a gender perspective in cybersecurity overall.109 Research indicates that this can occur but that, without support, women and members of other minoritized groups may instead feel pressure to adapt to the workplace norm.110 Tokenized incorporation of women and members of minoritized groups, without recognizing their contributions or in ways that reinforce stereotypes, do not contribute to meaningful participation or greater equality.111 4.1.3 Gender in the cybersecurity industry Some gendered issues relate specifically to the cybersecurity industry. As the field of cybersecurity is growing in importance, influence and prestige, women’s participation in cybersecurity is a matter of equality and equity in terms of opportunities for success, recognition and earning potential. Some working practices in cybersecurity, such as the shift requirements of Security Operation Centres, require further analysis to assess their gendered implications. Similarly, many cybersecurity certification programmes require intense sprints with long hours, which is an impractical work model for people (more likely to be women) with childcare responsibilities.112 More subtly, the cultivation of work environments, institutional cultures and management styles that are skeptical of traditional or conventional authority, although often praised as a characteristic of an innovative workforce, agile organization and dynamic socio-technological sector, can facilitate a narrow understanding of masculinity (and discrimination) akin to the wider fields above.113 Addressing the “gender gap” in cybersecurity expertise therefore requires policies that promote the inclusion and participation of women and gender training to reduce harassment and discrimination and to support organizational and cultural shifts to value a variety of activities and capacities, including those usually more associated with femininity.114

### IR

#### Gender Hierarchy represents the ordering principle of an anarchical system of IR – states operate according to constructed gendered identities where association with masculinity signals power, domination, honor, and chivalry in contrast to “weak” and “craven” femininities – this binary structure justifies the infinite exploitation and subordination of the feminized.

Sjoberg 17

Sjoberg, British Academy Global Professor of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway University of London. “The invisible structures of anarchy: Gender, orders, and global politics,” Journal of International Political Theory. 2017.

The argument that gender is a constitutive element of the international system is an argument that assumptions about gender are embedded in the ordering principles of the international system. This is consonant with feminist observations of global politics, which have characterized the global political arena as a “patriarchal structure of privilege and control” (Enloe, 1993: 70). Others see the global political arena a place where “the structure of political communities has assumed gendered forms” (Steans, 2003: 43), and ordered by “gender relations [which] structure social power” (Pettman, 1996: 43). These observations are rooted in feminist work which shows gender operating in how political leaders are chosen (Tickner, 1992), how state governments work (Peterson, 1992), how militaries function (Enloe, 1989), and how economic benefit is distributed (Pettman, 1996). States have been shown their relative military prowess, judged and asserted their relative power, and demonstrated and adjusted their relative economic status through gendered competition using gendered language (e.g. Cohn, 1987). The gender hierarchy in the world “out there” can be read as replicated in the “commonsense ground” or traditional theorizing in IR, which feminist theorists (e.g. Tickner, 1988) have characterized as partial at best and unrepresentative at worst because it often analyzes the perspectives and lives of only a small, elite, male portion of the global population. Paralleling Waltz’s understanding that anarchy can be seen manifested in the function of units (states) in the international arena, in the distribution of relative capacities among those units, and in the execution of political processes, Sjoberg (2012) argued that gender is a constitutive factor in what states do, important in the distribution of states’ relative capacities, and formative of political processes among states. In substantiating the claim that gender is a constitutive factor in what states do, Sjoberg (2012) builds on previous feminist empirical work around the world3 to suggest that states define their identities in gendered ways, where gender and national identity are inextricably linked, as “all nationalisms are gendered” (McClintock, 1993) and women are often the essence and symbols of the reproduction of state and/or national identity (e.g. Yuval-Davis, 1997). Hegemonic masculinities are among the influences that constitute nationalisms as gendered, where there is an ideal-typical notion of masculinity that both states and the men in them are expected to live up to, creating a relationship between militarism, masculinity, and full citizenship (Connell, 1995; Young, 2003). For the influence of gender on distribution of capacity in the international arena, Sjoberg (2012) builds on the feminist argument that “the structural and ideological system that perpetuates the privileging of masculinist” in IR is “a principle cause for so many of the world’s processes [such as] empire-building, globalization, modernization” (Enloe, 2004: 4, 6). Differences between dominant gender presentations and subordinated gender presentations play a role in hierarchies in the international arena, where it can be commonplace “to infantilize, ignore, trivialize, or even actively cast scorn on what is thought to be feminized” (Enloe, 2004: 5). What is thought to be feminized is not just women but also states and other political actors. Feminist research has shown that association with gender-based characteristics has been used as a marker of relative power in many policy discourses in diverse places around the world (e.g. Agathangelou, 2002; Banerjee, 2012; Eichler, 2012; Weber, 1999; Zalewski, 1994). In support of the argument that gender matters in shaping political processes, Sjoberg (2012) discusses feminist work on a number of different processes in global politics, including diplomacy (Enloe, 2000), interstate jurisprudence (Charlesworth et al., 1991), international institutions (Moser and Moser, 2005), interstate competition (Peterson and Runyan, 2010), and militarization (Alexander, 2010). Feminist work on militarization, for example, has shown that gender norms are used to shape the will to fight, to sharpen training, to build group solidarity, and to condition responses to battlefield injury (e.g. Alexander, 2010; Eichler, 2012; Enloe, 1993, 2000; Goldstein, 2001; Sjoberg and Peet, 2011). While this section is not the place to definitively explore the nature, direction, and contour of the influence of gender on how the international system works, this short outline of existing evidence suggests that gender itself is an ordering principle in global politics, both influencing the identity of actors and organizing them along hierarchies within anarchy. Feminist research provides significant evidence that gender hierarchies are prevalent in global politics, and matter in not only the results but also the constitution of interstate interactions. It provides a mandate to consider gender hierarchy as an important part of the ways that we think about hierarchy in global politics. One can see these gender hierarchies manifest in a number of the everyday (violent) features of global politics— places where women are being held unequal to men at the local, state, and global levels. From rape culture to human trafficking, unpaid care labor to gender-based violence, nowhere in the world are women socially, economically, or politically held equal to men. That is hierarchy based on gender—gender hierarchy in global politics.

### “Manpower”

#### Use of the term “manpower” serves to gender labor in military institutions and devalue women’s roles

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The use of ‘manpower’ to describe human resource management remains in common parlance by NATO and in the military setting more broadly. Yet it belies the contribution of serving women. Usually, it refers to the availability of suitable recruits to fill military capacity, and often the integration of women within the military service is understood as a means to shore up recruitment shortfalls. However, early Cold War manifestations within the alliance saw it also applied to the distribution of (men and women’s) labour across NATO member states, which was deemed relevant to European security and stability, when war was deemed highly possible (NATO, 1953). There was a particular focus on the availability of skilled labour or ‘manpower’ to support the defence industry, however, population surpluses and migration with Europe were also viewed as a potential source of unrest (NATO, 1953). For example, the Working Group on Labour Mobility considered the employment (and marital status) of civilian women across different industries (NATO, 1957), supporting the notion that women have always been of central importance to the functioning of the military, in roles from camp follower, to soldier (Enloe, 1989). It was therefore through discussion of recruitment shortfalls that NATO first considered the integration of women into NATO Forces in the 1950s (NATO, 1954). These preexisting institutional priorities are important to understand as a starting point when considering the push by Senior NATO Military Women to establish a Committee on Women in NATO Forces (as discussed in Chapter 3). Their efforts were not the first time NATO considered the integration of women, even if they did bring about a focal point and the establishment of formal gender machinery within the alliance. The Expert Working Group on Labour Mobility was tasked with addressing both surpluses and shortages of ‘manpower’, reviewing member countries’ immigration policies with the aim of facilitating labour mobility. The Working Group was specifically tasked with examining: (1) ways to intensify migration; (2) projects designed to mitigate the impact of manpower shortages on defence activities; and (3) preventive plans on labour market disturbance in the case of war. The Working Group was renamed in 1956 and became the Manpower Planning Committee (NATO, 2017). They considered the impact of Italy’s surplus and the UK’s shortfall of skilled workers in the defence industry (NATO, 1953). A particularly interesting aspect of the Working Group/Committee was that it requested reports from member states on their labour mobility status be submitted to them. The reports fed into the work of the group and provided a valuable overview of the status of labour mobility within the alliance. Questionnaires were issued to member states requesting information on ‘manpower’ mobilisation, the availability and training of scientific and technical ‘manpower’, arrangements for ‘manpower’ mobilisation in a crisis, the role of employment services and the status of ‘manpower’ employed by the host country of NATO HQ (NATO, 2017).3 So, while early consideration of ‘manpower’ issues was therefore solely instrumental, it remained deeply gendered, focusing implicitly on men’s recruitment. In a 1954 annual review on national military service, only a few countries enlisted women within the military (and this was primarily to release men for employment in more active roles due to manpower shortages) (NATO, 1954). Throughout NATO’s earliest years, most member states offered limited or no employment opportunities for women in the armed forces. By the 1960s and 1970s, many countries experienced a rise in public pressure for greater equality between women and men in society. Responding to these pressures, the armed forces, too, began increasing the numbers of women within the ranks, and eventually opened up more employment opportunities that were once exclusively reserved for men (Obradovic, 2014). NATO Officials have continued to shape and reshape their respective ‘personnel policies with one eye on the personnel needs dictated by military doctrine and the other eye on the preservation of the ideological bond between masculinity and military service’ (Enloe, 1993: 85). This does not mean, however, that the approaches of NATO member states have been consistent. Rather, member states have learned the value of women in the military through interaction with each other. This leads Enloe (1981) to argue that NATO has functioned as a ‘learning machine’ or ‘teaching machine’, sharing lessons on the integration of women into the armed forces. For example, the US was successful in increasing the number of women on active duty in its armed forces during the 1990s. These women were held up by these who would once have rejected such a move as an example of the US military’s ‘social enlightenment’ (Enloe 1993: 86). The US, a leading NATO ally, began to measure other NATO member states’ sophistication on ‘their ability to incorporate at least token numbers of women without jeopardising the military’s still crucial identification with masculinized patriotism’ (Enloe, 1993: 86). The official recognition of the Committee on Women in NATO Forces (CWINF) in 1976 led to a shift in focus for institutional consideration of ‘manpower’ issues. CWINF provided the framework for NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ in respect of women’s integration. For example, the Netherlands took a proactive approach to the integration of women into the military through opening all ranks to women from the beginning of the integration process in the 1970s and putting in place an anti-discrimination policy (Carreiras, 2006: 151). This resulted in the Dutch Army being used as a test case by NATO, taking on a ‘ “pioneer” in eliminating restrictions on women in combat and operational functions’ (Carreiras, 2006: 155–6; Bolscher and Megens, 1991: 181). For a twenty-first-century NATO, globally engaged in a broad range of theatres and activities, the preoccupation with military recruitment persists. The move away from conscription towards all volunteer forces in an increasing number NATO member states has further elevated the issue of military recruitment (Obradovic, 2014). So, while the immediate motivation for addressing recruitment shortfalls may have changed, the concern remains a pressing one. As we discuss below in relation to crisis management (and in Chapter 5 on the value of a gender perspective), women’s integration into NATO armed forces is now based on a premise that they are an operational asset and provide ‘added value’. The reconciliation of a concern with ‘manpower’ and women’s status within NATO Forces continues to be a key challenge for NATO today, albeit in a different guise. Women’s integration in NATO Forces has never been motivated by a concern that NATO military forces reflect the composition of the population they are intended to protect. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given what we uncovered in Chapter 3, early reflections on the use of this term ‘manpower’ were unsurprisingly critical. For example, remarks by the first Chair of the Committee on Women in NATO Forces, Colonel Else Martensen-Larsen, in 1975, is indicative of the tension between valuing women as an asset and advancing the status of women within the military towards equality: Whoever first coined the word ‘manpower’ did a grave disservice to the women who today, in so many countries, are dedicating themselves to vital defence tasks. I have often thought that it would be worthwhile for the highest NATO authorities to take an active interest in women’s often difficult role as members of a marked minority placed in a predominantly male world. (For, if women have successfully invaded and conquered fields which were long exclusively the province of men, the armed services still remain in many countries a well-protected enclave.)

### Military

#### Militaries act as organized reproduction of hegemonic masculinity and appropriate feminist analysis to violent ends

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Militarised masculinities (plural) have been the source of much scholarly debate and discussion in the field of Critical Military Studies (see for example: Henry, 2017b; Higate, 2018; Henry, 2018). Military institutions are spaces which privilege militarised masculinities over femininities. This matters because they function as sites for the production of culture and gender. For example, the social capital ascribed to forms of martiality (associated with masculinity) within most societies contributes to the ‘glorification of men’s participation in violence and war’ (Enloe, 1994; Henry, 2017b: 187). As a result, it is necessary to examine the socialisation process which takes place in militarised settings (Henry, 2017b: 187). It is also important to note that this process is far from homogenous, indeed, it is complex and often contradictory. The shape militarised masculinities takes differs among military institutions tasked with defence of the air, sea and land. Further permutations are found at national, regional and international level military institutions. One consistency is that it has always been a feature of sustaining militaries and militarism more broadly. Militaries have, traditionally, constructed a very narrowly defined, hegemonic ideal of militarised masculinity. In this sense the (re)production and promotion of hegemonic masculinity in a military context is devised in relation to the primary aim of the organisation, of war fighting and the deployment of violence. As Connell identifies: ‘studies of state military forces show an organisational effort to produce and make hegemonic a narrowly defined masculinity which will make its bearers efficient in producing the organisation’s effects of violence’ (Connell, 2005: 259). The military is therefore a space where qualities associated with war fighting, security and defence are ‘constantly associated with men’ (Hooper, 2001: 230) and men’s bodies, where soldiering is intimately fused with masculinity. As an institution of hegemonic masculinity the military also promotes the association of men, masculinity and soldiering via physicality and sexuality, largely in opposition/relation to the feminine other (Morgan, 1994; Bourke, 1996; Hooper, 2001; Via, 2010). The promotion – and often aggressive reinforcement – of heterosexuality has been seen as an essential tool for promoting social cohesion and comradery between men within the military (Kronsell, 2012: 44). Traditionally, this fusion of men, masculinity and soldiering within militaries has been facilitated by a literal exclusion of the feminine and homosexual other. Where women have been included in military forces, their inclusion was initially premised on exclusion from particular roles and occupations, particularly those defined as ‘direct combat’ roles (see for example, Kornblum, 1984; Horrigan, 1992). And homosexual men and women have traditionally served without22 NATO as an institution disclosure of their sexual orientation. In this regard, Hinojosa identifies that hegemonic masculinity in the military manifests in both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ forms. External in the sense that: ‘masculine power is embedded in the structure of the institution’ (2010: 180). Examples of this can include the banning of women from particular combat roles and the military rank system, which ‘ensures that some men maintain dominance over other men and women’ (2010: 180–1) and represent the gendered division of labour that characterises Connell’s (2006) conceptualisation of institutional gender regimes. Internal hegemony in Hinojosa’s conceptualisation is ‘the hierarchical structuring of masculinities such that some constructs are dominant and privileged over other masculinities and femininities’ (2010: 181). For example, subordinate masculinities in a military context are often patterned on a civilian/military divide, the variation of occupational roles and across the various branches of the armed forces (Higate, 2003; Barrett, 2008; Duncanson, 2009). Hinojosa’s study of the construction of particular hegemonic masculine ideals in the American military found that non-military personnel, service members of different branches, ranks and occupational specialities were cast as less physically able, less self-disciplined, less willing to take risks by pre-active duty servicemen, thereby creating patterns of ‘discursive domination’ (2010: 179). In this sense, hegemonic masculinities within a military context are both (organisationally) structural and a configuration of everyday gendered social practice whereby individuals construct gender identities in relation and opposition to other women and men (Connell, 2005; Hinojosa, 2010: 181). In relation to the military, Duncanson (2013) argues that there has been a ‘softening’ of dominant forms of masculinity (see also, Niva, 1998; Whitworth, 2004); as the hegemonic ideal appropriates certain characteristics from both subordinate masculinities and femininity in order to ‘refashion’ the ideal and respond to shifting cultural expectations (Duncanson, 2013: 61–2). Like Demetriou (2001) and Messner (2007), the sceptical view is that this appropriation, whilst refashioning expectations and masculine ideals within the military, reinforces difference and inequality. For example, Duncanson suggests that ‘the new man of the military often depends on the construction of those in areas of conflict as primitive, inherently and excessively violent and barbaric, or as helpless victims’ (Duncanson, 2013: 61, 2009). The assertion here is that even ‘ostensibly progressive masculinities can have a deeply regressive effect’ and ‘often further disempowers those already lacking power, security and wealth’ (Duncanson, 2013: 61). Therefore, hegemonic masculinities, as an assemblage of appropriated traits that continue to be premised on reformulated patterns of exclusion and subordination inhibit rather than indicate a potential for transformative change. In a military context, hegemonic masculinity has been used to explain why it is that the creation of the ‘New Man’ (for example, the heroic peacekeeper, the humanitarian soldier scholar) has not resulted in gender equality or for that matter, genuine peace and security on many military interventions. Yet, perhaps the utility of the concept leads to too hasty conclusions in feminist scholarship; to the automatic assumption that change in masculinities is little more than the ‘flexibility of the machinery of rule’ (Duncanson, 2013: 71). Duncanson offers an important note of caution on the negative connotations of appropriation, change and transformation of hegemonic masculinity, stating that it is too deterministic. She argues that ‘there is nothing in the concept itself which necessitates an interpretation that it always inevitably shifts in order that men retain power; that it can never be transformed, dismantled’ (Duncanson, 2013: 63). Connell and Messerschmidt argue that research on hegemonic masculinity ‘needs to give much closer attention to the practices of women and to the historical interplay of femininities and masculinities’ (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 848). To do so, it is necessary to centralise interaction of women and men, of masculinities and femininities in and through specific institutional practices. In doing so, we provide examples of understanding the construction of particular hegemonic and subordinate masculinities and femininities within NATO. It is therefore necessary to avoid essentialism, and assumed (negative) types, while acknowledging the fluidity and hybridity between masculinities and femininities. Hegemonic masculinity therefore remains a valuable theoretical and analytical tool, particularly when applied to a militarised institutional setting such as NATO.

### NATO

#### NATO is an international system of hegemonic masculinity which reinforces gendered hierarchies through a masculine protection logic

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In order to understand how institutions can come to be ‘institution of hegemonic masculinity’, we first need to consider how they are gendered. Connell (2005: 73) argues that institutions ‘are substantively, not just metaphorically, gendered’. Gender is understood as prescriptive. It is based upon socially constructed perceptions of the activities and actions appropriate for each gender. It is also relational, which means that masculinities and femininities do not exist independently (Kronsell, 2016: 106). The gendering of institutions manifests in fluid, intersecting and contradictory ways, but largely in a manner that privileges those individuals or groups in positions of power within organisations – these are usually (though not exclusively) men. Consequently, patterns of inequality, disadvantage and subordination result from this gendered privileging. This means that ‘advantage and disadvantage, exploitation and control, action and emotion, meaning and identity are patterned through and in terms of a distinction between male and female, masculine and feminine’ (Acker, 1990: 146). Institutions are gendered in the way they include, or exclude, gender from policy processes and this contributes to the way in which power is structured and normalised (Mackay, Kenny and Chappell, 2010: 582). Gender and gendered identities are intertwined in the day-to-day activities of the institution, rather than pre-existing in society or fixed to individuals (Mackay, Kenny and Chappell, 2010: 580). Gender can therefore be viewed as an organising principle (Walby, 2009: 260). These are built upon ‘organisation history and associated with a different configuration of personal experiences and consciousness’ (Connell, 2002: 844). Taking institutions seriously as gendered spaces equips us with an understanding of how actors, institutional culture and structures shape policies (Gains and Lowndes, 2014: 525). Institutions, conceptualised as both formal and informal rules and norms, do not operate in a bubble, rather they reflect wider social hierarchies and reproduce gender norms through including or silencing gender from the policy-making process (Guerrina, Chappell and Wright, 2018: 1041). NATO’s role as a military actor means it falls into the category of an ‘extreme case of the gendered organisation’ (Carreiras, 2006: 40). Britton (2000) outlines three criteria for gendered institutions which are applicable to NATO. These are: (1) structures that make a distinction between masculinity and femininity; (2) the preponderance of male bodies; and (3) built upon hegemonic masculinities (Britton, 2000). The formalisation of these norms contributes to the construction of gender regimes, reifying gendered power structures. A gender regime is a ‘set of interconnected gender relations and gendered institutions that constitute a system’ (Walby, 2009: 104, 2011: 301). Gender regimes refer to the configuration of gender relations in a particular setting, they exist in all institutional structures and at the same time are unique to each institutional context (Walby, 1997: 6). They are built upon ‘organisation history and associated with a different configuration of personal experiences and consciousness’ (Connell, 2002: 844). Gender regimes therefore operate in myriad ways and at different intersecting levels, from cultural to institutional and organisational. Connell and Messerschmidt (2005: 6) identify the gender regime of an institution as ‘the patterning of gender relations in that institution and especially the continuing pattern which provides the structural context of particular relationships and individual practices’. So, if we accept that institutions are gendered, what counts as an institution of hegemonic masculinity? In the broadest sense such institutions can be defined as ones ‘largely governed by men’ that have produced and recreated norms and practices associated with masculinity and heterosexuality (Kronsell, 2005: 281). This helps explain why women in minority positions among men in organisation structures were likely to become ‘tokens’, perceived of as representative of all women (Kanter, 1977: 382). However, in much the same way that hegemonic masculinity is not ‘numerically’ dominant, the conceptualisation of institutions of hegemonic masculinity incorporates more than the mere physical presence (or dominance) of men’s bodies. Institutions of hegemonic masculinity serve a particular (common) purpose: they are institutions or organisations where male power and dominance is reified and reinforced through organisational practices and discourses (see for example, Cohn, 1987). They are spaces within which particular masculine behaviours and practices are normalised, where particular understandings of masculinities (and femininities) are (re)produced and formalised. As Hooper notes: ‘Masculinity appears to have no stable ingredients and therefore its power depends entirely on certain qualities constantly being associated with men … masculine spaces are precisely the places where such associations are cemented and naturalised’ (Hooper, 2001: 230). In this sense, institutions of hegemonic masculinity provide such a space; where cultural norms that privilege men, and values associated with masculinity, intersect with institutional power structures and the physical presence of male bodies, to cement male dominance. The organisational space provides the link between cultural ideals and institutional power that Connell (2005: 77) argues is required for the establishment of hegemony. As Kronsell argues, ‘to be hegemonic, cultural norms must be supported by institutional power’ (Kronsell, 2005: 281). Though not exclusively ‘male spaces’, institutions of hegemonic masculinity are also traditionally patterned through a high level of segregation between the sexes and particular gendered divisions of labour. Institutions have traditionally constructed different spheres of activity for women and men to occupy – and this historically constructed division (and the norms it creates around male behaviour) helps to secure the continuity of institutions of hegemonic masculinity (Kronsell, 2005: 285). Institutions of hegemonic masculinity therefore provide the structural space for the (re)production of particular cultural understandings of gender, power and inequality. Institutions of hegemonic masculinity are organisations where male power and dominance is reified and reinforced through both formal and informal practices and discourses. They are spaces within which particular masculine behaviours, ways of ‘being’ and ‘doing’ are normalised; where particular understandings of masculinities (and femininities) are (re)produced and formalised. Yet within institutions of hegemonic masculinity, masculinity itself is usually silent, or ‘unseen’ due to its ubiquity (Kronsell, 2005). The process of normalisation, of making masculine practices and behaviours the ‘norm for appropriate conduct’, makes masculinity appear ‘natural’ and therefore difficult to critique (Kronsell, 2005: 282–4). Masculinity is ‘not named’ because it omnipresent, all-encompassing within these particular institutions. Indeed, as Acker argues, ‘as a relational phenomenon, gender is difficult to see when only the masculine is present’ (Kronsell, 1990: 142). Masculinity is not a stable construct and appears to have no ‘stable ingredients’ (Hooper, 2001: 230). Institutions of hegemonic masculinity provide a key site for this contestation; where cultural norms which privilege men, and values associated with masculinity, intersect with institutional power structures and the physical presence of male bodies, to cement male dominance. The organisational space provides the link between cultural ideals and institutional power that is required for the establishment of hegemony (Connell, 2005: 77). It is important to stress here that existence of hegemonic masculinity in the military context does not preclude transformation of military institutions through challenging hegemonic masculinities. Such a transformation would create an institution which ‘equally values “masculine” and “feminine” traits, so much so that they cease to be masculine and feminine’ (Duncanson and Woodward, 2015: 12). Duncanson and Woodward argue that a ‘regendered military’ is one where: soldiering is not a masculine identity, but becomes much more fluid, and is constructed through relations of equality, empathy, care, respect, and recognition of similarities and shared experiences. The displacement of gendered dichotomies is immediately recognizable in this conceptualization. Not only are the meanings of masculinity and femininity questioned, but so is the valuing of masculinity over femininity and therefore the hierarchical thinking and material domination that has characterized gender relations. There therefore remain possibilities to displace hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 2005; Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005). Even if these possibilities have been lost in application empirical case studies. As Duncanson (2015: 244) argues, to realise this, ‘hierarchical relations must be replaced with relations of equality, mutual respect, or empathy’. She critiques Connell’s (2002) suggestion that the transition phase should be one where a masculinity open to equality within women is hegemonised. Rather, the transitory stage has to be one where traditionally disparaged, feminized traits are newly valued and incorporated into ‘softer’ or hybrid masculinities. The forging of more equal relations is the ultimate, more challenging stage. The hybrid stage may make it more likely that relations of equality, mutual respect, empathy, and so on, are formed, however, so rather than dismiss the New Man syndrome in all its contexts, assuming it always camouflages the continuation of patriarchy, militarism, and neoliberalism, we can look to expose its contradictions and to push for those relations of equality. (Duncanson, 2015: 244) Implications for the masculinist protection logic Gender is an issue for the military (and military institutions) which ‘is often obvious, apparent and visible’ at the same time that it is ‘obscured, normalised, lived with and ignored’ (Woodward and Winter, 2007: 3). Hurley’s (2018: 16) study of men ‘doing’ gender work at NATO draws out the contradictions underpinning the way in which ‘women’s rights’ and equality are expressed within the institution. This is a recurring theme which manifests itself in NATO’s development and understanding of a gender perspective as we go onto discuss in Chapter 5. This finds gender issues articulated within a masculinist protection logic. Entwined with understanding NATO as an institution of hegemonic masculinity is therefore the logic of masculinist protection (Young, 2003). Understanding masculinist protection logic requires moving away from using gender in an explanatory manner or as a variable. For example, through attempts to connect the violence of states and institutions to particular behavioural propensities of women and men. Rather, it is necessary to understand gender as an element of interpretation. As Young (2003: 2) argues: viewing issues of war and security through a gendered lens … means seeing how a certain logic of gendered meanings and images helps organise the way people interpret events and circumstances, along with the positions and possibilities for action within them. The logic of masculinist protection extends the position of the male head of household as a protector of the family, to encompass male leaders more generally as protectors of a given population (Stiehm, 1982; Young, 2003). The logic of masculinist protection is premised on an understanding of variation and plurality in masculinities; specifically, the relationship between ‘dominative masculinity’ and that of the ‘protector masculinity’ (Young, 2003: 4). Masculinist protection recalls a ‘rather more benign image of masculinity’: ‘the role of this courageous, responsible and virtuous man is that of protector’ (Young, 2003: 4). This is constructed in opposition to an ‘other’ masculinity embodied by ‘bad’ men who exploit, harm and abuse the vulnerable for the pleasures of domination (Young, 2003: 4). The flip side to this coin is that ‘feminine subordination, in this logic, does not constitute submission to a violent and overbearing bully’ (Young, 2003: 5). Feminist subordination is not submission to a ‘dominative masculinity’ or the ‘bad men’. Subordination is this sense forms part of an exchange between the protector and the protected: ‘In return for male protection, the woman concedes critical distance from decision-making autonomy’ (Young, 2003: 4). As a consequence of this exchange the protected woman defers to the protectors judgement, looks up to him with gratitude for his manliness and admiration for his willingness to face the dangers of the world (Young, 2003: 5); this gratitude in turn reinforces his perception of his own masculinity and worth. And yet, power inequalities, domination and subordination persist within this logic: ‘the role of the masculine protector puts those protected, paradigmatically women and children, in a subordinate position of dependence and obedience’ (Young, 2003: 2). Drawing upon Foucault’s notion of pastoral power, Young suggests that masculinist protection is a power marked out by virtue and love (Young, 2003: 6), appearing ‘gentle and benevolent both to its wielders and to those under its sway’ (Young, 2003: 6). Military masculinity is as much about performance as it is about action (Partis-Jennings, 2017: 3). This understanding has parallels with Kronsell’s understanding of the presence and persistence of gendered norms in institutions. Here, gendered norms have been built into the ‘walls’ of institutions, whose structure appears so natural and ‘supportive’ that it becomes difficult to see them also as exclusionary barriers (Kronsell, 2005: 291). Couching gender mainstreaming initiatives and framing the gender perspective in a ‘supportive’ logic of masculine protection reinforces particular inequalities and barriers whilst projecting an image of care and consideration for women working both inside and outside of NATO. The logic of masculinist protection provides one particular way in which the hegemonic masculine norms of the organisation imprint on, condition and control understandings of the gender perspective. In this sense a logic of masculinist protection can be seen to be embedded within the hegemonic norms of NATO. At the more abstract level, NATO can be seen as a collectivisation of the security state, protecting its citizens from an ‘other’ and external threat, beyond the imagined borders of the alliance. The citizen, in this reading, as ‘protected’, defers decision-making autonomy to the nation state as protector and by extension the NATO alliance. In this sense NATO itself can be viewed as a masculinist protector, a role that reinforces the hegemonic militaristic ideals and norms that were identified above. This gendered logic helps NATO to define and locate itself and frame the gender perspective in a broader sense (Hurley, 2018). NATO as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity We argue that NATO is an international military institution constituting a particular gender regime. This leads NATO to function as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity. NATO is characterised by a particular gendered division of labour (both in regard to particular jobs that women and men ‘traditionally’ occupy, and to those that women are still excluded either formally or informally from) (Connell, 2002, 2006: 7). NATO is also characterised by gendered relations of power expressed through gendered institutional practices, symbolism and discourses. Although a complex institution with a dual political-military structure, NATO’s purpose is as a military alliance committed to collective defence, cooperative security and crisis management (NATO, 2010). NATO armed forces composed of national militaries are therefore a focal point of alliance activity. Yet, the national armed forces of NATO member states are still overwhelmingly male-dominated (Schjølset, 2013). This offers one way in which we can argue that NATO is premised upon hegemonic masculinity (Kronsell, 2012). At this point, it is worth offering a note of caution when extrapolating from the ‘national’ to the ‘international’. As Connell and Messerschmidt note when discussing a ‘global gender order’: ‘it is tempting to assume a simple hierarchy of power and authority, running from global to regional to local’ (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 850) – or indeed from the national to the international. Power, authority and gender are constructed and contested at multiple, multifaceted levels. NATO is an institution made up of the military forces of multiple and varied national armed forces with particular cultural practices and variation and, in this sense, there is a danger of oversimplifying the concept of ‘the military’. However, as Goldstein (2001) has identified, militaries are ‘institutions that have largely been governed by men and have produced and recreated norms and practices associated with particular forms and ideals of masculinity that are surprisingly consistent across cultures and time’ (in Kronsell, 2012: 44). It can be legitimately argued that one of the reasons why NATO works effectively as a collective military alliance is the similarity in the military norms and practices across its 29 member states. Similarly, NATO’s supranational institutional structures have been developing and integrating for 70 years and have proved adept at accommodating various phases of expansion and the incorporation of new member states’ militaries. Invoking Enloe (2000: 131) to ask ‘where are the women?’ provides a valuable starting point for the study of international institutions and understanding if, and how, they operate as institutions of hegemonic masculinity. This question makes men visible in a way they were not before (Enloe and Zalewski, 1999: 138). It draws attention not just to the reliance of institutions on women, but on the relationship between women and men (Enloe, 2014: 131). The location of women and men within an organisational structure is indicative of the value ascribed to them. To understand the ways in which military institutions are gendered it is necessary to investigate not only the meanings of masculinity and femininity, but also to ask ‘how these meanings determine where women are and what they think about being there’ (Enloe, 2014: 8). Military institutions analyse their own gender and racialised cultures, often to support operational effectiveness (Henry, 2017b: 187). Such analysis is something NATO engages in, albeit selectively. As we discuss below, NATO has been elusive in publishing up-to-date figures on gender balance and diversity in NATO HQ in recent years. This stands in contrast to the push for transparency from the NCGP on gender and diversity among NATO armed forces. As we discuss in Chapter 2, the NCGP now publishes an annual report detailing the status of women and engagement with Women, Peace and Security across NATO member and partner states (NATO, 2017). There is therefore a significant discrepancy between the transparency expected of NATO member and partner states, compared to that practiced by NATO as an institution itself. Despite this opaqueness on sharing data on those employed at NATO HQ, efforts to address gender and diversity have emerged since the early 2000s. However, as Ahmed (2007) draws attention to, the language of diversity is problematic. For postcolonial scholars, it ‘reifies difference as something that exists “in” the bodies or culture of others, such that difference becomes a national property’ (Ahmed, 2007: 235). Management studies scholars have highlighted the commodification of ‘diversity’ and how it is bound up with neoliberal logics. Difference is individualised, and the term distracts from continuing systemic inequalities (Ahmed, 2007: 236). When institutions embrace ‘diversity’, it can be read as a lack of commitment to change (Ahmed, 2007: 236). In the context of a military institution, diversity takes on new meanings. Diversity for NATO is understood narrowly as referring to national representation or gender, rather than race, disability or other characteristics (NATO, 2011). For example, NATO does not collect data on the ethnicity of its staff (NATO, 2011). The focus on national representation is to be expected given this has proved a highly sensitive issue for an expanding multilateral institution (Dijkstra, 2015: 13). Yet, the silence in respect to race and ethnicity in NATO’s understanding of, and data on, diversity serves to depoliticise ‘diversity’ through divorcing it from wider intersectional understandings (Henry, 2017b: 185). The absence of efforts to address diversity beyond national representation and gender could indicate that this is a controversial issue among NATO member states. NATO relies on consensus-based decision making, reflective of its position as an alliance, rather than an supranational body. No member can be forced to take a position it does not agree with (Pouliot, 2016). The conflation of gender with diversity by NATO (NATO, 2016) is also problematic, but is perhaps reflective of a broader articulation of diversity within military contexts (Woodward and Winter, 2006; Kronsell, 2012). This understanding of diversity at a national level may help explain why diversity has been introduced at NATO in this way. Diversity as ‘gender diversity’ means adding women to existing structures, rather than seeking to ‘regender’ them (Duncanson and Woodward, 2015). An approach which ‘adds women and stirs’ does not challenge gendered structures. As Hudson (2009: 291) argues such liberal approaches ‘add’ women to the ‘discourse with the assumption that they will behave like men when given men’s roles and that the fundamental frameworks … though they were created by men for men, are unproblematic and will remain intact’. This contradicts the lived experiences of many women (Hudson, 2009: 291). Moreover, the gender diversity argument is problematic because it rests on the assumption that women are something inherently different to men, and will perform the diversity expected of them (Kronsell, 2012: 67). The result, as Kronsell (2012: 67) argues, is that ‘the majority is simultaneously constructed as homogenous and as naturally associated with the organisation’. In 2002, the NATO Prague Summit established a task force to address imbalance in gender, age and national representation. The subsequent report opposed the imposition of quotas to support representation but did recommend the creation of an Action Plan (NATO, 2011). These efforts predate NATO’s engagement with WPS and, until 2014, the two were treated as separate in NATO policies. This is despite the fact that UNSCR 1325 calls for the ‘increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions’ (United Nations Security Council, 2000). The Action Plan produced by the task force covered the period from 2007 to 2010. It is not available publicly.1 However, the NATO website states that the Action Plan had three key objectives: (1) to maintain a NATO Diversity Framework and Policy; (2) to improve NATO’s work environment; and (3) to promote the image of NATO as an ‘employer of choice’ (NATO, 2011), the third objective drawing attention to the instrumental benefits of being seen to engage with gender and diversity issues for improving NATO’s image. This is also reflected in NATO’s more recent engagement with WPS which has identified NATO’s engagement with the agenda as a positive public relations story (Wright, 2019: 98). It is not evident whether NATO revised the 2007–10 Action Plan as the related webpage has not been updated since 2011 (NATO, 2011). The approval and implementation of a revised Diversity Action Plan is an outcome for the 2016 NATO/EAPC Policy, yet the existence of such a document has not been made public. This could also indicate that there has not been one in place since the previous one expired in 2010. A revision of the Action Plan should be accompanied by the public release of up-to-date gender and diversity data so it is possible to review what progress NATO has made. Despite some advances in women’s representation, it is of little surprise that NATO has been accused of being an anachronistic ‘men-only club’ (Harrison, 2014). Reports on gender and diversity within the International Staff have not been made publicly available since 2012 (NATO, 2012c). The latest data on gender balance at NATO Headquarters comes from the Global Study on the Implementation of the WPS agenda commissioned by UN Women. The report finds that at NATO Headquarters in Brussels just six of the 38 (16%) executive leadership positions are held by women (Coomaraswamy, 2015: 258). NATO’s international military command structures (NATO HQ, Allied Command Operations -ACO, Allied Command Transformation – ACT) are also largely staffed by men. The NCGP is currently the only NATO committee to be headed by a woman. At the highest levels of NATO’s governance structures, some small progress has been made towards women’s inclusion. For example, representation of women in NATO’s principle decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), has significantly improved in recent years with women now making up 28% of permanent representatives (NATO, 2018c), compared to 11% just four years ago (Fellin, 2014: 22). In contrast, there are no women representatives on the Military Committee (NATO, 2018a). This could be viewed as surprising given women now account for 24% of NATO defence ministers (NATO, 2018b). However, it also reflects the fact that NATO armed forces member states are still overwhelmingly male-dominated (Schjølset, 2013), at an average of just 10.9% women (NATO, 2017). So while gendered institutions can and are found in all areas of social and political life, military institutions represent an ‘extreme’ case (Carreiras, 2006: 40). ‘Gender war roles’ have been shown to be a hardy feature, serving ‘to organise men’s bodies into military organisations and women’s bodies out’ (Kronsell, 2016: 2). The under-representation of women is the responsibility of member states, and in respect to the Defence Ministers, reflective of a wider absence of women in politics from key government portfolios (Annesley and Gains, 2012). Yet, the improvements made in working towards gender balance among permanent representatives, and in NATO defence ministers, also suggest that there is an appetite among member states for women to be better represented. NATO remains an institution dominated by men in decision-making roles. It is also a long way from even considering the possibility of a woman as Secretary General (Harrison, 2014). Yet the few senior women within NATO are increasingly visible in outward-facing roles. For example, Rose Gottemoeller became the first woman to hold the position of Deputy Secretary General in 2016. The NATO Spokesperson, Oana Lungescu, is another example of a woman appointed to a position central to the alliance’s public presentation, and the Press Office remains an exception as a department to reach a gender balance (six women to six men) (NATO, 2018d). The Assistant Secretary for General Public Diplomacy also provides an exception among the Assistant Secretary General Portfolios as one held more than once by a woman. The appointment of an Assistant Secretary General is much coveted by allies because of the prestige and influence which comes with the post. This has historically been a legacy position and dominated by the larger allies. However, Secretary General Rasmussen was successful in opening all positions, including Assistant Secretary General, to open competition (Dijkstra, 2015: 12). This paved the way for the Croatian Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović2 to take office in 2011. It is also noteworthy that GrabarKitarović became the unofficial figurehead for NATO’s engagement with Women, Peace and Security prior to the creation of the NATO Special Representative on WPS in 2012 (Baker, 2015). The position has also been held by two other women: Stefanie Babst (acting, 2010–11) and Carmen Romero (2016–). This demonstrates a trend for senior women within NATO to be appointed to roles with high public visibility, rather than those roles considered to constitute the core business of NATO as a defence and security institution (Wright, 2016: 358). The outsider observer could be left with the impression that there has been a greater challenge to the dominance of men’s bodies within NATO than there actually has been. Directing our scrutiny upwards to take intersectionality seriously through identifying the gendered and racialised structures upholding military institutions is also necessary. This requires moving beyond understanding multiple differences and their impact upon the individual. It requires exposing ‘intersecting oppressions or systems of oppression’ (Crenshaw, 1989; Crenshaw et al., 1991) in order to provide the tools to challenge the ‘hegemonic position of men (or some women)’ in military structures (Henry, 2017b: 195). An intersectional lens exposes the ‘privileges, benefits, and power gains maintained and crystallized through either the power of the military or the patriarchy itself’ (Henry, 2017b: 195). As Henry argues, only by re-politicising intersectionality through this understanding does it become possible to ‘smash imperial white supremacist capitalist heteropatriarchy’ (Henry, 2018). Perhaps reflective of NATO’s reluctance to address diversity as an issue related to race and ethnicity, the characteristics of the military male body within NATO are also noteworthy. From a visual analysis of Figure 1.1 (below) we see the dominance of white men’s bodies in the NATO Military Committee. This is also reflected in the composition of the NAC (although as noted above there are some women at the table) (NATO, 2018c). The North Atlantic Council, NATO’s pre-eminent decision-making body might be more diverse in terms of gender, yet it also glaringly white. Like the NAC, which is composed of member states’ permanent representatives to NATO, the Military Committee is made up of member states’ Military Representatives.3 Both forums rely on member states to populate them. NATO member states have a sizeable number of non-white citizens who are not reflected here. The composition of the NATO Military Committee also mirrors the European Union’s Military Committee (Kronsell, 2015: 9). The defining characteristics of elite military leaders across Europe and the West has changed little, bar a few exceptions, since NATO’s foundation 70 years ago. Militaries, particularly in a European and a North American context, are exemplars of institutions of hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 1995: 213). The national armed forces of NATO member states are still overwhelmingly male-dominated (Schjølset, 2010). Traditionally, it is men and men’s bodies that have (almost exclusively) occupied the structures of military institutions, at every level in varying positions of power and subordination (Higate, 2003).NATO as an institution 33 The dominance of men’s bodies and masculine practices (Kronsell, 2015: 284) and a division of labour along gender lines both in terms of roles and physical space (Acker, 1990: 146–7) are evident within NATO. This recreates norms and practices associated with masculinity and heterosexuality, which when coupled with institutional power results in hegemonic masculinity (Kronsell, 2005: 281). However, in much the same way that hegemonic masculinity is not ‘numerically’ dominant among men (Connell, 2005), the conceptualisation of institutions of hegemonic masculinity incorporates more than the mere physical presence (or dominance) of male bodies. Describing an occupation as feminised or masculinised, or more generically as gendered, is not at the same as noting that it is dominated by men or women. Identifying where women and men are within the organisational structure is a useful starting point because military institutions are built on gender war roles, which tend to organise men’s bodies in and women’s bodies out (Kronsell, 2015). However, conflating the two can keep us from seeing contexts in which work dominated by men, for example, is more or less masculinised. It may also obscure the historical process through which definitions of gender-appropriate work are shaped. In addition to this dominance of men’s bodies, the norms, behaviours and discourses of NATO, transferred up and through national military structures, are also heavily masculinised. ‘Internal’ hegemonic masculinity (in Hinojosa’s (2010) conceptualisation) is also produced as a configuration of everyday social Figure 1.1 179th Military Committee in Chiefs of Defence Session, May 2018, NATO HQ, Brussels, Belgium.34 NATO as an institution practice (Hurley, 2018a). For example, perceived transgressions from the ideal type militarised masculinity are policed through trivialisation and feminisation (Hurley, 2018a: 4) or the ‘rules-in-use’ (Leach and Lowndes, 2007: 186). In this sense NATO is taken as a site of hegemonic masculinity wherein particular processes and relationships are located, through which individual and collective groups of men and women conduct gendered lives (Connell, 2005a: 71). NATO also occupies a position within the international security infrastructure and in this sense its actions (as a collective organisation) are situated, and saturated in international security discourses that value and privilege the masculine – ‘strength’, ‘rationality’ – over the feminine – ‘weakness, emotion’ (Via, 2010: 43; Tickner, 1992; Hooper, 2001) and are imbued with narratives of masculinist protection (Young, 2003) as we outline above. This leads us to argue that NATO is not just an institution of hegemonic masculinity but an institution of international hegemonic masculinity. This extends the understanding of NATO’s as a ‘teaching machine’ sharing lessons on the integration of women in the military and the value of WPS (Enloe, 1981; Wright, 2016). There are two co-constituting elements to NATO’s role as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity (see Figure 1.2 below). First, NATO, we argue, through socialisation of 29 member states and a growing number of partner states, the value of military masculinity is ‘learned’. NATO states meeting at the level of the North Atlantic Council, through the Military Committee or in other fora such as committees (including the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives), learn from each other what NATO’s role in the world is and how this should be embodied. Through NATO operations, including the former International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and current operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan, NATO, member and partner states work together and learn in practice what these values are. Second, NATO, as we argue above, has therefore taken on the role of masculinist protector which reinforces hegemonic militaristic, masculine ideals and norms. The enactment of this masculine protection logic further reinforces the notion of NATO as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity. This feeds into, and is further reinforced through, NATO’s role as ‘teaching machine’. Figure 1.2 Conceptualising NATO as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity. The two aspects of NATO’s role as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity are therefore co-constitutive. As we go into discuss in Chapters 2 and 5, this helps explain why NATO’s engagement with Women, Peace and Security and a gender perspective has been outward-facing, something NATO can engage with and utilise externally rather than being used to reflect inwards on NATO itself.

#### NATO adoptions gender policy to insulate itself from criticism and to serve pre-existing militarist agendas

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The first iteration of the NATO/EAPC Policy is a brief document. It acts more as a normative aspiration for what NATO can achieve through engagement with the WPS agenda, rather than as a detailed policy action plan. It quotes verbatim from NATO’s foundational values outlined in The Washington Treaty, and is presented as a tool to promote ‘democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law’ (NATO, 2007). The policy focuses primarily on operational aspects, with the intention that further work would take place to identify the wider applicability of WPS. Specifically, it calls for NATO Military Authorities to take the lead in developing practical proposals for engagement with the agenda. The broader context is key to understanding the operational focus. At this time, the NATOled ISAF Operation was in a particularly difficult stage as a result of Taliban insurgency (Johnson and Mason, 2007). There was an emerging realisation that gender was key to understanding Afghanistan, and there was a need to engage the whole population. This was evidenced in the deployment of Female Engagement Teams (FETs) (Mcbride and Wibben, 2012). The additional need to improve dialogue among a wide pool of contributors (Mattelaer, 2011: 598) provided another incentive for NATO’s engagement with WPS. This also contributes to explaining the centrality of partners to NATO’s engagement with WPS. WPS offered a shared starting point for NATO to foster a ‘community of practice’ with partners (Wagnsson, 2011: 598). The 2007 NATO/EAPC Policy on UNSCR 1325 was never intended as a transformative document, rather it was intended as a catalyst for further engagement with gender as an operational imperative. It took four years for the NATO/EAPC Policy to be revised and extended. The 2011 version moves beyond a narrow focus on operational issues. It outlines a six-track approach for the implementation of UNSCR 1325. This includes a commitment to mainstream WPS across policies, programmes and documentation in order to benefit the ‘daily work of the organisation, its staff and committees’ (NATO, 2011). WPS is also outlined as a means to foster cooperation with international organisations and civil society, including ‘exchanges of information, best practices and expertise, as well as practical cooperation’ (NATO, 2011). This supports and extends Enloe’s (1983) conception of NATO as a ‘teaching machine’ in respect to gender, sharing lessons among member states on the integration of women into NATO Forces. Here, we see NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ extending to include other actors, as well as relating to WPS specifically (Wright, 2016). It also demonstrates the ‘added value’ of WPS for NATO as a means to bring in civil society, a group of actors the alliance had previously not sought meaningful engagement with (Mayer, 2008: 117). As well as other international organisations, such as the EU, which while NATO has had a long-standing ‘strategic’ partnership with, it has been beset with ‘long-standing political blockages’ (Smith and Gebhard, 2017: 305). The understanding of both women’s bodies, and a gender perspective as a means to support operational effectiveness supports the broader context against which this policy was adopted. NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan, where gender (or women) became beneficial in rhetoric, doctrine and practice (Dyvik, 2013: 412), contributed both to NATO’s engagement with WPS but also supported a very particular understanding of gender (Wright, 2016: 356). Of particular note, is the aim for WPS ‘to become an integral and complementary part of NATO’s corporate identity’ (NATO, 2011c). This is interesting in two respects. First, the adoption of UNSCR 1325 is implied as something a ‘good’ institution would do and frames NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 as a means to bolster perceptions of NATO. Second, it goes against the intentions of the feminist activists who supported the realisation of UNSCR 1325 in the Security Council, with the Resolution intended to challenge, rather than support the militarism NATO embodies (see discussion in Chapter 1). The alliance has a track record of instrumentalising gendered narratives, and specifically targeting women. For example, the use of symbols of women’s liberation to demonstrate the superiority of Western countries during the Cold War (Risso, 2009: 509). More recently and following the adoption of the 2011 NATO/EAPC Policy, the alliance’s showcase digital diplomacy initiative to commemorate the draw-down of NATO-led forces from Afghanistan in 2014, titled Return to Hope, instrumentalised Afghan women to ‘sell’ NATO’s intervention to publics back home. The narratives included also supported a very particular gender understanding of the intervention and were underpinned by a masculinist protection logic (Wright, 2019: 10). At the same time as NATO had publicly committed to integrating WPS concerns into public diplomacy, a core part of the agenda being the better representation of women, we see women marginalised from a key public diplomacy initiative (Wright, 2019: 11). The 2011 NATO/EAPC Policy also endorses national initiatives to promote women’s participation their armed forces. This situates UNSCR 1325 within NATO’s long-established concern with the status of women in NATO Forces, formalised in the recognition of the CWINF in 1976 and discussed in Chapter 4. Some feminist advocates of WPS have been critical of this association, critiquing the motivation as stemming not from NATO’s support for gender equality, but to support pre-existing objectives to modernise and professionalise NATO Forces (Cockburn, 2011). Three years later, the 2014 NATO/EAPC Policy represented a significant development in NATO’s approach to WPS. This was reflected in the creation of the of Secretary General’s Special Representative on WPS in 2012 who became the figurehead for NATO’s engagement with WPS (discussed below). Most pertinently, there is a shift away from the emphasis in previous policies on the ‘added value’ of UNSCR 1325 to bolster NATO’s existing agendas, to a focus on how NATO can support the broader WPS agenda. For example, the implementation of UNSCR 1325 is framed ‘within the context of NATO’s wider policy objectives core tasks’, rather than as an add-on. The policy also applies for the first time to NATO’s own human resource policies (civilian and military), stating that ‘gender balance within our institutions is a goal in itself, and is also a means for improving performance’ (NATO, 2014a). In addition, the monitoring and reporting mechanisms are also strengthened and provide greater transparency to enable outside scrutiny of NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325, with the NATO/EAPC Action Plan being released publicly for the first time (see discussion below). The latest iteration of the NATO/EAPC Policy was released in autumn 2018. It is the first revision of the policy to have been formally consulted on with external actors through the Civil Society Advisory Panel (CSAP) established formally in 2016 (NATO, 2016a). NATO has previously been an outlier among international institutions because it has had no formal mechanisms to consult civil society in the policy-making process. CSAP therefore represents a significant change. The 2018 NATO/EAPC Policy also calls for NATO to develop ‘specific mechanisms to prevent and respond to SEA’ because ‘it causes disproportionate harm to women and girls and undermines NATO’s credibility and operational’ (NATO/EAPC, 2018). This is a significant development and could be an example of NATO seeking to reflect on how WPS relates to its own structures and practices. NATO Action Plans on UNSCR 1325 Beyond policy commitment, the actual implementation of the NATO/EAPC Policies on UNSCR 1325 has remained a key challenge for NATO. To support this, NATO has mobilised corresponding action plans with practical tasks assigned to institutional actors. In 2010, the first Action Plan was adopted by the NAC (Oudraat et al., 2015: 5), and was intended ‘to provide an overall framework for NATO’s practical implementation of the Resolutions with its Partners’ (NATO, 2011). This is referenced in the 2011 revision of the NATO/EAPC Policy, which includes provision for monitoring and accountability mechanisms. The stakeholders involved in the Action Plan are the International Staff, IMS, NATO Military Authorities, and member and partner states. However, this is all the information available on this version of the implementation plan because it remained classified due to the sensitive and operation-specific information it contained (NATO Official, 2014). This meant it was not a document which could be used to hold NATO to account for its implementation of the WPS agenda. Since the NATO/EAPC Policy was revised in 2014, the accompanying Action Plan has been made public and also included Afghanistan, Australia, Japan, Jordan, New Zealand, and the United Arab Emirates (Oudraat et al., 2015: 5). This increased transparency is welcome and brings NATO into line with the global approach to WPS which has seen 79 states adopt public-facing National Action Plans (PeaceWomen, 20184). However, it is far from practical for an international security institution, where, particularly in regards to operations, a level of secrecy is necessary. For practical reasons in certain areas, NATO Officials may therefore need to develop an additional classified and more detailed action plan (NATO Official, 2014). On the surface, the 2016 NATO/EAPC Action Plan seems to support the increased representation of women in NATO. One of the core outcomes is the ‘improved gender balance at all levels at NATO allies and partners’ defence and security institutions’. Yet, if we dig a little deeper into this statement, we find it omits mention of the representation of women within the International Staff or IMS. So, while increasing the representation of women in allies’ own forces, if realised, is likely to have some trickle-down impact on gender balance within delegations to NATO and staff seconded from member and partner states, it will not address the gender imbalance among those employed directly by the alliance. The gender imbalance within NATO should be a pressing issue for the alliance given its stated commitment to the WPS agenda. The 2018 NATO/EAPC Action Plan seems to offer a significant development then. It commits NATO under its pillar of ‘inclusiveness’ to ‘Map the obstacles and implement activities to increase the number of women in NATO, especially in leadership roles’ (NATO/ EAPC, 2018). Yet NATO has not released figures on gender balance at NATO HQ since 2012, an important part of achieving this aim is to provide transparency and therefore accountability on this issue. This indicates it is not a high priority for NATO and therefore an issue with considerable political sensitivities among the allies.

#### NATO’s militarism serves to reinforce violent gendered and racialized logics—FETs prove

Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz 19

Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “Gendering NATO’s core tasks Collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 112-115. LJS

The conclusion is that – as NATO goes global, women are a critical asset for NATO’s new missions.… Particularly in certain cultural contexts, like in Afghanistan, female troops and mixed-gender units are essential toGendering NATO’s core tasks 113 carrying out such tasks as house searches, or establishing ties with the local population. As former CWINF Chair, Lieutenant Colonel Kristin Lund draws attention to above, as NATO became a crisis management organisation, military women became essential operational assets (NATO, 2004). NATO defines crisis management as ‘military and non-military measures to address the full spectrum of crisis – before, during and after conflicts’. Three years before NATO produced a policy on WPS, the 2004 CWINF conference outcomes included a call for the greater involvement of women in NATO militaries as ‘force multipliers’ (NATO, 2004). So, while NATO’s later engagement with UNSCR 1325, WPS and a gender perspective (as discussed in Chapter 5) would further articulate the ‘added value’ of women, WPS did not provide the impetus. Rather, WPS has mapped onto NATO’s pre-existing concern with women and in NATO Forces, and NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan. NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan came in December 2001 with the creation of the ISAF. This was to become NATO’s largest and most challenging crisis management operation to-date. Until the draw-down of forces December 2014, over 51 states drawn from NATO members and partners contributed to the mission (NATO, 2018). The complexities of the conflict saw gender (or women) become central to Western understandings of Afghanistan (Daulatzai, 2008) and shaped NATO’s subsequent engagement with the WPS agenda (Wright, 2016: 356). Gender, or specifically women, became beneficial not just in rhetorical justifications for the action, but in both doctrine and practice to population-centric counterinsurgency (Dyvik, 2013: 412). For example, the gendering of counterinsurgency through the use of FETs became part of efforts to sell the intervention to a war-fatigued audience framing it as a ‘gentler (feminine) option’ (Mcbride and Wibben, 2012: 200). We return to this when we discuss the gender perspective ‘in action’ in Chapter 5. FETs are far from representative of the experience of women in NATO Forces. Nevertheless, FETs captured the imaginaries of the media and broader public, as this Daily Mail headline exemplifies: ‘The British Army’s secret weapon in Afghanistan? It’s the seven female officers in Helmand Province gaining the trust of the locals’ (Daily Mail, 2012). FETs have also caught the attention of NATO, for example, the NCGP has continued to address the issue at conferences, despite their decreasing use (e.g. in 2004, 2018). Academia has also become fixated upon FETs, contributing to their exceptionalising, and leading the Navy War College in a call for papers for its regular academic conference on WPS to ban papers addressing them (US Naval War College, 2018). In operations, including in Afghanistan, FETs have been used to engage and ‘win over’ local women, or the half of the population out of reach to male soldiers. They were developed by the UK, US and others. However, ISAF forces also formed informal FETs drawn from ‘tactical and provincial reconstruction teams, civil affairs forces and agribusiness development teams’ (Holliday, 2012). Despite this, many of these efforts remained ‘ad hoc and disorganized and114 Gendering NATO’s core tasks training and employment are not standardized’ (Holliday, 2012). This is reinforced through the reflections of a former FET deployed in Afghanistan: ‘I couldn’t do anything for them,’ my medic told me. And I responded, ‘Neither could I.’ We were tourists, unable to solve problems with units that changed every 12 months. Everything was temporary, except Afghanistan. Although we did other programmatic work like husbandry training and a literacy program, none were sustainable. Where there were few roads and doctors, we attempted to hand out pudding and toothpaste. When the next team came to replace us, their commander refused to conduct FET missions. (Ricks, 2016) Centralising gender in our analysis of FETs as a crisis management tool points to some of the broader implications of their use. As Mcbride and Wibben (2012: 211) found in their study of FETs, there was an irony that ‘their effectiveness is limited more by U.S. commanders than patriarchal Afghans’, leading them to question just ‘who is shielding their women from Afghan society more: Pashtun men or U.S. Commanders?’. Ultimately the deployment of FETs mobilised as a counterinsurgency tool rested on gendered and racialised logics. This is what Spivak originally articulated as ‘white men saving brown women from brown men’ (Spivak quoted in Cooke, 2002). Here, this problematic reasoning has morphed to become ‘white women saving brown women from brown men’ (Cooke, 2002; Mcbride and Wibben, 2012). Gender and security in Afghanistan have been understood within a masculinist protection logic (Partis-Jennings, 2017: 414). As we argue in Chapter 1, a core part of NATO’s role as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity is the projection of a masculinist protection role. Gendered norms become apparent when women join the military. This occurs as the ‘women soldiers’ subjectivity is formed against the norms of masculinity embedded in the organisation’ (Kronsell, 2012: 43). The increasing presence of women in the military therefore has the potential to be ‘disruptive’ (Duncanson and Woodward, 2016: 12). Military women can be disruptive in the sense that their mere presence means the institution is no longer exclusively occupied by men’s bodies. But also in the sense that the perspective and presence of these women disrupt the masculine norms that pervade such institutions. The presence of women challenges the naturalness and invisibility of masculine norms; the relational nature of gender and the dominance of masculinity are therefore exposed. The use of women soldiers in FET roles brings this disruptive potential into question. In addition to their symbolism, FETs frame women as of ‘added value’ to the military, thus separating them from the homogenous military whole. Their use therefore is a potential obstacle to women into the military presenting a ‘disruption’ to established gender hierarchies and structures. For example, the foundation of military training is to strip a recruit’s individuality from them, making them an obedient part of the military whole and able to respond to command structures (Whitworth, 2004: 158). Adding women because they are perceived to bring something different is problematic because it accentuates difference and rests upon the premise that the ‘different’ individuals can, and will, provide the diversity expected of them (Kronsell, 2012: 67). In so doing, the existing majority is normalised and constructed ‘as homogenous and naturally associated with the organization’ (Kronsell, 2012: 67). Far from challenging the hegemonic masculinity militarism is built upon, the diversity argument reinforces an essentialist view of women as in opposition to the norm (Whitworth, 2004: 154). It also contradicts the foundation of military training, whereby recruit’s individuality is stripped from them so that they become part of an obedient military whole able to respond to command structures (Whitworth, 2004: 158). The use of FETs fits a wider pattern of the recruitment of military women, where they are often assigned to particular, often times subordinate, roles (Mathers, 2013: 134).

### Negative Peace

#### The realist conception of “negative peace” leaves much to be desired – the aff’s flawed approach to containing conflict perpetuates the gendered status-quo and excludes non-state actors

McLeod and O’Reilly 19

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Conflict management approaches – associated with international negotiation, mediation, and traditional peacekeeping – are largely inspired by the realist belief in the inevitability of conflict and the impossibility of achieving resolution.18 These focus narrowly on managing conflict situations and achieving ‘negative peace’19 by halting overt violence. The aim is to reinforce international order and security by ‘isolating’ and ‘containing’ conflict.20 There is shared agreement between critical and feminist PCS regarding the inadequacies of conflict management approaches for building sustainable peace. Traditional peacekeeping missions, for example, hold a mixed record in limiting armed conflict, and are ‘virtually uniform’ in their failure to achieve conflict resolution.21 They rarely created the conditions for peace, and worked largely to ‘freeze’ rather than resolve conflict.22 Women and gender issues were largely excluded from traditional peacekeeping missions: for instance, between 1957 and 1989, the number of women participating in the military component of peacekeeping missions was a mere 0.1%.23 Furthermore, the coercive power wielded by armed peacekeepers is criticised by feminists – for reproducing violent masculinities which (re)create gendered forms of insecurity,24 and for perpetuating relations of domination which are at the root of violent conflict.25 Traditional diplomacy, meanwhile, frequently produced settlements based on ‘peace without justice’ and often found it difficult to address the rising number of intra-state conflicts due to its state-centric view of conflict.26 Feminist scholars have documented the long-standing absence of women from formal peace negotiations.27 Obstacles include highly gendered norms and practices of diplomacy, which associate negotiations and mediation with men, masculinity, and military affairs.28 The lack of recognition of women as significant peace-making actors is another factor; as is the priority afforded to high-level political and military actors (usually men), at the expense of women’s interests and demands.29 From a feminist perspective, conflict management approaches, in theory and in practice, reflect and sustain a ‘cult of power’ within peace research – one which marginalises the perspectives and contributions of relatively ‘powerless’ non-state actors, including many women, girls, and non-binary people.30 Furthermore, the goal of promoting negative peace, is strongly criticised by feminists, who point out that this leaves (gendered) forms of direct violence (e.g. gender-based violence), structural violence (patriarchy), and cultural violence (militarism) unaddressed.31

### Rational Actors

#### The aff perpetuates gendered hierarchy by depicting Western countries as “rational” actors which dictate which weapons are justified and who gets to wield them – this legitimates military spending and programs which fuel warfare

Cohn 3 – PhD from The Union Graduate School, director of the Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights at the University of Massachusetts. [Carol, “A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction”, 2003, [https://genderandsecurity.org/sites/default/files/Cohn\_Ruddick\_-\_Femst\_Ethical\_Perspective\_on\_WMDs.pdf]//AV](https://genderandsecurity.org/sites/default/files/Cohn_Ruddick_-_Femst_Ethical_Perspective_on_WMDs.pdf%5d//AV)

Thus, use of the term “proliferation” tends to locate the person who uses it within a possessor state, and aligns him or her with the political stance favoring the hierarchy of state power enshrined in the current distribution of WMD. The framing of Question Four. “... is it proper to deny [WMD] possession to others for the same purposes?”, seems similarly based in a possessor state perspective, as it is presumably the possessor states who must decide whether it is proper to deny possession to others. As we have already stated, we find WMD themselves intrinsically morally indefensible, no matter who possesses them, and we are concerned about the wide array of costs to any state of development and deployment. We therefore reject the discourse’s implicit division of “good” and “bad,” “safe” and “unsafe” WMD, (defined as good or bad depending on who possesses them). Our concern is to understand how some WMD are rendered invisible (“o urs”) and some visible (“theirs”); some rendered malignant and others benign. Here, we join others in noting that the language in which the case against “proliferation” is made is ethno-racist and contemptuous. Generally, in Western proliferation discourse as a whole, a distinction is drawn between “the ‘Self’(seen as responsible) vs the non-Western Unruly Other.” 36 The US represents itself as a rational actor, while representing the Unruly Other as emotional, unpredictable, irrational, immature, misbehaving. Not only does this draw on and reconstruct an Orientalist portrayal of third world actors 37; it does so through the medium of gendered terminology. By drawing the relations between possessors and non-possessors in gendered terms – the prudential, rational, advanced, mature, restrained, technologically- and bureaucratically- competent (and thus “masculine”) Self, versus the emotional, irrational, unpredictable, uncontrolled, immature, primitive, undisciplined, technologically-incompetent (and thus “feminine”) Unruly Other – the discourse naturalizes and legitimates the Self/possessor states having weapons which the Other does not. By drawing on and evoking gendered imagery and resonances, the discourse naturalizes the idea that “We” / the US / the responsible father must protect, must control and limit “her,” the emotional, out-of-control state, for her own good, as well as for ours. This Western proliferation discourse has had a function in the wider context of US national security politics. With the end of the “Evil Empire” in the late 1980s, until the attacks of September 11th , 2001, the US appeared to be without an enemy of grand enough proportions to justify maintaining its sprawling military-industrial establishment. This difficulty was forestalled by the construction of the category of “rogue states” – states seen as uncontrollable, irresponsible, irrational, malevolent, and antagonistic to the West. 38 Their unruliness and antagonism was represented as intrinsic to their irrational nature; if it were not in their “nature,” the US would have needed to ask more seriously if actions on the part of the West had had any role in producing that hostility and disorder. The discourse of WMD proliferation has been one of the principal means of producing these states as major threats. To say this is neither to back away from our position opposing weapons of mass destruction, nor to assess the degree to which WMD in the hands of “Other” states actually do threaten the US, the “Other” states’ regional opponents, or their own population. But it is an assessment of the role of WMD proliferation discourse in naturalizing and legitimating otherwise-difficult-to-make-appear-rational programs and expenditures such as National Missile Defense. 39 Within the logic of deterrence theory and proliferation discourse, the phenomenon of WMD proliferation is understandable in two main ways. States either acquire WMD for purposes of aggression – i.e., to use WMD or to threaten their use in acts of aggression, intimidation and/or coercion against other states or populations within their own state. Or states acquire WMD to enhance their own security by deterring an opponent from attack. Within a strategic calculus, either is understood as a “rational” motivation for WMD possession, even if not everyone would view these reasons as equally morally defensible.

### Russia-Ukraine

#### The ‘realpolitik’ of the 1AC elides feminist analysis of Russia’s invasion in Ukraine and continues the exclusion of feminist discourse from NATO

Wright 22

Katharine A., Senior Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University. “A feminist perspective on the Russian-Ukraine War: Implications for NATO.” Centre for Women, Peace, and Security. 3/8/2022. LJS

Russia’s intervention in Ukraine seemingly caught the international community and many International Relations scholars by surprise. It has been heralded as a return to ‘realpolitik’ leading to a (re)focus on the state as the primary referent point of international politics. Yet while feminist IR scholars have made important inroads into the discipline in recent decades, demonstrating how the personal is not only political but international too, at this time of crisis we again find feminist insights marginalised from mainstream discussion of the war and its consequences (with a few notable exceptions, including work by Jenny Mathers and a subsequently postponed RUSI event). Feminists IR scholars have much value to add to the discussion to aide our understanding of the war and its gendered impact. For example, how masculinities and femininities are invoked in constructing Russia and Ukraine in geopolitical imaginaries, the absence of women from both Ukranian and Russian negotiation delegations, or in the gendered silences of just who is seen to fight/be protected in Western media coverage, to name just a few of examples. However, the purpose of this blog is to focus on the implications of the war for NATO through a feminist lens. Feminist IR scholars’ primary concern with NATO stems from a premise that it functions as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity. This has included a focus on how NATO shares lessons on the value of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda and a gender perspective, constituting both through a militarist lens, even if gender work often remains under resourced and not fully utilised within the alliance and its operations. Feminist IR scholars have also examined how gendered narratives are invoked to shape NATO, its value, and purpose, both internally through storytelling and the interactions of ‘gendermen’ (and women) and externally through the projection and reception of strategic narratives. The value of women, and more recently gender perspectives, to the alliance is nothing new and NATO has long been concerned with the integration of women into its armed forces in relation to balancing ‘manpower’ shortages and supporting operational effectiveness. More recently, in 2019, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that “Gender equality is an integral part of all NATO policies, programmes and Projects.” Likewise, the NATO/EAPC Policy and Action Plan on WPS makes it clear that “NATO aims to address gender inequality and integrate WPS through the Alliance’s three core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security [emphasis author’s own]”. Even if ‘nations have the primary responsibility’ in respect to collective defence, it is these nations which makeup NATO and agree its response, they are therefore responsible for ensuring “the provision of trained troops and experts on gender issues, as well as a better gender balance in NATO-led forces depend entirely on national decisions”. The NATO WPS policy has “encouraged [member and partner states] to make WPS an integral part of their defence and security.” The test of whether they have or not comes now. Despite such a commitment, we have yet to see NATO, or its members or partners, articulate the relevance of gender in their response to the Russian intervention in Ukraine. While there remains a lot we don’t know about NATO’s reaction, we would expect, if it were in place, for NATO to have made the case for the relevance of a gender perspective publicly. If the response to Russia’s actions has seen NATO return to its Article 5 collective defence founding purpose, it has also, yet again, drawn attention to the disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of NATO’s commitment to the WPS agenda. This also further undermines and demonstrates the hollowness of recent calls for NATO to adopt a Feminist Foreign Policy. As feminist IR scholars, we should be asking not only where are the women but where are the gender advisors and where is the gender expertise? Is the NATO Special Representative on Women, Peace and Security being included in all high-level discussions? Are Gender Advisors being deployed with the NATO Response Forces? Has a gender perspective been incorporated into NATO’s strategic communications? Is a gender perspective being included in all decision-making processes? Has a gender perspective been part of the briefings at the NATO extraordinary meetings on Ukraine? Which (if any) member and partners states (including those with Feminist Foreign Policies, such as Canada, France, Germany, Sweden, Luxembourg and Sweden) are raising NATO’s commitments under WPS as something to be taken into consideration at these meetings? And what gender expertise are they contributing substantively? Moreover, given in the last decade NATO has begun engaging civil society formally on its WPS work, we must ask where are their voices and perspectives now? This short contribution has sought to raise questions and provocations related to the WPS agenda and how it has (or hasn’t) been invoked in NATO’s response to the Russia-Ukraine War. It has also demonstrated that feminist knowledge and attention to NATO is needed now more than ever. It is just one take, and there remains more than one feminist perspective on NATO, while feminism remains a broad school, even if feminist IR scholars remain united by a commitment to emancipatory praxis. It has shown how, even at times such as these, we need to make space to hear voices outside of the mainstream discourse, which might make us uncomfortable or challenge the accepted status quo, because doing so keeps alive the possibility that another world is possible. Asking feminist questions of NATO specifically can contribute to a better understanding of the alliance’s role in the global power order, in particular how it engages with and shapes ‘new’ security threats, including the Russian intervention in Ukraine.

### Security Cooperation

#### Security cooperation legitimizes irredeemable institutions like NATO, allow them to continue patterns of masculine colonization

Basticka and Duncansonb 18

Megan, School of Law, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK; Claire, School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK, “Agents of Change? Gender Advisors in NATO Militaries.” International Peacekeeping. 2018. Pg 5-6. LJS.

Militaries are viewed by many feminist scholars as fundamentally inimical to feminism, institutions of destructive power and inherent misogyny.13 Militaries perpetrate devastating violence in war, which disproportionately affects women when the long term impacts, including of forced migration, and sexual and gender-based violence are considered.14 Even where described as ‘pacifying’ or ‘liberating’ missions, military interventions remain violent, for some feminists, often ‘wars of extraction’15, involving the logic of all war: ‘opposition, differentiation and the othering of peoples’.16 As well as perpetrating direct physical violence, militaries are implicated in equally pernicious structural violence. States’ military-industrial complexes organize economies around producing weapons rather than civilian goods and absorb vast amounts of funding that could otherwise be spent on achieving human security.17 The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) highlights the opportunity-costs at play: the world’s total military expenditure in 2013 was estimated to be $1.747 trillion.18 Only a small fraction of that would be required to fund the measures to achieve the Millennium Development Goal for gender equality, such as women’s economic empowerment, family planning, and women’s participation and leadership. A feminist vision of peace and security, as articulated by WILPF and reflected in feminist scholarship, is for ‘a world free from violence and armed conflict in which human rights are protected and women and men are equally empowered and involved in positions of leadership at the local, national and international levels’, hand in hand with universal reduction and elimination of weapons,19 suggesting a vastly reduced (if any) role for armed forces and military alliances. Militaries are, moreover, viewed by many feminists as an institution where hegemonic forms of masculinity privileging practices of violence and misogyny, combined with myths of heroic protection of vulnerable civilians, are produced and reproduced.20 Militarized masculinity, constructed within militaries but with effects rippling through society, is theorized as focused upon domination of women (and subordinate males) and the denigration of the feminine.21 Indeed, many scholars argue that the capacity of women within the military to be agents of change of institutional culture or of military operations is limited, as they adapt their performance of femininity to fit their hyper-masculine environment.22 They likewise question claims that women make a distinct contribution as military peacekeepers: to protection of women and girls, prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, or as role models for local women.23 As Heineken says, ‘Clearly one cannot bring about a different perspective to war and peace if women [in the military] are expected to embrace masculine norms and values and where gender difference is not recognised and valued’.24 As such, it is unsurprising that some feminist scholars and activists are sceptical of military engagement with the Women, Peace and Security agenda. They suggest that when taken up by militaries, the Women, Peace and Security agenda risks being used to lend legitimacy to the ‘war system’ rather than challenge it,25 even ‘militarizing feminism’.26 NATO is regarded with particular suspicion, by ‘Women Against NATO’, as ‘an ambitious, expansionist and belligerent war-machine, primarily serving the economic and strategic interests of the more powerful among its member states’.27 From this perspective, NATO invoking women’s rights is not progress, but the co-optation of feminism for militarist ends. More specifically, some feminists allege that NATO’s gender work too often carries the implication that gender is only relevant for the host country, as if western institutions had achieved gender equality; that it perpetuates colonial assumptions about the superiority of the west as the bearer of civilization and humanitarian values.28 One imagines that anti-militarist feminists would argue that Military Gender Advisors are either not-feminist or feminists wasting their time, legitimizing fundamentally problematic institutions.

## Perms

### A2 Perm Do Both

#### Perm do both eschews gender analysis by tacking the alt onto the aff without doing any of the work the alt requires

Sjoberg 15

Laura, British Academy Global Professor of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway University of London. “’I know there’s stuff I don’t talk about’ and other annoying responses to feminist analysis.” Relations International. June 25th, 2015. <http://relationsinternational.com/i-know-theres-stuff-i-dont-talk-about-and-other-annoying-responses-to-feminist-analysis/> LJS

There’s nothing ground-breaking about my response – it repeats things feminists have been saying for decades. It suggests that seeing the US government as the location of relevance may be not only wrong but morally insidious, then makes the argument that the notion of objective knowledge and scientific process that Desch shares with the quantitative work he criticizes might be the root of a differently understood ‘relevance problem’ for Security Studies – hierarchy and exclusion. Even though this response is, in my view, strikingly unoriginal – it seems to be getting the same reaction it got 20 years ago. Desch was able to write a response to the response – well, a response to other people’s responses anyway. All of the other pieces (including the other two in the sentence below) are addressed substantively. My piece is mentioned in one sentence. Brace yourself. “Finally, Tutton, Voeten, and Laura Sjoberg all make an important point about policy-relevance involving much more than government policy-makers.” Yep. That’s it. I say: gender analysis shows your conception of Security Studies is normatively harmful and intellectually counterproductive. He says: oh, nice of you to tell me that we need to pay attention to policy-making outside of government. I meant that, I just didn’t say it. But my catch-all point applies to that. In other words, I know there’s stuff I didn’t talk about, and that’s enough to dispense with the gender critique. My colleagues from outside of the United States often wonder why I engage with the American mainstream of IR, and, when I first read Desch’s response to the response, I’ll admit, I got on the skeptical bandwagon. But then I thought – that response is exactly why it has to keep getting said. There, and then here, and then anyplace else that it can be. Gender analysis is not just something you mean but don’t say, and then can get away with saying “I know there’s stuff I didn’t talk about.” It affects how you think about a project, ontologically, epistemology, and methodologically. It affects it whether or not you think so – your work is as impacted by implicit masculinized gender assumptions as mine is by explicit feminist assumptions. And I’m talking about it even if you won’t.

### A2 Perm – NATO Has Gender Policy

#### Despite rhetoric geared towards gender equality, NATO continues to be a male-dominated organization—no reason the aff’s specific example of a gender-centered policy matters

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Lauren, a German chancellor's fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin and a nonresident fellow at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. “The Men-Only Club.” Foreign Policy. 4/3/2014. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/04/03/the-men-only-club/> LJS

For all of NATO’s rhetoric about engaging in a "continuous process of reform, modernisation and transformation," the composition of its top leadership looks downright anachronistic. With the March 28 designation of Jens Stoltenberg as the next secretary general, it seems certain that at least 70 years will pass without a single woman serving at the very top of the organization. The problem is not confined to the position of secretary-general. In 65 years, there has also never been a female deputy secretary-general, and Croatia’s Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic is the first and only woman to ever serve in one of the assistant secretary-general positions. Unsurprisingly, the imbalance is every bit as pronounced within the military delegations to NATO. There has never been a female supreme allied commander Europe, and all of its 56 current chiefs of defense and military representatives are male. Its organizational chart of top civilian and military leaders shows 80 men and three women smiling gamely at the camera. Individual member states, meanwhile, are increasingly sending women to top positions within their own governments, outpacing NATO in the slog toward gender equality. At the moment, eight of the alliance’s 28 member states have at least one woman representing the country’s security and foreign-policy priorities in Brussels or serving as a defense minister, and over half of its members have or have previously had a female head of government. As senior stateswomen with expertise in collective defense, many of these women are qualified candidates for NATO leadership positions, yet they are not making it to that top echelon. There are doubtlessly those who question whether a gender imbalance even matters, particularly in a defense-oriented organization. Given the alliance’s challenging agenda, from countering Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggression to making the most with increasingly strained military resources, the composition of its leadership may seem like an auxiliary concern. In fact, the types of challenges with which NATO contends would especially benefit from more representative leadership. Ample research suggests that female leadership brings about positive change for organizations, particularly in the domain of conflict resolution. Women leaders have been shown to have a more democratic and collaborative leadership style — an important attribute when trying to build consensus in a large organization such as NATO. When women play an active role in discussions about post-conflict reconstruction, research has shown that the resultant peace agreements and operational policies are less likely to marginalize parts of society and more likely to endure. Recent literature about women in the private sector has hailed the diversity of perspective and problem-solving techniques that women bring — surely those same benefits also apply in the context of the alliance. At a time when NATO is trying to address 21st-century challenges without slipping back into a 20th-century mindset, more diversity at the top could go a long way toward keeping the organization and its thinking modern. Beyond these practical benefits, the other reason that increasing the number of women in top NATO positions matters is, quite simply, a question of values: A collective security organization that only represents 50 percent of the population in top leadership jobs is inconsistent with the contemporary Western values the alliance espouses.

### A2 Perm – Co-Optation

#### Incorporating so-called feminist principles into inherently masculine institutions waters down feminist politics—WPS proves

Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz 19

Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “The long view.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 46-49. LJS

The realisation of UNCR 1325 was premised on a network of actors working both within UN structures and outside. Importantly, civil society were present through the NGO Working Group on WPS, an umbrella organisation which brought together interested NGOs to lobby for, draft and redraft the final Resolution (Hill, Aboitiz and Poehlman-Doumbouya, 2009: 1258–60). They envisaged the transformative potential of UNSCR 1325 not as a tool to ‘make war safe for women’, but through acknowledging the different and disproportionate impact on women, and women’s role in conflict prevention and resolution (Cook, 2009: 126). The role of feminists, including those working through the NGO Working Group on WPS, meant UNSCR 1325 was championed as a ‘feminist achievement’ (Cockburn, 2011). Some later went onto question whether the Resolution was a ‘trick or treat’, arguing that despite some weaknesses, it should be seen as a new global gender norm in the making (Tryggestad, 2009: 552). More recently, and despite some progress in the adoption of National Action Plans (NAPs) to support the implementation of WPS, a growing cynicism has emerged in relation to its transformative potential (Duncanson and Woodward, 2015: 8). Member states, civil society, academics and critical actors within the UN itself were critical to the realisation of the Resolution. The formation of such a coalition of interested parties working together at the Security Council was unprecedented (Cockburn, 2011). Despite this, the politics of the Security Council meant certain compromises were necessary to realise the Resolution. This has resulted in silences and omission within the WPS agenda more broadly. It remains unclear if the lack of ‘feminist’ conceptualisations in policy can be attributed to a knowledge gap among those formulating policy (Cook, 2016: 22). Rather, given the diversity of the coalition supporting UNSCR 1325 it could be that even those fully equipped with sufficient understanding may struggle to get such language adopted because of wider institutional pressures or specific resistance (Cook, 2016: 22). For example, the NGO Working Group on WPS had feminist and anti-war members but they were not in the majority, there was therefore a lack of consensus on the extent to which UNSCR 1325 should challenge existing practices (Cohn, 2011: 12). As a result any discussion of the arms trade and militarism was off the agenda because some members found the topics ‘too political’ (Cohn, 2011: 12). As a result, there is an absence from UNSCR 1325 of the Security Council’s own responsibility within the UN Charter to support the establishment of arms regulations systems (Otto, 2004: 12). Another key silence is any mention of ending war, despite this being a foundational part of the Security Council’s brief (Cockburn, 2007: 147). These omissions and silences draw attention to the contradiction between the Security Council with an implicit support for a militarised interstate system, and the normative underpinnings of UNSCR 1325 on women in armed conflict. As Basu (2010: 289) argues, this dissonance has emerged precisely because of the challenges to women’s security which result from the current set-up of the international arena. The language of the WPS resolutions is also worth considering. UNSCR 1325 relies on comparatively weak language for a Security Council Resolution. This includes the repetition of ‘urges’, ‘encourages’ and ‘calls’, rather than stronger language demanding action from states (Tryggestad, 2009: 544). It also associated ‘gender’ with ‘women’, which means the calls for gender mainstreaming can be read as only applicable to the concerns of women. Gender is therefore transformed into a ‘safe idea’ for policy makers leaving behind its radical potential to produce change (Puechguirbal, 2010: 184). Gender also comes to signify a ‘need/want/lack’ (Shepherd, 2011: 515, 2008: 171–2). UNSCR 1325 also presents a victim-agent dichotomy. The Resolution frames women both as having ‘special needs’ and in need of protection in conflict situations, but also as agents ‘stressing the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security’ (United Nations Security Council, 2000). For some, there is no contradiction here and it is possible to acknowledge both the disproportionate impact of war on women, while still ‘making women’s agency vibrantly visible’ (Cohn, Kinsella and Gibbings, 2004: 139). For others, the language of the Resolution has missed an opportunity to challenge myths that sustain beliefs about women’s helplessness in the face of sexual violence by also acknowledging their capacity to be agents of change (Otto, 2010: 117). UNSCR 1820 presents something of a shift away from this victim-agent understanding, and while UNSCR 1888 returns to the dual track approach, it does refer to civilians as victims of Conflict-Related Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (CRSGBV), rather than women specifically (Shepherd, 2011). The passage of the WPS Resolutions through the Security Council has not always followed the same pattern as UNSCR 1325. In 2009 the next WPS Resolution, UNSCR 1820, was initiated by the US State Department, rather than civil society advocacy, and designed to complement the Bush Administration’s antitrafficking agenda (Otto, 2010: 109). However, the draft of the Resolution was leaked to NGOs who sought to respond critically in attempt to tone down the focus on women as powerless and vulnerable victims (Otto, 2010: 109). Unsurprisingly, UNSCR 1820 received a mixed reception from scholars and activists. Some welcomed it as a long overdue engagement by the Security Council with CRSGBV. Others criticised the resolution for reducing the broad scope of UNSCR 1325 and holistic nature of the WPS agenda to the issue of women as victims of war (Otto, 2010: 101; Cook, 2009b). In treating CRSGBV as a separate issue from violence against women in peacetime, there is a danger that the latter become normalised. Further, sensationalising sexual violence in war may reinforce the beliefs which make rape a powerful weapon of war (Cook, 2009b:48 The long view 129; Meger, 2016). Sam Cook (2009b: 129) argues that it is necessary to question the idea that experiencing sexual violence in conflict is the very worst thing that can happen to a woman and is unrecoverable from. This reinforces the notion that raping a woman in war is equivalent to ‘raping a nation’, with women seen as a resource, and closes down avenues to ending violence (Cook, 2009b: 129). The third WPS Resolution, UNSCR 1888 adopted in 2009, also addressed the issue of CRSGBV and was again sponsored by the US. However, the Obama administration sought to break from the Bush legacy on the issue (Otto, 2010: 110). The Resolution made a significant departure from UNSCR 1820 by treating the issue of CRSGBV as one of structural inequality, not women’s inherent vulnerability (Otto, 2010: 103). Five days after the adoption of UNSCR 1888, Vietnam sponsored the adoption of UNSCR 1889. The fourth WPS Resolution returned the focus of the WPS agenda to women’s participation, reinforcing and strengthening the provisions of UNSCR 1325 with measures to address women’s structural inequalities. UNSCR 1889 joined UNSCR 1325 in introducing new language acknowledging women as agents and displacing representations of women as victims (Otto, 2010: 103). In 2010, the adoption of UNSCR 1960 created a set of institutional tools to combat impunity and steps towards the prevention and protection from CRSGBV. Two further WPS Resolutions were passed by the Security Council in 2013: UNSCR 2016; and UNSCR 2122. UNSCR 2106, adopted in June, was proposed by the UK as part of their Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI) and became the fourth resolution to focus on CRSGBV. As a result there was again concern that the WPS agenda had narrowed to focus on CRSGBV at the expense of women’s participation (Krause and Enloe, 2015: 329). The adoption of UNSCR 2122 in 2013, which acknowledged the salient role women do and should play in contributing towards sustainable peace, was therefore significant because it represented the return of the WPS agenda to its wider and more comprehensive origins (Björkdahl and Mannergren Selimovic, 2015: 20). The Resolution also embodies the strongest language on women’s agency of all the WPS Resolutions (Miller, Pournik and Swaine, 2014: 51). The penultimate WPS Resolution, UNSCR 2122’s focus on monitoring the implementation of the WPS agenda through increased briefings to the Security Council from various UN entities, represented a radical departure from previous WPS Resolutions (Shepherd, 2014: 22). The Resolution called on member states, regional actors and UN entities to review their existing implementation of the WPS agenda and revise existing targets in preparation for the High-Level Review mandated by the Resolution in 2015. In addition, the Secretary General commissioned a Global Study led by Radhika Coomaraswamy, former Special Representative of the Secretary- General on Children and Armed Conflict and former Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women. The study was intended to review the progress made towards achieving the goals set out in the WPS Resolutions and to outline a global policy agenda to inform WPS efforts going forward (UN Women, 2014).The long view 49 Fifteen years on from the adoption of UNSCR 1325, Spain sponsored the adoption of a further resolution, UNSCR 2242. This resolution is the most recent in the WPS framework and the main focus is a call for WPS to be a cross-cutting issue within the Countering Violence Extremism agenda. This is a departure from the recommendations of the Global Study on UNSCR 1325, which recommended that CVE be separated from women’s rights, noting that the instrumental use of women’s rights can be harmful in fragile situations (Wright, 2015). More positively, as Wright (2015) notes, UNSCR 2242 does call for research into the impact of CVE on women’s rights. In addition to CVE, UNSCR 2242 makes a number of other contributions to the WPS agenda. These include the creation of an Informal Expert Group on WPS at the UN Security Council (a recommendation of the Global Study) and a call for WPS to be incorporated into all country-specific situations on the Security Council’s agenda. As Table 2.1 points out, the WPS Resolutions can be broadly categorised into those addressing CRSGBV and those addressing WP. The CRSGBV Resolutions have been critiqued for being reductive in framing the rationale for women’s participation as a means to address CR-SGBV (Heathcote, 2018: 380). The paradigm also presents men from conflict-affected states as the perpetrators of CRSGBV, deflecting from the inadequacies within other ‘peacetime’ states’ approach to the issue (Heathcote, 2018: 380). CRSGBV is understood as the archetypal experience of women during conflict. As Heathcote (2018: 380) argues, this could deflect ‘attention from economic needs, Gender-based Violence and the role of gendered power relations in producing the myriad of gendered harms that communities experience’. As Meger (2016: 153) contends, this has resulted from the ‘securitization’ of CRSGBV which has entailed presenting the issue as a threat to the state with the assumption that restoring state authority and bringing perpetrators to justice will decrease CRSGBV. In separating CRSGBV from the broader continuum of violence against women, evident through peacetime and in conflict, women’s insecurity is not adequately addressed. UNSCR 1889 and UNSCR 2122 focus on substantive representation, developing further the call for women’s participation in UNSCR 1325. As Heathcote (2018: 381) cautions, while this is a welcome development it has also been accompanied by a shift to the use of indicators as a means to ‘measure’ the success of WPS. As she notes, indicators are never neutral or objective tools and there is a risk that WPS will become a means to count women, rather than to meaningfully address the ‘the substantive and structural disadvantages that hinder women’s full participation within any community’ (Heathcote, 2018: 381). UNSCR 1889 also lacks nuance in considering just which women are represented and assumes women are a homogenous group able to speak for all. Both Resolutions also fall back on emphasising the need to consult women’s civil society groups as a solution to WP, rather than considering how to promote women as decision makers (Heathcote, 2018: 380).

#### Attempting to achieve gender equality through policy initiatives reinforces protective masculinity and the subordination of the feminine within NATO

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As the above has demonstrated, gender work at NATO has largely been the domain of women. This has provided an opportunity for women to advance their own and other’s interests, but also serves to further a conflation of gender with women, or women’s issues, that can have restrictive effects on how the role and92 NATO women and gendermen place of women – and the utility of a gender perspective – is understood within NATO, as our analysis in Chapter 5 demonstrates. Drawing on the work of Hurley (2018a), here we want to explore what happens when military men start to engage in gender work within NATO. This is a relatively recent occurrence, there are still relatively few men working in senior positions to advance NATO’s engagement with WPS or working as gender advisors – though this number is growing at a significant rate. These developments are also complemented by an increased willingness by high-profile and senior men within NATO, including the Secretary General, to publicly advocate WPS and the work of the NCGP; for example the 2018 annual meeting of the NCGP was opened by a keynote address from Jens Stoltenberg. Though, as we have identified above, this is not the first time a Secretary General has expressed support and provided important influence in advancing NATO’s gender agenda. Here we conceive of the men ‘doing gender work’ as ‘gendermen’; and occupying a distinct position within NATO. They are men, working in predominantly female-occupied job roles in an organisation dominated by men (Hurley, 2018a). In many ways they challenge or transgress what are deemed to be ‘appropriate’ or acceptable norms within NATO. Here we explore how these perceived transgressions are policed and controlled by those same institutional structures and norms and can reinforce a masculinist protection logic (Young, 2003) that we argue in Chapter 1 underpins NATO’s broader engagement with WPS. Yet, we also argue that men engaging with gender work can offer opportunities for positive, incremental changes in the ways in which militarised masculinities are understood (Duncanson, 2013, 2015) and by extension an opportunity to expose and push for broader changes within NATO’s institutional structures that continue to privilege men and masculinity (Hurley, 2018a, 2018b). Men doing gender work at NATO identified some of the key challenges that they faced in advancing that work. Some of these challenges were informal, yet powerful ways of highlighting difference and reinforcing what was perceived to be acceptable: other people are not convinced, even my colleagues make a lot of jokes about me: ‘You are “genderman”, have you shaved your legs?’ These are jokes, but sometimes, inside their brains, there is some kind of truth. They don’t believe in this. Now seeing a man [doing this work], I think they will open their eyes a little bit more. Interview with NATO Official, 2012 in Hurley (2018) Lazar (2005, 2007) suggests that these sorts of ‘gender crossings’ – the transgression of expected gender norms, in this case a military man working on gender issues – emphasise the underlying dualism of the gender structure within any given organisation. Deviations from these gender-appropriate norms are often policed through criticism and containment, in both formal and informal ways – such as jokes and humour (Lazar, 2005: 8–9). Hearn has argued that ‘trivialisation through humour’ is one of myriad social and psychological resources that military organisations provide for the reproduction and changing of individual psychologies (in Higate, 2003: xiii). And yet, it is a particular form of trivialisation; one that seeks to feminise both the individual and the work that he is doing. This joke serves to both feminise the individual man and, by extension, identify his work as feminine and therefore unimportant within NATO as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity. The joke is used to link gender work at NATO with (a culturally specific) feminine practice – the shaving of legs – reinforcing an implicit and persistent conflation of gender with ‘women’s issues’. Women shave their legs, men do not; therefore gender is a woman’s concern, not a man’s (Hurley, 2018a). In this example, through working on gender issues, by addressing and highlighting the merits of the Women, Peace and Security agenda to other men within the organisation, the masculinity of the gendermen is questioned. As Duncanson (2015) notes, one of the ways in which hegemonic masculinity achieves its hegemonic status is through the feminisation of ‘other’ groups of men (in Hurley, 2018a: 13). And yet the response to this challenge is important too. The distinct and highly visible position that gendermen have is understood as an opportunity to change minds of other resistant men and, in doing so, increase the importance of gender within NATO: Some of them just don’t see the practical use. They just can’t get beyond the idea that women, approaching them, understanding them and that addressing their security needs matters at all … I know some men here will tell me, and they wouldn’t tell her [his female colleague], that they don’t quite buy the concept. So, I can have conversations with them as far as that goes and both they and I gain a better insight into the concept. Interview with NATO Official, 2012 in Hurley (2018) So, gendermen can use their distinct positions, and (re)negotiate their identities in the context within which they find themselves and in response to challenges, to change the minds and perspectives of these resistant colleagues. Yet what is highlighted here is the importance of men speaking to, listening to and being influenced by other men (rather than their women colleagues). This reinforces an understanding of whose voices – and what messages – are afforded respect and credibility within NATO, a point we develop further in Chapter 5. In addition to the risk of feminisation, a common concern of men involved or interested in gender-equality initiatives across a broad range of institutions was a perceived challenge to or misunderstanding of their heterosexuality. In their study of gender mainstreaming within EU member states, Ruxton and Van der Gaag (2013: 169) identify that there was ‘absolute terror in individual men [of] coming across as gay, as female and so on’. This conflation of gender and sexuality was also evident at NATO: I speak with my friends, and I say I work in gender and they start shouting about the gays and the lesbians and you have to say: ‘I don’t have anything to do with gays and lesbians, it is gender’. The thing is, what I do mainly is work to protect men and women, boys and girls who suffer the effects of operations, missions and worse; and in that moment people change their perspective and say: ‘oh my God’; and I say: ‘you can literally help them’. Here, then, there is a fear of feminisation and subordination through a perceived association of working on WPS at NATO with homosexuality (Hurley, 2018a). Interestingly all of the men we spoke to made explicit reference to their wives, girlfriends or children, often at the beginning of conversations, something that the women we spoke to very rarely did. Others made clear references to being ‘OK with gay men’ – even when the focus of the discussion was on a seemingly unrelated topic – with some even suggesting that a focus on LGBT rights should become part of NATO’s broader WPS engagement. Hurley (2018a; in Holmes et al., 2019: 25) has speculated that this might be one mechanism gendermen use to affirm their heterosexuality and to dispel any misperceptions or ambiguity regarding their sexuality, and/or be used as a bonding ploy when in conversation with other men (Conway, 2008; Schwalbe and Wolkomir, 2001). There was also a common articulation that engaging in gender work and promoting the WPS agenda at NATO was a way to protect the vulnerable, most commonly, though not exclusively, women and children. Chapter 1 has shown how masculine norms at NATO reinforce a particular hegemonic regime that becomes built into the structures of the alliance and are transmitted to member and partner states through NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’. Informing these norms is a logic of masculinist protection. There is broader evidence of this logic in the way that NATO framed its engagement with WPS under the banner of Protection, Participation and Prevention, as we have explored in Chapter 2 and go onto discuss further in Chapter 5. What the quotes above, and the accounts of the gendermen, highlight is an individualisation of this broader masculinist protectionist narrative: I tend to think that we work for men and women, boys and girls. You focus on the weakest part, the people that are suffering the most. So maybe men don’t suffer, but then I think that is happening more and more. In that way our objective is much more interesting and your work is much more rewarding, let’s say. Interview with NATO Official, 2012 in Hurley (2018) Here, then, gender work is framed as work that helps and is informed by a desire to protect. In similar ways to Young’s (2003) conceptualisation, this account of masculinist protection is expressed in benign terms yet a hierarchy between vulnerable, predominantly non-Western civilians, and a powerful Western military organisation acting a protector is established nonetheless: ‘the role of the masculine protector puts those protected, paradigmatically women and children, in a subordinate position of dependence’ (Young, 2003: 2). The masculinist protection narratives as a response challenges these individual gendermen face draws upon and reinforces broader constructions of hegemonic masculinity at NATO writ large. They provide a further mechanism through which the disruption of their ‘transgression’ can be normalised.

#### The perm is worse than the alt alone—NATO’s history of co-optation allows it to defang feminist demands and insulate itself from criticism

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Feminist goals are always inherently vulnerable to co-option. This occurs when institutions use feminist rhetoric selectively ‘to promote their own agenda irrespective of the consequences for women’s lives’ (D’Costa and Lee-Koo, 2013: 2). Co-option as a practice ‘absorbs the meanings of the original concepts to fit into the prevailing political priorities’ (von der Lippe, 2012: 19). On one level co-option occurs when these original feminist concepts interact with hegemonic strategic policy priorities and objectives, neutralising their transformative praxis (von der Lippe, 2012: 20). Our discussion in Chapter 5 on the meaning of a ‘gender perspective’ draws attention to this. However, the implications of cooption are arguably far more severe for feminist praxis when they are used as an alibi for neutralising positive action or opposition. This sees institutions ‘appropriate the language of advocacy in order to co-opt social movement resistance’ (True, 2003: 379). A public commitment to feminist goals can therefore become resistance to feminism. For example, at the national level, large corporations which adopt legislative recommendations before they are binding are likely to do so because they are vulnerable to criticism if they are not seen to be proactively engaged (Martin, 2000: 213). The public commitment may indeed loosely correlate to certain specific actions taken by the institution. However, ultimately it allows the institution to co-opt the issue and use it to support an alternate message (Martin, 2000: 213). Initiatives which on the surface appear progressive then come to sit against both sexist and racist institutional structures which are left unchallenged. For example, research on UK universities’ implementation of the 2010 Race Relations Act finds a disjuncture between the image of the university presented in an implementation policy and the reality (Ahmed, 2007: 594). Ahmed’s concept of ‘documents as performance’ is helpful here (2007: 594). Ahmed asks us to consider how documents become ‘forms of institutional performance in two senses. Both the ways in which institutions perform an image of themselves through the document and how institutions perform presenting an image of “doing well”’ (Ahmed, 2007: 594). International Women’s Day provides another example of an event with radical and transformative foundations which is now being marked by global108 Gendering NATO’s core tasks corporations, the UN and other international actors, including NATO. The first International Women’s Day was organised by internationalist socialist women in the USA in 1907 with the aim of bringing attention to their fight for equality in every aspect of life (Kaplan, 1985: 166). In Europe, the inaugural event was held in 1911 to draw attention to the cause of women’s suffrage (Kaplan, 1985: 166). It was the celebration of International Women’s Day in Russia in 1917, where women were joined by men from the metal works in protests on the breadline and in factories,2 which really served to root the day in its transformative socialist origins (Kaplan, 1985: 166). The protests and the response of the Czar (who ordered his generals to shoot if necessary) precipitated the February revolution (Kaplan, 1985: 166). Despite these origins, the increasing neo-liberalisation of International Women’s Day is evident through its adoption by global corporations. This has been accompanied by a shift to understand the day as about women’s empowerment, rather than women’s rights (Grosser and McCarthy, 2018). Ultimately, this has led to its distancing from the transnational feminist activism which is at its core (Grosser and McCarthy, 2018). To mark International Women’s Day 2018, NATO launched a Facebook and Instagram campaign posing the question: ‘Did you know that NATO has more women in leadership positions than ever before? Together – men and women – we are stronger! #IWD2018’. While this may be true, as we discuss in Chapter 1, this belies the reality of the continued and significant marginalisation of women from decision-making roles within NATO. There has been progress, but it has been slow. This presents the possibility that International Women’s Day has been co-opted as a public diplomacy tool to promote a linear picture of progress of women’s empowerment, one removed from the reality of women’s positions within these institutional structures, whether global corporations or NATO. Rather than reflect on existing institutional challenges to gender equality, again as we outline in Chapter 1, NATO has marked the day by presenting a positive picture of a gender-sensitive employer. This supports the argument that one outcome of the commodification and co-option of feminist agendas (e.g. gender equality and women’s rights) can be that they lose their transformative potential (Acker, 2006: 460). At the international level, the implications of co-option are epitomised in the relationship of feminists to the World Bank. Following the 1995 Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women, a ‘Women’s Eyes on the Bank’ initiative was established to monitor and attempt to transform the World Bank (True, 2003: 379). The women’s movement shifted from challenging the World Bank to viewing it ‘as a potential ally in dialogues between women’s groups and their own governments’ (O’Brien et al., 2000). This resulted in women’s needs and goals being framed as compatible with the neoliberal logics underpinning World Bank programmes (Bergeron, 2001: 1002). The relationship between local women’s movements and the World Bank has therefore facilitated the appropriation of the ‘language of advocacy’ by the institution (True, 2003: 379). The very real danger of the co-option of feminist agendas by international institutions necessitates critical feminist knowledge of how such institutions operate. Gender mainstreaming is one policy initiative which states and international institutions have engaged with, which has transformative potential. Gender mainstreaming refers to ‘efforts to scrutinize and reinvent processes of policy formulation and implementation across all issue areas to address and rectify persistent and emerging disparities between men and women’ (True and Mintrom, 2001: 28). It has its origins in the UN conferences on women (True and Mintrom, 2001: 28), and is also called for in UNSCR 1325 (United Nations, 2000). It is a core part of NATO’s implementation of WPS. For example, the 2018 NATO/EAPC Women, Peace and Security Policy and Action Plan 2018 brochure states that ‘gender equality is considered as an integral part of NATO policies, programmes and projects guided by effective gender mainstreaming practices’ (NATO/EAPC, 2018). Gender mainstreaming initiatives are retroactive in the sense that the organisational structure as well as the practices, norms and behaviours of individuals within that structure predate gender mainstreaming as a policy initiative (Benschop and Verloo, 2006: 20). They can therefore be characterised as ‘disruptive’ because of an inherent tension and competition between a ‘new’ focus on ‘gender’ and the institutional ‘mainstream’ (Benschop and Verloo 2006: 20). If implemented correctly, such initiatives should seek to address the persistence of gender inequality within organisations and through doing so asks ‘new’ things of the institution. They therefore have the potential to address ‘the genderedness of organisations: the material and discursive constructions of masculinity and femininity that shape and are shaped by organisations’ (Benschop and Verloo, 2006: 19). As Walby (2005: 322) argues, pre-existing institutional priorities (in the case of NATO, the ‘core tasks’ outlined in the NATO Strategic Concept) ‘compete with goals of gender equality for prioritisation, which makes gender mainstreaming an inherently contested process that is never simply about adopting new policy’. Instead, the process involves a ‘negotiation’ between the ‘dual agenda’ of the established institutional practices and gender equality (Walby, 2005: 322). Here it is ‘new’ policy that is struggling with the existing organisational norms; disrupting them and rendering them visible. Analysing the effects of particular ‘disruptive’ policy initiatives within NATO provides insight into the pervasiveness of gender norms and hierarchies. However, contextualising NATO’s concern with gender issues against its core tasks, collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security, brings into question whether they were ever ‘disruptive’ or can bring the change expected of them in terms of transforming NATO’s role as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity.

#### The perm merely incorporates women and feminist policy into systems of militarized violence—prefer the alt alone

Wright 2015

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The Global Study rightly notes that women peace activists who lobbied for 1325 “were seeking a fundamental shift” in how international security is pursued; a “rollback of the escalating levels of militarization making homes, communities and nations less rather than more secure”. Yet since the passage of 1325, many Member States, UN agencies and civil society actors have tended to prioritise adding women and their concerns into existing militarised systems for maintaining peace and security, whilst deprioritising efforts to challenge the very nature of those systems. This is evident in the fact that many of the states championing women, peace and security on the global stage also continue to pursue militarised foreign policies. The UK, for example, has recently been working hard to push for faster implementation of 1325 internationally, whilst providing political and military support for the Saudi-led coalition’s bombing of Yemen, fuelling a rapidly growing humanitarian crisis in that country. In preparation for the Global Study, Saferworld and others highlighted this trend and called for the agenda to prioritise preventing violent conflict by address its underlying structural causes. The Global Study – authored independently by Radhika Coomaraswamy, in consultation with UN agencies, Member States and civil society – makes a call for greater use of non-violent approaches to conflict prevention as its very first recommendation, and states that “a militarized view of conflict prevention sells resolution 1325 short of its transformative vision”. Yet, perhaps unsurprisingly, UNSCR 2242 does not reflect this bold message, making only passing reference to the need to “invest more in conflict prevention”. The provisions of the resolution – which include, among other things, higher targets for numbers of female peacekeepers, better inclusion of gender-based violence in sanctions regimes, and more gender advisers within the UN system – may well bring some positive outcomes for women and girls living with conflict and violence. But they present technical fixes, filling gaps in the previous resolutions, rather than an attempt to rethink how we approach international security and turn back the tide of militarisation. The Global Study also notes that, “Militarism and cultures of militarized masculinities create and sustain political decision-making where resorting to the use of force becomes a normalized mode for dispute resolution”. Questions around men and masculinities have often been neglected in policy and practice around 1325: activists have competing perspectives on the the politics of focusing attention and resources on men and boys as part of an agenda that seeks to put an end to male dominance in the field of peace and security. Saferworld advocates for the transformation of militarised masculinities as part of efforts to prevent conflict, and strongly welcomes the Global Study’s recommendation to support the training of men, women, girls and boys which “reinforces and supports non-violent, non-militarized expressions of masculinity”. As with the other recommendations on conflict prevention and demilitarisation, however, recommendations on masculinities were not reflected in 2242 beyond a brief mention of “engagement by men and boys as partners” - a much weaker message. Perhaps the issue where the fault lines have appeared most strikingly in recent months has been the role of women in countering violent extremism, which features prominently in UNSCR 2242. The Global Study calls for the promotion of women’s rights to be detached from counter-terrorism and military planning processes, noting that counter-terror strategies, and their instrumentalisation of the women’s rights agenda, can be directly harmful to women and girls in fragile contexts. For example, restrictions on financial transfers to areas subject to counter-terror measures prevent women’s organisations from receiving funding, while attempts to justify military interventions based on concerns about women’s rights risk provoking a violent backlash against women‘s rights activists. Saferworld’s research underlines that counter-terror strategies also frequently serve to deepen conflicts and undermine efforts to build peace. While women can and do play important roles in preventing radicalisation in their communities, simplistic notions that empowering women is the key to ending violent extremism risk placing a huge burden of responsibility on individual women without addressing the many other injustices and failures of governance which so often drive conflict and radicalisation. Despite the Global Study’s words of warning, UNSCR 2242 calls for greater integration of the women, peace and security and counter-terror agendas. The broad language of the resolution is, like most such documents, open to varying interpretations. More positively, it does call for research on “the impacts of counter-terrorism strategies on women’s human rights and women’s organizations”. The news that counter-terrorism is officially on the women, peace and security agenda (and vice versa) will be welcomed by some women peace activists as evidence that women’s roles are being taken seriously, but will no doubt garner concerned reactions from others, including many in countries that are the focus of counter-terror efforts.

## Impact

### Hegemonic Masculinity

#### The aff’s lack of gendered analysis about NATO specifically reproduces hegemonic masculinity, creating violent hierarchies

Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz 19

Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “NATO as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 17-21. LJS

The concept of hegemonic masculinity was brought to prominence by Connell (1995) and refers to the particular set of masculine norms and practices that come to subordinate other masculinities, enabling the continued dominance of men over women. Hegemonic masculinity is never explicit and has primarily been built upon cultural norms (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 832) and supported by institutional power (Kronsell, 2012: 45). The military occupies the most important position for the definition of hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 1995: 213). As a military alliance NATO is also a source of ‘normative conception of gender’, amplifying already dominant cultural norms but also actively participating in their construction (Carreiras, 2006: 40). This makes NATO, as a trans-Atlantic military alliance, a key site for the transfer of gendered values. The concept of hegemonic masculinity refers to a configuration or pattern of ‘idealised’ masculine characteristics that occupy a position of power and privilege within particular a social, cultural and temporal context (Connell, 2005: 78). Central to this formulation is the notion differentiation within masculinities, bound up with varying levels of power and privilege. Connell defines these as ‘hegemonic’, ‘subordinate’, ‘complicit’ and ‘marginalised’ masculinities (Connell, 2005: 79). Subordinate masculinities therefore are those which do not conform (or are not seen to conform) to hegemonic ideals. For Connell, (assumed) characteristics and practices of subordinated masculinities are often ‘blurred’ with femininity (Connell, 2005: 79) – ‘effeminate’, homosexual men for example – thereby allowing for them to be ‘symbolically expelled’ from the hegemonic representation of ‘masculinity’. Complicit masculinity encompasses Connell’s notion of the ‘patriarchal dividend’. In short, Connell (2005: 79)18 NATO as an institution asserts that whilst not all men represent the hegemonic ideal, the majority of men gain advantage from the overall subordination of women– that there is an inherent dividend attached to simply being born a man, into the one half of a socially constructed binary that is culturally more valued. As Via (2010: 43) argues: A man’s (or anyone’s) claim to masculinity … is a positional claim in opposition to a feminine other that society has constructed to be the lesser of the two binaries. Without the existence of an individual or group that can be labelled as the weaker party, masculine social norms would be without content. In addition to gender, ethnicity, class and other marginalised characteristics also have a part to play in how hegemonic masculinity is constructed. Here, it is necessary to consider ‘relations between the masculinities in dominant and subordinated classes or ethnic groups’ (Connell, 2005: 80). This is a linear relationship between the ‘authorisation’ of the hegemonic masculinity of the dominant group and the marginalised. So, while it is possible for some within marginalised communities to embody hegemonic masculinity, this does not necessarily correlate with an increase in social authority to the wider group. Indicative of this is the example of black men athletes in the United States who are seen to embody hegemonic masculinity, but this is not something extended beyond their elite grouping (Connell, 2005: 81). Hegemonic masculinity is plural and variable. It is therefore necessary to centralise the ‘relationality’ of gender relations. This means considering the relationship both within and between masculinities and femininities. No masculinity (or femininity) arises except in a complex system of gender relations that are fluid and contextually specific (Connell, 2005: 73). Therefore ‘masculinity, like femininity, is always liable to internal contradiction and historical disruption’ (Connell, 2005: 73). To state that particular manifestations of masculinity are hegemonic is not to suggest that all, or even most, men enact or embody hegemonic masculinity; indeed, it can be argued that most men do not (see Demetriou, 2001: 342). Hegemonic masculinity can therefore be seen to represent normative ideals about the conduct, embodiment and enactment of masculinity in any culturally specific context. However, Connell posits the question: ‘What is “normative” about a norm hardly anyone meets’? (Connell, 2005a: 70). It is normative then, not in the numerical sense, but in that it culturally accepted and legitimised via particular cultural practices and through institutions. Hegemonic ideals are therefore conditional and intrinsically linked to institutional power; they are constructed via process rather than existing as a fixed or static ‘type’ and intimately linked to context: Hegemony is likely to be established only if there is some correspondence between cultural ideal and institutional power, collective if not individual. So the top levels of business, the military and government provide a fairly convincing corporate display of masculinity, still very little shaken by feminist women or dissenting men. It is the successful claim to authority, more than direct violence that is the mark of hegemony (though violence often underpins or supports authority). (Connell, 2005a: 77) In this conceptualisation, hegemonic masculinity is bound up with the legitimation of authority and claims to power and privilege in a particular gender order or gender regime. This legitimation and claims to authority within institutions and cultural practices produce a façade of unitary masculinity which determine the standards against which other masculinities (and femininities) are then defined (Cornwall and Lindisfarne, 1994: 20). In the example of the military, constructions of hegemonic masculinity are drawn upon to construct uniformity within the soldiers and conformity to particular organisational priorities. That the unitary nature of hegemonic masculinity may be ‘illusionary’ does not negate the powerful, dominant effects it has upon ‘other’ masculinities and femininity, more broadly defined. As Sandra Via (2010: 43) notes: The dominance of hegemonic masculinity relies on its opposition to and competition with subordinated masculinities and femininities. Hegemonic masculinities at once promote a particular organisation of the political order and reinforces unequal relationships between men and women in order to promote the legitimation of masculine authority. Hegemonic masculinity therefore has powerful ‘organisational’ effects (and indeed, can be drawn upon as a particular organisational resource) through which unequal patterns of gender relations can be ordered and maintained. One of the main critiques of the concept of hegemonic masculinity – indeed of a hierarchical gender order, more generally – is that it can imply a rigidity or a static representation, a ‘type’ or ‘essence’ of masculinity; further, that this was a negative type or a toxic assemblage of traits (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 840). Ultimately, that there was an inherent ‘descriptive tendency’ within the concept of hegemonic masculinity that resulted in essentialised characteristics being applied to particular groups of men. Connell and Messerschmidt rejected this critique and re-emphasised the importance placed on social context (2005: 832–3), asserting that just as masculinity and femininity is not a fixed entity in the body or personality traits of individuals – masculinities are configurations of practice that are accomplished in social action and therefore can differ according to the gender relations in a particular social setting. (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 836) Indeed, it can be argued that the various usages and application of the term across a wide variety of empirical and theoretical research (including Feminist International Relations – see Kronsell, 2005 below) necessitate periodic critical evaluation as the concept ‘must mutate’ as it ‘finds applications in other settings and by other hands’ (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 854; Tickner and Sjoberg, 2011: 227–9; Messerschmidt, 2012). A level of appropriation or co-option, of elements from subordinate or marginalised masculinities and indeed of femininities, is necessary for hegemonic masculinities to remain hegemonic in changing social or cultural settings (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 848). Hegemony can be accomplished through ‘the incorporation of such masculinities into a functioning gender order rather than by active oppression in the form of discredit or violence’ (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 848). Both co-option and oppression can, and often do, occur together (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 848). They are ‘to a significant degree constituted in men’s interaction with women; therefore the commonalities in women’s gender practices also produce convergence’ (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 848). This notion of ‘hybridisation’, through appropriation, rather than overt violence, is a key theme in critical masculinities studies that sought to theorise the contested, contradictory, yet ultimately variable relationships between the masculinities of Connell’s gender order (for example: Messner, 1992, 1993, 2007; Anderson, 1993; Demetriou, 2001; Bridges, 2014). Messner (2007) puts forward a notion of a culturally ascendant hybrid masculinity that combines toughness and tenderness, but in specific ways which obscure (and perpetuate) power and inequality (Bridges, 2014: 61). Anderson (2010) has formulated a theory of ‘Inclusive Masculinity’ to explain what he sees as a (Western) cultural shift in declining homophobia and greater sexual and gender equality – though the extent of Anderson’s ‘inclusivity’ within contemporary Western masculinity in regard to homosexuality is contested (O’Neill, 2015). Demetriou (2001: 345) critiques an inherent elitism within Connell’s conceptualisation of hegemonic masculinity, in that it downplays – or neglects entirely – the agency of individuals within subordinated masculinities and women generally, something Connell and Messerschmidt acknowledge (2005: 847). Demetriou’s work focuses on the appropriation of elements of gay culture into a ‘contemporary hegemonic bloc’ that reproduces rather than challenges patriarchy. What these studies (Anderson’s excluded) note is that the malleability of hegemonic forms or manifestations of masculinity does not suggest that patriarchal power is undermined. Indeed, it is suggested that transformation, appropriation and hybridisation of particular hegemonic forms of masculinity are essential for them to remain hegemonic and therefore do nothing to advance gender equality. As this discussion highlights, hegemonic masculinity is the norm and is normative, but it is never explicit and although this hegemony could be supported by force, it has primarily been built upon cultural norms (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 832) and supported by institutional power (Kronsell, 2012: 45). For example, Connell (1995: 213) argues that the military (in Europe and the US) occupies the most important position for the definition of hegemonic masculinity. As a military alliance, NATO is also a source of ‘normative conception of gender’, amplifying already dominant cultural norms but also actively participating in their construction (Carreiras, 2006: 40). This makes NATO, as a trans-Atlantic political and military alliance, a key site for the transfer of gendered values and a valuable space for the study of military masculinities.

### War

#### Patriarchy is the root cause of violence—masculine norms require violent actions for membership into privileged groups

Acheson 21

Ray, Director of Reaching Critical Will, the disarmament programme of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). “’Terminally Unserious’: Ideologies and Oppressions of Nuclear Weapons.” Banning the Bomb, Smashing the Patriarchy. 2021. Pg 26-30 LJS

Based on what I have seen over the past fifteen years working around the United Nations and even longer as an antinuclear activist, I believe—as several feminists have argued previously—that a significant part of why this knot is so hard to untie is patriarchy. In fact, as a feminist disarmament activist, I have come to believe that more than anything else, the association of weapons with power is one of the foremost obstacles to disarmament. And, as feminist scholars have articulated time and again, that this association is gendered. Patriarchy is a system of power. It is, in the barest sense, a hierarchical social order in which women are subordinate to men. But it is more than that. It is an order that shapes and entrenches gender as a cultural construction and system that endows the hegemonic conception of what is a “man” with the “right” to dominate and rule over others. Understanding how patriarchy works requires us to understand how gender works. Gender refers to the socially constructed expectations and norms about how we are supposed to perform as women, men, and others, or in relation to sexual orientations; that is, concepts of masculine and feminine and the normative demands of how to behave in order to “properly” represent the bodies we inhabit or are perceived to inhabit. It comes from a particular—and unfortunately, very dominant—understanding of masculinity. This is a masculinity in which ideas such as strength, courage, and protection are equated with violence. It is a masculinity in which the capacity and willingness to use weapons, engage in combat, and kill other human beings is seen as essential to being “a real man.”77 Feminists have long explored the ways in which gender norms, particularly militarized masculinities, drive conflict and violence and the acquisition and proliferation of weapons. These scholars and activists argue that the association of power and strength, coded as masculine traits, with the accumulation and use of weapons, has a negative impact on disarmament and peace.78 Militarized masculinity harms everyone. It harms those who do not comply with mainstream gender norms— queer-identified people, nonnormative men—and it harms women. It requires oppression of those deemed “weaker” on the basis of gender norms. It also assumes men to be inherently violent and inclined to participate in violent acts—and thus also more expendable.79 And it makes disarmament seem weak. It makes peace seem utopian. It makes protection without weapons seem absurd. When it comes to nuclear weapons, several dimensions to the connection between patriarchal power and militarist masculinities contribute to the difficulty in advocating for nuclear disarmament. We can start with the “ubiquitous weight of gender” throughout the entire nuclear weapon discourse and the association of nuclear weapons with masculinity that Carol Cohn described in her groundbreaking work in the 1980s mentioned earlier. Her analysis of the gendered symbolism of nuclear weapons developed through a discourse of “defense intellectuals” provided the foundations for a feminist analysis of nuclear war, nuclear strategy, and nuclear weapons. She described the “sanitized abstraction and sexual imagery,” including metaphors that equate military and political power with sexual potency and masculinity—such as “vertical erector launchers, thrust-to-weight ratios, soft lay downs, deep penetration, the comparative advantages of protracted versus spasm attacks,” and discussions about how “the Russians are a little harder than we are.”80 She and Sara Ruddick suggested that this type of highly sexualized language serves to “mobilize gendered associations and symbols in creating assent, excitement, support for, and identification with weapons.”81 It is also “a way of minimizing the seriousness of militarist endeavors, of denying their deadly consequences.”82 In later years Cohn, along with Ruddick and Felicity Ruby, expanded the inquiry into the sense of masculine strength afforded by nuclear weapons, tying this into some of the broader feminist analysis about violent and militarized masculinities discussed above. They listened to a nationalist leader after India’s 1998 nuclear weapon tests explain, “We had to prove that we are not eunuchs.” They argue that this statement is meant to “elicit admiration for the wrathful manliness of the speaker” and to imply that being willing to employ nuclear weapons is to “have the balls” or to be “man enough” to “defend” your country.83 This link between masculinity and the power of force persists today. Think of Trump “becoming presidential” by launching missiles at Syria84 or of Kim Jong-un and his massive parades of missile hardware in a literal showcase of “mine is bigger than yours.”85 Think of Theresa May giving a resolute yes to the question of whether she would be willing to “personally authorize a nuclear strike that could kill 100,000 innocent men, women and children.”86 It is, after all, women leaders as well as men who are conditioned to prove their capacity to lead by a “manly” show of force. Simply adding women to the situation is not sufficient to achieve nuclear disarmament. And “men” as a category are not specifically or exclusively the problem. Gendered norms, in particular violent or militarized masculinities, are the main problem. The structural imbalance of power among gender identities is also the problem. A recent study published by New America paints a portrait of the nuclear policy field in the United States, dominated as it is by cisgender heterosexual white men who compose a self-described “nuclear priesthood” that espouse normative masculinized perspectives on security and weapons. Seeking a place at the table within this space, women (mostly white, cisgender women) tend to be inclined to try to gain favor with and impress the priesthood, seeing it as an important challenge to fit in and prove that women are “not afraid of nuclear weapons.”87 As a case in point, the U.S. nuclear weapon team under the Obama administration included women in the roles of secretary of state (Hillary Clinton), undersecretary of state for arms control and international security affairs (Ellen Tauscher), assistant secretary of state for verification, compliance, and implementation (Rose Gottemoeller), special representative of the president for nuclear proliferation (Susan Burk), permanent representative to the United Nations (Susan Rice), and permanent representative to the Conference on Disarmament (Laura Kennedy). Yet the Obama administration pursued the biggest nuclear arms buildup since Reagan and vociferously opposed negotiations of a nuclear weapon ban treaty. Similarly, as of the beginning of 2019, the CEOs of four of the five biggest weapon producers in the United States—Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, and the military wing“Terminally Unserious” 29 of Boeing—are now women.88 These women are not challenging the patriarchal structures and systems that have created the militarized world order; they are actively maintaining it and profiting from it. The solution to the dominance of toxic masculinity in disarmament discourse or capitalism in the nuclear-industrial complex is not simply to include women. Liberal feminism is “dedicated to enabling a privileged few to climb the corporate ladder or the ranks of the military,” through which it “subscribes to a market-centred view of equality that dovetails with corporate enthusiasm for ‘diversity,’” Nancy Fraser, Tithi Bhattacharya, and Cinzia Arruzza have written for a new feminist manifesto. Rather than abolish social hierarchy, liberal feminism “aims to feminize it, ensuring women at the top can attain parity with the men of their own class.”89 As Cynthia Enloe says, “You can militarize anything, including equality.”90 To actually challenge policies and practices of the elite decisionmaking class, it is imperative to create space—inside but also outside of existing institutions—where women and others of diverse gender identities, races and ethnicities, backgrounds and experiences—who are willing and able to approach the issue from different perspectives, including feminist and human security perspectives—can be fully engaged. A lesson from feminist, queer, and Indigenous struggles, among others, is that appealing to the establishment for rights or equality or a seat at the table is at best insufficient to achieve change, and at worst serves to reinforce existing injustices by just making problematic institutions or processes appear more palatable or equitable without actually changing anything those institutions do. In order for true alternative perspectives to be treated as relevant, credible, and expert—to the same extent as the dominant, toxic, militarized masculinity perspectives—we don’t just need diverse participation in mainstream institutions. We must consider and create alternative spaces and relationships in order to engage in meaningful processes. Just as Indigenous struggles refuse to center or appeal to whiteness, and queer struggles refuse to center or appeal to the cisgendered or straight community, we need to work with others whose beliefs are outside the dominant, mainstream narrative of nuclear weapons to generate a new sense of what is normative and credible.91 This is important for the story of the nuclear ban and for nuclear abolition more broadly, because changing what people view as credible and normative about nuclear weapons is vital to achieving change in nuclear weapon policy. We need to not center the dominant frameworks of thought on nuclear weapons—which were created predominantly by white, cisgender, heteronormative men—but to bring a robust critical approach to these frameworks by centering the perspectives, ideas, and frameworks of thought developed by others who have traditionally been excluded from this area.

## Alt

### Feminist Foreign Policy

#### Vote negative to act from a feminist foreign policy – this stance takes principles of care, responsibility, and empathy seriously as a normative framework for how states should act. Abandoning the self-fulfilling prophecies of realism is a pre-requisite to creating a lasting peace between nations.

Aggestam et al. 19 – Karin Aggestam, professor of Political Science and holds the Pufendorf Endowed Chair at Lund University; Annika Bergman Rosamond, associate professor at the Department of Political Science, Lund University; Annica Kronsell, Professor of Political Science at School of Global Studies, Gothenburg University. [“Theorising feminist foreign policy,” International Relations, Volume 33, Issue 1. Sage Publishing, 2019.

Embedded in feminist notions of foreign and security policy is an ethical commitment to the care and nurturing of distant others, who reside beyond the confines of one’s own political community. As noted above, scholarship on ethical foreign policy is surprisingly void of gender analysis and feminist ethical engagement despite the fact that it is situated within the subfield of normative IR that engages widely with issues related to global justice and equality. We therefore propose that the ethics of care provides fertile ground for thinking through the analysis of feminist-inspired foreign and security policy discourse and practice as well as identifying the limits to such engagement. Ethics of care scholarship has been inspired by social psychology.51 Carol Gilligan argues that care is a form of moral development distinct from the justice-oriented moral dimension stemming from Enlightenment thinking. In the first generation of studies on ethics of care, there was an explicit association with female experiences as an alternative to maleled justice reasoning. A key contention here is that the mother’s distinct relationship with her child gives her a set of caring and nurturing skills that are transferrable beyond the immediate family and nation. Sara Ruddick, among others, suggests that maternal and caring relations can bring about peace.52 Still, while maternal care is strongly associated with women’s bodies, Ruddick insists that mothering is not a practice confined to women alone.53 Yet, in realpolitik, women, and mothers in particular, are frequently depicted as innately peaceful, which is an assumption that has been contested and rejected in feminist IR scholarship.54 Instead, feminist ethical theory has been attentive not to essentialise all women as peaceful, but instead to fully recognise the differences that exist between women. The second generation of care ethics scholars understand care in broader terms. For example, Joan Tronto defines care as ‘everything we do to maintain, continue and repair our world so that we can live in it as well as possible’.55 We find the broad range of scholarly efforts to globalise ethics of care56 useful to theorise feminist foreign policy because it can shed light on how care principles may be used in foreign policy in an effort to address global gender inequalities, violence and protection across borders. This necessitates taking issue with the assumption that ethics of care is inapplicable to the study of global gender politics because of its essentialisation of women’s experiences and universal lack of agency. Fiona Robinson rightly notes, concerns over the essentialism of care ethics must be taken seriously, I would argue that it is only a narrow, orthodox, ethics of care – the view of care as essentially a morality for women, belonging in the private sphere and valorising ‘dependence’ over ‘independence’ – to which these criticisms actually apply … clearly, the importance of an ethics of care, and its transformatory potential, does not, and indeed must not, rest on its association with women. While it is crucial to avoid undermining its feminist origins … the ethics of care is significant because it represents an alternative view of ethics which is relevant beyond the role of women within the family … ‘it’ extends beyond the personal to the political and, ultimately, to the global context of social life.57 In line with Robinson’s argument, we challenge orthodox conceptions of care ethics as a ‘morality for women’ only, while maintaining that its emphasis on dialogue and care is a useful approach to critically unpack the moral ambitions of a feminist and gender-based foreign policy-making. Moreover, we argue that the ethical foundations of feminist foreign policy, by and large, are consistent with the normative imperative of a globalised ethics of care, which contends that ‘those who are powerful have a responsibility to approach moral problems by looking carefully at where, why and how the structures of existing social and personal relations have led to exclusion and marginalization’.58 In contrast, orthodox notions of foreign policy do not consider the situatedness of the state within distinct cultural, political and ethical settings nor the intersectional subjectivities and moral preferences of the citizens inhabiting that sphere. However, an ethics of care approach to the study of foreign policy is sensitive to such variation because it is based on a relational ontology, which addresses the moral relations between human beings. Hence, an ethics of care approach to the study of feminist foreign policy takes into account the situated moral stories and experiences of individuals and in particular women whose voices have not been considered in traditional foreign policy analysis and IR.59 With an increasing number of states advocating pro-gender norms in foreign policy and principles of care and empathy, ethical foundations for the actual conduct of foreign policy become important to analyse. Yet, theoretical tools developed for such analysis need to embrace the criticisms that the ethics of care essentialises women’s aptness for care and nurturing, and, as such reduces their agency and actual engagements in global politics and participation public life.60 The emphasis on care and relationality also provide fertile ground for ethically unpacking the situated contents of a feminist foreign policy. As mentioned, an increasing number of states are resolutely pushing for a distinct feminist stance on foreign policymaking regarding the inclusion and representation of local women in world politics. Canada’s feminist development policy, for instance, is grounded in the assumption that women and girls have the ability to achieve real change in terms of sustainable development and peace, even though they are often the most vulnerable to poverty, violence and climate change. So we will work closely with local women’s rights groups, particularly in the areas of sexual and reproductive health … we will make sound decisions based on evidence and closely track our progress, but in a manner adapted to the needs of different stakeholders in different contexts.61 Swedish feminist foreign policy is grounded in a commitment to engage with distinct ethical reflections, experiences, needs and wants of local populations as a way of gaining insights and knowledge how to support local peace, conflict resolution and the eradication of gendered violence. Moreover, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2015) highlights the significance of ‘the participation of women and girls as actors in peace processes in conflict countries, including by encouraging parallels to the Swedish network for women mediators and supporting local women leaders, women’s rights activists, women’s organisations’ as well as ‘ensuring that women and girls are included and that their experience is taken into account in the design of mechanisms and systems for early conflict warning and in conflict analyses’.62 The unpacking of such discursive foreign policy statements enables a critical analysis of the presence of care values in states’ actual foreign policy practice. In this way, prevalent inconsistencies in the making of feminist foreign policy can be identified, which in turn can show in what ways they may impede its operationalisation in practice. For instance, both Canada and Sweden can be criticised for not sufficiently matching their care for distant other women living in conflict or poverty-struck zones with an empathetic commitment to their own indigenous or marginalised refugee populations. While feminist IR theory remains alert to and critical of the structural underpinnings of world politics, the ontological relationality of the ethics of care provides a key contribution because it takes stock of the experiences of the people at the receiving end of feminist foreign policy. In contrast with orthodox foreign policy practice and theory, which tends to disregard the lived histories of women and colonial subjects, an ethics of care approach would actively seek to uncover their stories to enable intersectional and situated analyses of foreign policy. This involves investigating whether states and other actors actually employ care and empathy as a normative ideal in their pursuit of foreign, security, defence and development policies. States tend to vary in their commitment to such dialogue, but this does not mean that a global ethics of care should be dismissed in the context of foreign and security policy analysis. Instead a critical analysis of feminist-oriented foreign policy should seek to address the ethical question how our view of security in global politics would change once we recognize and accept … the ways responsibilities and practices of care grow out of relations of dependence and vulnerability of people in the context of complex webs of relations of responsibility.63 This entails exploring to what extent the makers of feminist foreign policy take note of ‘the everyday’ and whether Robison’s notion of ‘a feminist ethics of security’ which centres on ‘marginalised sites’ has some resonance with actual policy-making.64 Ethics of care as foreign policy conduct is often expressed in notions of gender-just protection of such marginalised groups, in particular, the protection of women and children from gendered violence and discrimination. Here ethics of care scholar Joan Tronto highlights the shift in global relations from what previously was a ‘right to intervene’ and sovereign-based logic to ‘the responsibility to protect’ and an ethics of global care.65 We propose here that protection, though at times requiring military means, should always rest on the act of listening to marginalised voices – a diplomatic tool that is key to the successful conduct of feminist foreign policy. A foreign policy, which builds on the ethics of care as its foundation, rests on the idea of inclusive and ethical dialogues as well as acts of listening across borders and intersectional confines. Virginia Held holds that emotions, such as empathy, sensitivity and responsiveness, are sentiments that need to be cultivated as a significant element when making moral decisions.66 Central to the analysis of feminist foreign policy then is the extent to which care, the act of listening and dialogical engagement really are key norms in the implementation of gender-just external relations? Here we find Christine Sylvester’s67 concept of empathetic cooperation particularly useful and closely associated with the ethics of care.68 Empathetic cooperation challenges sovereign rights and national interests as the sole platforms for international interactions in favour of empathy across intersectional and ethical boundaries. Laura Sjoberg also suggests that emphatic cooperation is a fruitful platform for the development of a feminist international security ethic, which pays attention to care and justice as well as the gendered structures that have led to the marginalisation of vulnerable groups across international society.69 It may also lead to ‘a form of knowledge of other persons that draws explicitly on the commonalty of feelings and experiences to enrich one’s understanding of another in his or her own right’.70 If empathy is an expressed willingness and ability to appreciate the other then empathetic cooperation is ‘a process of positional slippage that occurs when one listens seriously to the concerns, fears and agendas of those one is unaccustomed to hearing’.71 In short, we argue that empathetic cooperation, as part of the making of a feminist foreign policy, may be a way of opening up for a global ethic and concrete expressions of politics, which do not privilege statist interests and notions of security. Moreover, it moves the agenda towards human security while respecting cultural difference.72 Thus, to explore the presence of empathetic cooperation in the conduct of feminist and genderbased foreign policy is key to the analysis of feminist foreign policy and to ethical investigations into ethically minded foreign policy more broadly.

### S – Cybersecurity

#### The alt is key—patriarchal norms surrounding cybersecurity prioritize masculine institutions and incentivize victim-blaming, which creates serial policy failure

Millar, Shires, and Tropina 21

Katharine, Assistant Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science; James, Assistant Professor with the Institute of Security and Global Affairs at the Leiden University, the Netherlands, and a fellow with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council; Tatiana, Assistant Professor in Cybersecurity Governance with the Institute of Security and Global Affairs at Leiden University. “Defence.” Gender approaches to cybersecurity: design, defence and response. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 2021. Pg 40-41. LJS

Incident response – organizational measures to handle network intrusions, attacks, data breaches and other malicious cyber acts – is characterized by a hierarchy of priorities. Studies have shown that the cybersecurity industry reports on and responds to certain victims (commercial organizations, governments) that are associated with “traditional” security and the activities of elite men disproportionately, and it has a blind spot for threats to civil society and human security (e.g. non-governmental organizations, educational institutions and individuals).116 As schools, non-governmental organizations and individuals are more likely to be concerned with issues of social power, harms and equality, this prioritization has knock-on gender effects. The composition, expected practices and working hours, and workplace culture of incident-response teams also require a gender analysis. There is some evidence that “tech support” teams, which are often the first line of response following a security incident, are predominantly staffed by men, compounding the association of technical expertise with masculinity.117 The composition and culture of Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs or CSIRTs) is also a part of cybersecurity response. Research indicates that CERTs have distinct political strategies and characteristics, especially at the national and international levels, and it is possible that these characteristics include gendered dynamics.118 Information sharing – the process of trusted exchange of information about attacks and other security incidents, vulnerabilities, and cybersecurity practices – is also an essential part of responding to cybersecurity threats. The same masculine, national defence norms may also impede States and organizations from sharing information about cyberattacks and system vulnerabilities. Studies suggest that informal “trust communities” are the basis for much cybersecurity information sharing, rather than formal lines of communication between individuals with similar roles.119 The informality of these communities, and the consequent unconscious bias that this permits, means that they may have lower participation from women and minoritized groups, even when adjusted for overall proportions in the industry. Cybersecurity response can also demonstrate an unfortunate gendered dynamic of victim-blaming, wherein organizations or individuals with cybersecurity defence or identity-protection measures that are deemed to be “insufficient” are framed as “asking to be hacked”, which shifts responsibility onto the party that has been harmed, rather than the one who committed harm.120

### S – US-China War

#### Only the alt deconstructs international patriarchy – that resolves the underlying and proximate causes for US-China conflict and encourages a space of dialogue between the two nations while creating unilateral responsibility.

Sjoberg 10

Laura Sjoberg, British Academy Global Professor of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway University of London. “Gendering Power Transition Theory,” Gender and International Security: Feminist Perspectives. 2010.

If (R3) is correct, then it is possible to envision great state equality without war in a non-patriarchal international system. In a system that values care and empathy, actors would be interested in the collective security of the world’s citizens. Such a system would prioritize understanding, communication, and community. A feminist perspective might imagine challenging great powers to engage in empathetic cooperation, and suggest that major powers take unilateral steps to transgress the cycle of violence in international politics.120 Each power would engage in purposive compromise of values and interests in order to create peace between them. In PTT’s scenario of potential conflict between the US and China, then, the US should not fear a dissatisfied China or attempt co-option. Instead, it should attempt to understand the interests, values, and needs of those challengers. If challengers took a similar approach, they would not have to choose between unattainable satisfaction and perpetual dissatisfaction. Along these lines, feminists suggest that the US should include China in deliberative dialogues, treat the Chinese government and people with empathy and understanding, and show China and other potential challengers by example that the strong can defy international system patriarchy unilaterally and stop the cycle of violence.121 Feminists have argued that inclusive understanding is key to peaceful coexistence. Spike Peterson clarifies that “feminists argue that the domination of women, nature, and all who are constructed as ‘other’ is not a matter of ‘essential,’ atemporal qualities but of socially constructed, historically contingent.”122 In other words, the voices of marginalization could serve as a bridge between hostile and masculinized states. In these terms, a dialogue which promoted understanding between the US and China (and their differentiated citizens) would go a long way towards decreasing the potential for conflict between the two great states. Analyzing the Chinese “overtaking” through gendered lenses These feminist reformulations of PTT’s key hypotheses provide both alternative understandings of the potential for conflict between the US and China and alternative futures. PTT suggests that the question of whether or not that rising will cause conflict between the two states depends on China’s satisfaction or dissatisfaction as it approaches parity with the US. A feminist approach suggests that a good deal of the possibility for conflict between the US and China might be explained by gender-related variables. The patriarchal nature of the international system provides an incentive for the US to attempt to maintain dominance. Such a system also gives China a motivation to seek not parity but supremacy. In addition, the cultural salience of masculinity in each society is manifested in each state’s desire to compete with the other. This alternative explanation for the potential competition between the US and China suggests alternative solutions. Realists like Mearsheimer suggest a combined strategy of economic containment and military presence,123 and power transition theorists suggest attempts to co-opt China into satisfaction with the existing order. Some International Relations scholars outside of the realist paradigm have suggested strategies like GRIT (graduated reciprocation of tension reduction) in order to establish trust between the US and China.124 If gendered competition and international system patriarchy underlie the competition between the two states, however, none of these strategies will be successful. Mearsheimer’s containment strategy will incite more competition; power transition theorists’ co-optation strategy is misdirected since dissatisfaction is endemic and would not be China’s main motive for making war; and trust-building solutions without the deconstruction of the masculine competition for superiority would just be read as weakness. Seeing gender-as-power both helps explain the potential for conflict between the US and China and provides a theoretical and practical alternative to that competition in recasting the genderings of the state and the international system. Some feminists prescribe the strong need to unilaterally deconstruct the cycle of violence and masculinized competition between great powers in the international arena. States would need to recognize conflict’s basis in competition, posturing, and subordination under patriarchy and deconstruct that in order to head off violence. Feminist theorists suggest that the US and China could come to terms with the gendered nature of their competition by dealing with each other in empathy and in dialogue to try to find a deeper sense of understanding if not common ground. The path to an empathetic reconstruction of the relationship between the US and China could begin with the rejection of PTT’s claim that hegemonic domination is empirically and normatively valuable. Domination and the resulting subordination, at the international level as well as at the personal level, are normatively problematic. Therefore, even if hegemonic dominance did decrease great power warfare, a feminist approach asks if that would be a sort of peace that the international arena would truly thrive under.

### S – Ukraine

#### We control uniqueness – peacebuilding efforts in Ukraine are incorporating feminist strategies and women’s involvement – the aff paternalistically delegitimates their attempts at a post-conflict transition

Tull et. al 17

Brian Lucas, Brigitte Rohwerder, and Kerina Tull. “Gender and conflict in Ukraine,” Knowledge for Development (K4D) Helpdesk Report. UK Department for International Development, 2017.

There has been virtually no civil society engagement with the peace process, ‘due to overstretch and capacity constraints as well as the lack of opportunities for participation’ (Kapur 2016, p. 6; WILPF 2014, P. 28). However, despite the lack of opportunity for formal participation in the peace process, ‘a small number of women activists living close to the frontline and in the eastern regions continue to undertake local outreach and confidence building activities’ (Kapur 2016, p. 6). Women’s civil society organisations have been found to be very interested in engaging in dialogue processes between people from western and eastern Ukraine and in re-establishing former relations with women’s groups in the Russian Federation, including soldiers’ mothers (OSCE 2015, p. 8). A number of initiatives were documented at the beginning of 2015, including the initiative of the Union of Ukrainian women to encourage women to be appointed to senior positions in conflict regions; and initiatives by prominent female singers and politicians to highlight the situation in the conflict areas (Zakharova 2015, p. 25). Women have also engaged in shadow peace talks, like those in 2015, organised by the Union of Women of Ukraine, which brought together activists, civil society leaders, volunteers, journalists, public servants and women directly impacted and displaced by the fighting to discuss ways to help end the conflict. The participation of women in politics and peace-making at the local level is slowly increasing (Fellin 2015, p. 5-6). WILPF (2014, p. 23) have also noted that there is little public space for Ukrainian men to adopt a non-violent position in opposition to war. Women’s groups engaged in conflict resolution and peacebuilding argue that they need more training for mediators and peer-to-peer training programmes for those involved in dialogues on women, peace and security, as well as regular meeting and exchanges of experiences and resources. A number of initiatives have supported women’s participation in peacebuilding activities. They include a project with the Women’s Information Consultative Center aimed at ‘increasing the capacity of women – especially internally displaced women and rural women – to protect themselves, increase women’s empowerment and participation in decision-making processes, and build and raise awareness about international documents on women’s peace and security and mechanisms to secure and protect women during war conflict and political, economic and social crises among decision-makers in Ukraine’ (Hanssen 2016, p. 59). Another initiative, implemented by La Strada in cooperation with the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine and relevant local authorities, aimed to build capacity in peace-building and conflict resolution and mediation efforts among conflict-affected groups and communities with a focus on women and IDP girls (Hanssen 2016, p. 79). Ukrainian women working towards peace have also engaged in a solidarity dialogue with women activists from Bosnia and Herzegovina in June 2016 to share experiences and gain a better understanding of women’s contribution to conflict and post-conflict transition (Kapur, 2016). The Ukrainian activists would like to professionalise their organisations and strengthen the Ukrainian feminist movement to help make women’s voices in Ukraine stronger (Kapur 2016, p. 8). They feel that ‘women must actively participate in the peace process to ensure inclusion of their voice, experience and perspective across all issues’ (Kapur 2016, p. 8). It was suggested that women’s organisations could help build local peace by working to create dialogue between host communities and IDPs, as well as reaching out to women in Donetsk and Luhansk, which could then link in with national, regional and international initiatives for peace (Kapur 2016, p. 23). At a formal level, Ukraine’s 2016 National Action Plan on Women’s Peace and Security aims to increase the participation of women in peacebuilding by improving the infrastructure and legal environment for women’s participation in international peacekeeping operations, and for their service in administrative and combat positions in the Armed Forces and other national security and defence institutions (Martsenyuk et al. 2016, p. 182). In addition it plans to conduct an assessment of gendered aspects of conflict prevention and resolution and promote the women’s role in peacebuilding, peacekeeping and negotiation processes in the media (Martsenyuk et al. 2016, p. 182).

## FW

### Epistemology First

#### Prioritize feminist epistemologies—the aff’s urgency framing mystifies structural causes and creates serial policy failure

Enloe 14

Cynthia, Research Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment, with affiliations with Women’s and Gender Studies and Political Science, all at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts. “Conclusion.” Bananas, Beaches and Bases Making Feminist Sense of International Politics. Pg 348-359. LJS

One of the simplest and most disturbing feminist insights crafted in recent decades is that “the personal is political.” It is a profound theoretical statement that can be transferred to a T-shirt or bumper sticker. Asserting that “the personal is political” is disturbing, intentionally disturbing, because it means that relationships we once imagined were (and many of our friends and colleagues still prefer to think are) private or merely social are in fact infused with power. Furthermore, those allegedly private, personal relationships are infused with power that is unequal and backed up by public authority. But the assertion that “the personal is political” is like a palindrome, one of those phrases that can be read backward as well as forward. Read as “the political is personal,” the assertion suggests that politics is not shaped merely by what happens in legislative debates, voting booths, political party strategy sessions, court rooms, or war rooms. While men who dominate public life in so many countries have told women to stay in the proverbial kitchen (not travel to workshops in Manila, not organize, not theorize), those same men have used their myriad forms of public power to construct private relationships in ways that have bolstered their own masculinized political control. Without these deliberate gendered maneuvers, men’s hold over political life might be far less secure. Without these gendered maneuvers, moreover, most men’s seeming “expertise” in politics would look less impressive. A 2013 cross-national survey of citizens’ political knowledge found that in virtually every one of the ten countries studied, “women know less about politics than men regardless of how advanced a country is in terms of gender equality.”2 The authors of the study speculated that this gender gap in political information might be due to the fact that few women play prominent roles in news journalism and elite political life, which discourages many women viewers and readers from seeing how current news accounts are relevant to themselves. While this possible explanation for the country-by-country political information gaps appears feasible, a British feminist journalist analyzing the same ten-country study offered an additional explanation: perhaps the researchers’ definitions and measures of what counts as “politics” were too narrow.3 Perhaps what many women do pay attention to, and do store information about, is encompassed by a broader, some might say more realistic, map of politics—for instance, the availability of affordable child care, the condition of public parks, the accessibility of public transport, the readiness of police to treat a woman with respect when she brings a rape charge, the government’s willingness to use sexualized pictures of local women to lure foreign tourists, and the impunity with which employers abuse women on the job. That is, perhaps if the map of what is counted as political were redrawn by feminist-informed cartographers, the gap between women’s and men’s political knowledge would shrink dramatically. Explaining why any country has the kind of politics it does should motivate us to be curious about how public life is constructed out of struggles to define masculinity and femininity. Accepting that the “political is personal” prompts one to investigate the politics of marriage, the cheapening of women’s labor, ideologies of masculinity, sexually transmitted diseases, and homophobia—not as marginal issues but as matters central to the state. Doing this kind of research becomes just as serious as studying military weaponry or taxation policy. In fact, insofar as the political is personal, the latter categories cannot be fully understood without taking into account the former. To make sense of international politics, we have to read power backward and forward. Power relations between countries and their governments involve more than troop maneuvers and diplomatic emails. Read forward, “the personal is international” insofar as ideas about what it means to be a “respectable” woman or an “honorable” man have been shaped by colonizing policies, international trade strategies, and military doctrines. Today it has almost become a cliché to say that the world is shrinking, that state boundaries are porous: think of KFC opening in Shanghai, sushi eaten in Santiago, Cézannes hanging on walls in Doha, a Korean pop star drawing crowds in New York, and Russian weaponry propping up a Syrian autocrat. We frequently persist, nonetheless, in discussing personal power relationships as if they were contained by sovereign states. We frequently consider violence against women without investigating how the global trade in Internet pornography operates, or how companies offering sex tours and mail-order brides conduct their business across national borders. Similarly, we try to explain how women learn to be “feminine” without unraveling the legacies left by colonial officials who used Victorian ideals of feminine domesticity to sustain their empires; or we try to trace what shapes children’s ideas about femininity and masculinity without looking at governments’ foreign investment policies that encourage the global advertising campaigns of such giants as McCann Erickson, BBDO, or Saatchi and Saatchi. Becoming aware that personal relationships have been internationalized, however, may make one only feel guilty for not having paid enough attention to international affairs. “You should know more about the IMF,” “Don’t switch channels when experts start talking about climate change,” “Find out where Guam is.” While useful, this new international attentiveness by itself is not sufficient. It leaves untouched our conventional presumptions about just what “international politics” is and where it takes place. Coming to realize that the “personal is international” expands the politically attentive audience, but it fails to transform our understandings of what is happening on the multiple stages of international politics. The implications of a feminist understanding of international politics are thrown into sharper relief when one reads “the personal is international” the other way around: the international is personal. This calls for a radical new imagining of what it takes for governments to ally with each other, to compete with and wage war against each other. “The international is personal” implies that governments depend on certain kinds of allegedly private relationships in order to conduct their foreign affairs. Governments need more than tax revenues and spy agencies; they also need wives who are willing to provide their diplomatic husbands with unpaid services so those men can develop trusting relationships with other diplomatic husbands. They need not only military hardware but also a steady supply of women’s sexual services, as well as military wives’ gratitude, to convince their male soldiers that they are manly. To operate in the international arena, governments seek other governments’ recognition of their sovereignty; but they also depend on ideas about masculinized dignity and feminized sacrifi ce to sustain that sense of autonomous nationhood. Thus the international politics of debt, investment, colonization, decolonization, national security, diplomacy, trade, and military occupation are far more complicated than most conventional experts would have us believe. This may appear paradoxical. Many people, and especially women, are taught that international politics are too complex, too remote, and too tough for the so-called feminine mind to comprehend. If a Hillary Clinton, Angela Merkel, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Michelle Bachelet, or Christine Lagarde enters, it is presumably because she has learned to “think like a man.” Conventional analyses stop short of investigating an entire area of international relations, an area that feminist-informed researchers in the still-expanding fi eld of gender and international relations are pioneers in exploring: how states depend on particular artifi cial constructions of the domestic and private spheres to achieve their political goals. If we take seriously the politics of domestic servants, of women living on or near a military base, or of women who sew Gap and Zara apparel, we discover that international politics are more complicated than nonfeminist analysts imagine. This is worth saying again: explanations of international politics that are devoid of feminist questioning are too-simple explanations. Such nonfeminist explanations shy away from complexity. They underestimate power. A feminist investigatory approach exposes a remarkable assortment of the kinds of power it takes to make the complex international political system work the way it currently does. Admittedly, conventional analysts of interstate relations do talk a lot about power. In fact, they put power at the center of their commentaries. These are the sorts of commentaries that are presumed to be most naturally comprehended by manly men; women, especially those women presumed to be conventionally feminine, allegedly do not have an innate taste for either wielding or understanding power. However, feminist-informed explo rations of agribusiness plantation prostitution, foreign service corps sexism, and repeated attempts to tame outspoken nationalist women all reveal that, in reality, it takes much more power to construct and perpetuate international political relations than we have been led to believe. One result of feminists’ insight is that they do not erect false barriers between the fi elds of “security studies” and “international political economy.” Feminists realize that the actual workings of gendered politics routinely blur these artifi cial fi elds of investigation. This is why the ten politically savvy women who might come together for Theresa’s imagined Manila workshop start with their domestic lives. It has taken power to deprive women of land titles and pressure them to leave home to work as domestic workers abroad or to stay on banana plantations. It has taken power to keep women marginalized in their countries’ diplomatic corps and out of the upper reaches of central banks and fi nance ministries. It has taken power to exclude women from labor bargaining. It has taken power to keep questions of inequity between local men and women off the agendas of many nationalist movements in industrialized as well as developing societies. It has taken power to keep diverse women in their separate places for the sake of the smooth running of any military base. It has taken power to ensure that UN treaties do not recognize the rights of sexual minorities. It has taken power to ensure that the UN treaties that do take account of violence against women are not implemented. It has taken power to construct popular cultures—through fi lms, advertising, school curricula, television, books, music, fashion, the Internet—that reinforce, rather than subvert, globally gendered hierarchies. “The international is personal,” combined with a sustained feminist curiosity about women’s lives and the workings of masculinities, provides a guide to making sense of the WTO, the ILO, the IMF, the Group of Eight, the Group of Twenty, the World Bank, the EU Commission, the Vatican, the Qatar emirate, the Chinese Politboro, the UN Security Council, the International Crimes Court, the African Union, and the Arab League. “The international is personal” is a starting point for making sense of Gap, Apple, Disney, Foxconn, Chiquita Banana, Deutsche Bank, and H&M, as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross, CARE, OXFAM, and Human Rights Watch. To make realistic sense of international politics, we need thorough, feminist-informed gender analyses of each of these organizations—and more. One can do a feminist-informed gender analysis of anything. And each will make us smarter about how this world works, or fails to work. Taking seriously the assertion that “the international is personal” means that women—in all their diversity—must be made visible, analytically visible, in our investigations of every one of these organizations, and in the relationships between these organizations. If it is true that cooperative as well as hostile relations between governments, corporations, and international organizations rely on constructions of women as symbols, women as providers of emotional support, women as both unpaid and lowpaid workers, women as voters, and women as token participants, then it does not make sense to continue analyzing international politics as if women were a mere afterthought. It does not make sense to collect ungendered data on refugees, private security personnel, earthquake victims, militia members, corporate executives, factory owners, journalists, or peace negotiators. It does not make sense to treat women as if they made eye-catching photo images but do not need to be interviewed. International policy-making circles may at times look like men’s clubs, but international politics as a whole has required women to behave in certain ways. When enough women have refused to behave in those prescribed ways, relations between governments and between governments and corporations have had to change. That is, women are not just the objects of power, not merely passive puppets or unthinking victims. As we have seen, women of different classes and different ethnic groups have made their own calculations in order to cope with or benefi t from the current struggles between states. These calculations result in whole countries becoming related to one another, often in hierarchical terms. In search of adventure, the physical and intellectual excitement typically reserved for men, some affluent women have helped turn other women into exotic landscapes. In pursuit of meaningful paid careers, some women have settled in their governments’ colonies or hired women from former colonies. Out of a desire to appear fashionable and bolster their sometimes shaky self-confi dence, many women have become the prime consumers of products made by women working for low wages in dangerous factories. And in an effort to measure the progress they have made toward emancipation in their own societies, some women have helped legitimize international global pyramids of “civilization” and “modernity.” Therefore, when asking “Where are the women?”—and following up with “How did they get there?” “Who benefi ts from their being there?” and “What do they themselves think about being there?”—one should be prepared for complex answers. Acting out of a new awareness that women, especially in poorer countries, need to be made visible—and audible—on the international stage, one can risk painting over the important dif ferences between women. The widening economic class differences between Chinese, for instance, are alarming even Beijing’s male political elite. Those gaping inequalities are sharpening the differences between rural and urban women, between women married to politically connected businessmen and women working on the assembly lines in those men’s factories. Noting inequalities among women is not just a comparative statement—for instance, noting that urban girls are more likely to reach secondary school than rural girls, or that affluent women are more likely to have access to the Internet than working-class women do. It is a comparative statement with relational consequences. Women’s diverse experiences of social class—as well as of race and ethnicity—can translate into often surprising differences in understandings of femininity, in marital economics, in relationships with particular men, and in encounters with the state. In the United States, China, India, Turkey, South Africa, Vietnam, Mexico, Brazil, Malaysia, Iraq, and Egypt, these widening material and political inequalities between affluent women, middle-class women, urban poor women, and rural poor women, especially when exacerbated by racism and ethnocentrism, present daunting challenges for any women who are working to create and sustain a vibrant national or transnational women’s movement. Creating transnational women’s banana workers’ groups, launching the International Domestic Workers’ Network, building a transnational alliance to lobby for a gender-conscious arms-trade treaty, organizing a transnational network of women living near overseas American military bases, creating unions for women garment workers, sustaining a transnational network of feminists living under patriarchal religious laws, building a UN-focused alliance that can take on the “unholy alliance”— not one of these efforts has been easy. And every day there are those who act to defend their local or global stake in having diverse women lose trust in each other, withdraw support from each other. One might make a list of those patriarchal stakeholders, those people who have come to rely on women’s fragmentation. Not all the people on the list will be corporate moguls and political autocrats. Male officials who make foreign policy might prefer to think of themselves as dealing with high fi nance or military strategy, but in reality they have self-consciously designed immigration, tourism, labor, foreign service, cultural, and military-base policies in order to divide and control women. They rarely admit it, but they have acted as though their government’s or organization’s place in world affairs has hinged on how women behaved. Uncovering these efforts has exposed men as men. International politics have relied not only on the manipulation of femininity’s multiple meanings but also on the manipulation of ideas about masculinities. Ideas about adventure, modernity, civilization, progress, expertise, rationality, stability, growth, risk, trust, and security have been legitimized by certain kinds of masculinized values, systems, and behavior. That is one of the reasons that each of these ideas has become so potent. Frequently, male government officials and company executives seek to control women in order to optimize their infl uence over other men: men as husbands, voters, migrant workers, soldiers, diplomats, intelligence operatives, plantation and factory managers, editors, and bankers. Thus, understanding the international workings of masculinity is important to making feminist sense of international politics. Men’s sense of their own manhood has derived from their perceptions both of other men’s masculinity and of the femininities of women of different races and social classes. Thus a caveat: one cannot make adequate sense of the international politics of masculinity by avoiding paying close attention to women and femininity. Ideas about masculinities—the full array of masculinities—have been crafted out of ideas about, myths about, and uncertainties about femininities and about actual women. To conduct a reliable investigation of masculinity, one must take women seriously. Climate change, capitalist globalization, the new arms race, and widening gaps between rich and poor—it is tempting to plunge into the discussion of any of these contemporary issues without bothering to ask, “Where are the women?” In fact, the more urgent the issue—“New York will soon be under water!” “China’s military build up is going to set off a world war!”—the more reasonable it seems to not ask “Where are the women?” In patriarchal hands, “urgency” is the enemy of feminist investigation. The previous chapters suggest, however, that these urgent issues demand a gendered analysis precisely because they are urgent, because they call for the fullest, most realistic understandings. As feminist environmental researchers and activists already are revealing, the causes of climate change, for example, and not just its effects, can be realistically tracked only if one exposes the workings of ideas about manliness and femininity and the relations between women and men, each fostered by the deliberate uses of political power. So too can the causes of the new arms race, exploitive globalization, and the widening gaps between rich and poor. Theresa, Chobi, Takazato, Iris, and the other workshop participants are now, we can imagine, deep into their discussions. The deeper they dig, the more candid they become with each other. They have tried to create an atmosphere of trust, one that encourages each woman to be honest about her worries and puz zles. Together, they are on a journey to understand how banana plantations work, how garment subcontractors perceive women seamstresses, whose security a military base protects, and why women and men who employ domestic workers do not see them as real workers. Every time the conversation slips into abstractions, one of the women pulls it back to women’s complex everyday realities. This is what making feminist sense of international politics sounds like.

#### Feminist epistemology for peacebuilding

Julian et al. 19 – Rachel Julian & Robin Redhead, School of Social Sciences, Leeds Beckett University; Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University. “From expert to experiential knowledge: exploring the inclusion of local experiences in understanding violence in conflict,” Peacebuilding, Volume 7, Issue 2. Routledge, 2019.

A feminist epistemology asks why socially marginalised groups are absent from the design and conduct of research about them and seeks to transform those political practices that legitimate this exclusion.23 This involves the inclusion of the researched in the research, revealing the power dynamics between researcher and researched and stressing the value of local knowledges or experiences.24 It demands scrutiny of our own practices as scholars as well as a commitment to transformative politics.25 Knowledge is understood as an intersubjective process, it is produced through encounters with others.26 This means that knowledge is ‘not just “out there”, but the result of a particular engagement in a particular context as a continuous way of “becoming”’, 27 highlighting the crucial role the researcher-researched relationship plays in (conflict) knowledge production – a role that is usually written out of conflict analyses. The feminist approaches we draw on highlight everyday experience as crucial to knowledge. Feminist ethnographies, for instance, consider the ‘everyday’ activities of people to show the complexities of local-global relations.28 They ‘listen to the unsaid’ 29 in the everyday and produce ‘sincere and reliable knowledge’. 30 The feminist approach accounts for embodied knowledge: how we make sense of the world based on our own experiences in it.31 While experience is universal in the sense that we all experience everyday social reality, it is also personal in that it cannot be generalised or categorised by an external actor. It incorporates what is of central importance to the person having the experience, including the perceptions, narratives, myths and relationships that surround it. In much the same way that the study of practice challenges the norms of institutionalised politics, an understanding of the importance of everyday experience challenges the dominance of the outside expert in creating knowledge about conflict, violence and peace in several ways. Inspired by these insights of feminist methodologies,32 underpinning the research agenda of ‘Raising Silent Voices’ was a strong commitment to developing and valuing experiential knowledge, which redefined what counted as ‘knowledge’ in understanding conflicts. Feminist approaches provide us with at least two reasons why including everyday experiences into our analyses of violent conflict enhances understanding. Firstly, experiences cannot be categorised by group (e.g. the experience of all women), but rather need to be treated as a set of narratives from which we can learn more and which may challenge the assumptions or systematising analyses of outsiders. Thus, understanding that there are different knowledges that emerge from lived experiences, and that all these experiences have value, is essential. This also means that not all specific or personal experiences can be represented solely by community leaders or civil society representatives. Civil society and community leaders are not interest-free conduits of knowledge, but their position is already a manifestation and a potential source of the power struggles in the conflict area. This is an important insight when considering that community and civil society leaders feature prominently in conflict analysis approaches, where these actors are often taken to be able to speak on behalf of those they represent. Feminist approaches remind us that we need many experiential knowledges in order to achieve a fuller picture, not all of which can be represented by ‘local elites’. Studying ‘ordinary people’ rather than starting with ‘local elites’ promises to unearth insights, knowledges and strategies that currently tend to remain hidden in conflict analysis which starts with outsider views. Indeed, what emerges from our research is that those who live amidst violence, seek to protect people, or create peace, are far from ‘ordinary’, but are courageous, creative and extraordinary people who have interwoven relationships and protection into their everyday lives in order to deal with the fears, insecurities and threats they face. Using a feminist conception of knowledge production opens up spaces to allow for different actors and actions to form part of the knowledge that is seen as valid in these circumstances. This may ultimately have a positive impact on everyday peace strategies, for when someone is recognised as an actor, they are empowered with the capability to act and with that comes recognition of the validity of their actions. In this idea of inclusion of local agency and people’s everyday actions, we are not following the much debated ‘participatory’ models, which can reproduce hierarchies of power and expertise in their own right, but rather the idea of ‘capacity recognition’, 33 which begins with the understanding that people already have agency, that their actions have value and importance in the local context, and that people’s everyday experiences based on these actions make them valuable holders of experiential knowledge that gives them the capacity to act knowingly (i.e. with an awareness of what they are doing). This form of empowerment-through-inclusion raises the significance of everyday activities to more than a local matter,34 and writes them into the dominant narratives and practices of peacebuilding. Secondly, experiences are important for conflict analyses because they are likely to defy any uncritical form of universal or generalizable narrative coherence. By their virtue, experiences are diverse, producing many knowledges. Including the diversity of experiences – including past, present and future thinking – into conflict analyses, reveals how people’s varied interpretations and perceptions create a set of different knowledges, which all contribute to understanding the web of conflict and potentials for peace. People living amidst violent conflict know the significance of details – that it matters what they wear, which symbols are of importance in identifying allegiances, which routes, roads and paths are safe and at which times, who is aligned with whom, and how to find safe escape routes when necessary. They see conflict and violence in their many forms, and they also know what peace looks like. Especially for work in the areas of protection and conflict transformation, such experiential micro-insights are invaluable. This leads us to the question of how to access experiential knowledge methodologically, without reproducing the power hierarchies inherent in outsider-expert knowledge production discussed above. While ethnographic approaches seem promising as a way of knowing experiences and are now used more frequently in peacebuilding studies,35 Macaspac has shown that most of this ethnographic research still revolves around the experience of researchers from the Global North, thus perpetuating the outsider-expert view on conflict at the cost of a more meaningful inclusion of local experiential knowledge.36 Furthermore, ethnography usually presupposes a longer-term engagement with ‘the field’ in which the ethnography takes place, thus making this methodology difficult to realise within the time and financial constraints of international organisations’ project work. Critical peace and conflict studies scholars have provided some ideas on how to foreground the centrality of local people’s knowledge and experiences (rather than that of the Northern researcher) in violent conflict and conflict transformation. These include approaches based on reflective practice,37 empowerment and emancipation through listening,38 and patience and humility.39 Lederach has used some of these approaches in his argument that some people in the midst of conflicts can become key catalysts and produce dramatic results, describing them as ‘critical yeast’, that is, people who are engaged in constant and growing ‘web-weaving’ (or building of relationships between people) to make them connected and stronger.40 Ideas of reflexivity, listening, critical yeast and web-weaving all provide clues for how we can re-think peace and conflict studies in ways that give primacy to local experiences and overlap with feminist epistemology. A shared insight is that revealing experiential knowledge requires research methods which involve trust and a recognition of the power or agency of the local everyday experience. Standard social science methods often find their limits when applied to topics that involve complex or strong experiences, emotions and/or cultural taboos and shame, which may resist objectification in language. For one, human knowledge constitutes more than just that which can be put into words, or as Polanyi writes about tacit knowledge: ‘The fact that we can possess knowledge that is unspoken is of course a common-place and so is the fact that we must know something yet unspoken before we can express it in words.’ 41 Furthermore, health and psychology research suggests that people may find it hard to voice traumatic or tabooed experiences, especially in front of others, or that they simply lack the words to describe how an experience makes them feel, to make the unheard and invisible heard.42 Sexual violence, torture and other common conflict-related experiences are prone to fall into this category, but also situations that do not constitute an unspeakable issue in one culture (e.g. that of the aid worker) may resist direct reporting in the context of different cultural conventions and norms.43 Methods to reveal experiential knowledge thus ideally need to create safe space for sharing and provide tools that empower people to do so.44 Exploring experiential knowledge also involves revealing and working to mitigate power relations between researcher and researched, since the use of methods that do not challenge power would risk perpetuating the norms created by ‘external experts’ and encourage local people to ‘just tell you want they think you want to know’. Therefore, overcoming the shortfalls of outsider/expert methods is the task of studies that try to include experiential knowledges of ordinary people living amidst violent conflict. In ‘Raising Silent Voices’ we have developed a methodology that achieves inclusion. It is to this we will now turn.

## A2s

### A2 Policy Good

#### Policy fails to break down patriarchal structures—only the alt can solve the root cause

Shekhawat 21

Seema, phd, the India Centre Fellow at the University of Central Florida. “Patriarchy is the Constraint: Resolution 1325 Two Decades Later.” Accord. 4/21/2021. <https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/patriarchy-is-the-constraint-resolution-1325-two-decades-later/> LJS

The reality, if put alongside the theory of UNSCR 1325, offers a dismal global scenario. Largely, Resolution 1325’s agenda of protection, representation and participation has not translated into aspired development. Notwithstanding the intentions of Resolution 1325, women largely remain undervalued in peacebuilding. Their under-representation in peace processes is a harsh reality, despite NAPs and legislation in several states. The gender insensitivity in peacemaking processes in Africa, and elsewhere, reflects a critical scenario where the implementation of the resolution remains constrained. In October 2020, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa called for greater inclusion of women in peace processes. It was argued that “[d]espite the notable achievements by African women, their contribution to the four pillars of UNSCR 1325, namely conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding, still needs to be strengthened”.[12] For instance, in 16 African peace mediation processes between 1992 and 2011, only two had 5% female signatories, and only three of the 16 processes had female-led mediators, according to the AU Special Envoy on WPS. In addition, African countries are lagging behind in developing or adapting NAPs on UNSCR 1325. The APRM study on Governance, Gender and Peacebuilding reveals that in some African regions, only a quarter of countries have NAPs on UNSCR 1325.[13] What is hindering effective gender mainstreaming in peace processes in Africa and elsewhere? Primarily, the scholarship argues that the representation of women merely as victims and not as active agents of change is problematic. Laura Shepherd problematises Resolution 1325 to conclude that it and other UN documents “permit the violent reproduction of gender”.[14] The representation of women in UN documents rely on “an essentialist definition that allows male decision-makers to keep them in the subordinated position of victims, thus removing their agency,” argues Nadine Puechguirbal.[15] For Judy El-Bushra, “essentializing women as wives, mothers and nurses excludes them from the world of active players and decision-makers.”[16] A deconstruction of the language of Resolution 1325 and other resolutions certainly brings forth the perpetuation of the gender assumption of women as primarily vulnerable victims. While conceding that this gendered stereotype prohibits gender equality, it must also be argued that gender equality is majorly constrained by a sociocultural setup that is highly patriarchal. There is something inherently wrong – beyond text and language – within the societal context that needs to be corrected to promote gender equality in peacebuilding and all other areas. The highly masculinised sociocultural structure has to be changed to bring the desired outcomes. Until existing highly gendered power structures in society and polity are challenged and corrected, all attempts to tackle gender inequities – however genuine – will merely at the best retain, if not multiply, the existing gendered realities. Women remain deprived of the roles of decision-makers and effectively contributing to peace and security, not because of the linguistic constraints of UN resolutions and documents but because of the deep-rooted patriarchal social environment. Hence, one then reinforces the other in a gendered oppression cycle. Patriarchy is deep-rooted. Irrespective of gender, positions of power do not necessarily make people less patriarchal. States run by patriarchal leadership would, at the most, institute cosmetic changes; changes that may not uproot existing sociocultural norms. At the international and national level, masculinised contexts are also highly visible. In such scenarios, expecting a desired change through mere UN resolutions may not be practical. The typical patriarchal mindset is predominantly visible in traditional contexts. Women in traditional societies are highly constrained to claim their public space. Patriarchal norms are insidious, known for their constant reinventions to ensure their survival.[17] Reinventing itself even amidst claims of its demise, patriarchy remains omnipresent, only with varying intensity, in pre-conflict, during conflict and post-conflict situations in traditional societies. Until gender discriminatory social constructions are challenged and subdued, resolutions – such as 1325 – will remain more theory and less practice. The roots of patriarchy and the consequent gendered constraints for women lie in the concept of superiority of a particular gender. For women, claiming public space in peacemaking processes in an atmosphere of patriarchal domination, where men are groomed to believe in their “natural” physical and mental superiority, is a daunting task. The socially constructed gendered hierarchies remain unchallenged in all situations, and this mental construction is ingrained across genders. In the reiteration of the patriarchal falsities and the belief that these are natural, gendered discrimination thrives. In such a scenario, understanding and acknowledging the gender discrimination and, more importantly, transgressing the established gendered norms to claim their rights as peacebuilders, is problematic for women. I have been documenting the impact of patriarchy on women in conflict situations in Asia and Africa for over a decade.[18] A cursory look at the responses of some male and female respondents from Kashmir, Kathmandu and Manipur helps to understand that ushering change through the passage of resolutions such as 1325 is problematic unless the root causes of gender discrimination are addressed. This assertion stands true, more or less, for all traditional societies, including African ones. The opinion of most male ex-combatants was that women are merely good followers, not leaders. Through reasons such as women’s inability to be away from home, their unwillingness to get involved in political processes, their safety and other related issues, women’s absence from peace processes was projected as normal. When I posed a question regarding women’s absence from peace attempts to an armed group leader, the response was: “Women have to perform several routine work. They are busy in homes and families. They don’t have time to travel and work for peace outside their homes.”[19] There is an intrinsic patriarchal resistance on the part of men even to acknowledge the significant position of women in conflict; consequently, women’s exclusion from peace processes is considered normal. A male ex-combatant noted: “Women helped us… there are certain cultural norms and women should adhere to them. This would maintain peace in society as well as family. Women’s limited presence in the public space for a cause does not give them liberty to cross their traditional boundaries.”[20] “Women are happier in their homes and families. Women have no understanding of issues such as war and peace. They are also not interested in participating in formal peacemaking. They contribute to a protest movement when they are asked to do so and go back when their job is over,” argued another male respondent.[21] “Women are natural ‘healers’ and ‘pacifiers’, but not decision-makers. I do not think involving women in peace negotiations is necessary. During a conflict, they are followers… they do what they are told to do… men initiate a conflict and end that, women are merely players. It is not an issue of equality but that of ability. Women have no capability to negotiate formal peacemaking,” asserted another male combatant.[22] Yet another male respondent stated: “Women prefer peace, but they cannot negotiate peace. Preferring peace and negotiating peace are not the same.”[23] Interestingly, the majority of female respondents echoed the opinions of their male counterparts. “Women are led. They do not lead. They have no capability to make important decisions,” said a respondent.[24] “What can we do?” is the often-repeated response by women. Most accepted their marginalisation as normal and natural. Only a few argued that women should be part of decision-making processes. To quote Rita Manchanda: “Part of the difficulty of making women’s activism in peace building visible and therefore mainstreaming gender in the political activity of peace agreements and the actual planning for a society’s reconstruction, is that women themselves see their activity as non political and an extension of their domestic concerns and ‘stretched roles’. Moreover, women’s visibility is further obscured by the fact that their language of support and resistance flows from their cultural experience, especially of being disempowered.”[25] Conclusion Gender-based exclusion of women from peace processes primarily originates from sociocultural constraints, the result of a larger deep-rooted problem of patriarchal norms that severely constrain women’s presence in the public space and, more importantly, in power positions. An attitude reversal through sustained sensitivity awareness campaigns and education is needed if Resolution 1325 is to be effectively implemented. An attitudinal change is necessary. At times, to be politically correct, women are included in peace processes or paragraphs in a document, but the need of the time is to go beyond symbolism and ensure the genuine involvement of women. States and societies have to come together to look beyond the established norms to achieve the significant participation of women in peace and security.

#### Feminist policy is the result of feminist activism—the alt is a pre-requisite—top-down gender policy in the West re-creates imperial violence

Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz 19

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The realm of international peace and security remained resistant to advocacy around women’s rights and gender until relatively recently. A case in point is the fact that the UN Security Council with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the UN Charter did not consider gender issues until 2000 and the adoption of UNSCR 1325 on WPS. The internal politics of the Security Council were undoubtedly crucial to realise the adoption of this Resolution. Yet, the Resolution did not emerge in a vacuum with wider developments in global politics helping to make it possible (Tryggestad 2009: 542). The end of the Cold War also contributed, freeing the Security Council from its deadlock and allowing space for the emergence of gender onto the Security Council’s agenda. Further, the very type of thematic resolution which UNSCR 1325 is an example of would have been unthinkable during the Cold War but gained traction in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Tryggestad, 2009: 543). It is therefore salient to consider the wider global political landscape which contributed to the adoption of UNSCR 1325. Superpower politics during the Cold War shaped feminist advocacy at the UN and contributed to isolating the issue of ‘violence against women’ from the international agenda (Harrington, 2011). This has a significant impact on the efficacy of transnational feminist advocacy. For example, it led to the isolation of US women’s groups from more radical (and socialist) groups around the globe but also within the US itself. And while Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) could apply for ‘consultative status’ to give them access to UN debates and meetings from 1946, some of these NGOs inevitably became subject to intervention by the US and Soviet Union (Harrington, 2011: 561). A case in point is the communist Women’s International Democratic Federation which the Soviet Union used as a vehicle to promote Soviet propaganda (Weigand, 2002: 49). When women’s rights were discussed in a UN context, Cold War politics and the dichotomy between East and West defined the nature of discussion. At the 1975 UN World Conference on Women in Mexico, the Soviet Union wanted to debate a wide range of issues, including capitalism. In contrast, the US wanted to narrow discussion to women’s legal equality (Ghodsee cited in Harrington, 2011: 563). At the same, gender issues remained marginal to ‘everyday’ Cold War politics. The US and Soviet Union did not criticise each other over gender issues, even when there was a case to do so. This is despite the fact that the US was drawing upon women’s rights to oppose other regimes at the time (Enloe, 1989: 57). This silencing is particularly visible in relation to their respective international interventions in Afghanistan in the 1980s. For example, the US did not draw attention to the hypocrisy of the Soviet Union purporting to protect Afghan women, while the Red Army used prostitutes and perpetrated sexual violence. Likewise, the Soviet Union (and UN recognised NGOs) did not point out that the US, in supporting the Afghan Mujahedeen, was supporting a patriarchal regime pitted against one advancing women’s rights (Moghadam cited in Harrington, 2011: 563). The end of the Cold War appeared to open up space for the international community to consider women’s rights as an issue of international peace and security. However, the issues considered remained limited. This period of US hegemony coincided with the US emerging as a women’s rights champion, albeit supporting a narrow remit of issues. It was human trafficking, wartime rape and domestic violence which became prominent issues for the women’s sector at the UN (Harrington, 2011: 565). While Joachim has argued that this represented domestic feminist lobbying finding alignment with the Clinton administration’s world views (Joachim, 2003: 259), Harrington urges caution. She argues that violence against women emerged as an issue against the ‘new wars’ discourse because it provided a reason for policing and surveillance (Harrington, 2011: 566). Violence against women had become embedded within the militarised project of democracy promotion and the accompanying political and economic transformation it advocates. Women’s rights and gender issues were included instrumentally. They provided a means for states and institutions such as NATO to ‘criminalise’ their military targets through the ‘new wars’ doctrine pitting ‘alliances of democratic state and non-state actors against militia that control populations through rape and other forms of bodily atrocity’ (Harrington, 2011: 566). This dichotomy between the democratic West and the enemy ‘other’ also found a gendered articulation in the War on Terror. Bush, and later Obama, drew on a masculinist protectionist logic in their discourse on the War on Terror (Messerschmidt, 2016: 167). For example, the 2001 US-led intervention in Afghanistan drew on the emancipation of Afghan women as a supplementary justification. The logic invoked a rationale that to defend our universal civilisation we must rescue Afghan women (Cooke, 2002: 485–6). Ultimately, the implication of women’s rights in the ‘geopolitical manoeuvrings of powerful global actors’ makes the invocation of the ‘principled politics solidarity’ extremely problematic (Kandiyoti, 2007: 505). As Harrington (2011: 567) argues, it ‘contributes to a hegemonic conflation of women’s equality with “Western” (or Northern) civilization, and women’s oppression with an undeveloped “rest”, obscuring “Western” agency in both male privilege and violence against women’.

### A2 Retrenchment/Transition Wars

#### U.S. hegemony has already met its end – ascendance of regional powers, abandoning international agreements, and alienation of long-term allies – the very fact that we haven’t had a great power conflict proves its not zero-sum.

Zakaria 19 – Fareed Zakaria, host of Fareed Zakaria GPS, on CNN. "The Self-Destruction Of American Power Washington Squandered The Unipolar Moment," July/August 2019, 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-06-11/self-destruction-american-power

Just as American hegemony grew in the early 1990s while no one was noticing, so in the late 1990s did the forces that would undermine it, even as people had begun to speak of the United States as “the indispensable nation” and “the world’s sole superpower.” First and foremost, there was the rise of China. It is easy to see in retrospect that Beijing would become the only serious rival to Washington, but it was not as apparent a quarter century ago. Although China had grown speedily since the 1980s, it had done so from a very low base. Few countries had been able to continue that process for more than a couple of decades. China’s strange mixture of capitalism and Leninism seemed fragile, as the Tiananmen Square uprising had revealed. But China’s rise persisted, and the country became the new great power on the block, one with the might and the ambition to match the United States. Russia, for its part, went from being both weak and quiescent in the early 1990s to being a revanchist power, a spoiler with enough capability and cunning to be disruptive. With two major global players outside the U.S.-constructed international system, the world had entered a post-American phase. Today, the United States is still the most powerful country on the planet, but it exists in a world of global and regional powers that can—and frequently do—push back. The 9/11 attacks and the rise of Islamic terrorism played a dual role in the decline of U.S. hegemony. At first, the attacks seemed to galvanize Washington and mobilize its power. In 2001, the United States, still larger economically than the next five countries put together, chose to ramp up its annual defense spending by an amount—almost $50 billion—that was larger than the United Kingdom’s entire yearly defense budget. When Washington intervened in Afghanistan, it was able to get overwhelming support for the campaign, including from Russia. Two years later, despite many objections, it was still able to put together a large international coalition for an invasion of Iraq. The early years of this century marked the high point of the American imperium, as Washington tried to remake wholly alien nations—Afghanistan and Iraq—thousands of miles away, despite the rest of the world’s reluctant acquiescence or active opposition. Iraq in particular marked a turning point. The United States embarked on a war of choice despite misgivings expressed in the rest of world. It tried to get the UN to rubber-stamp its mission, and when that proved arduous, it dispensed with the organization altogether. It ignored the Powell Doctrine—the idea, promulgated by General Colin Powell while he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Gulf War, that a war was worth entering only if vital national interests were at stake and overwhelming victory assured. The Bush administration insisted that the vast challenge of occupying Iraq could be undertaken with a small number of troops and a light touch. Iraq, it was said, would pay for itself. And once in Baghdad, Washington decided to destroy the Iraqi state, disbanding the army and purging the bureaucracy, which produced chaos and helped fuel an insurgency. Any one of these mistakes might have been overcome. But together they ensured that Iraq became a costly fiasco. After 9/11, Washington made major, consequential decisions that continue to haunt it, but it made all of them hastily and in fear. It saw itself as in mortal danger, needing to do whatever it took to defend itself—from invading Iraq to spending untold sums on homeland security to employing torture. The rest of the world saw a country that was experiencing a kind of terrorism that many had lived with for years and yet was thrashing around like a wounded lion, tearing down international alliances and norms. In its first two years, the George W. Bush administration walked away from more international agreements than any previous administration had. (Undoubtedly, that record has now been surpassed under President Donald Trump.) American behavior abroad during the Bush administration shattered the moral and political authority of the United States, as long-standing allies such as Canada and France found themselves at odds with it on the substance, morality, and style of its foreign policy.

# Aff

## FW

### Extinction First

#### Existential threats outweigh

GPP 17

Global Priorities Project, Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” Global Priorities Project, 2017, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>

1.2. THE ETHICS OF EXISTENTIAL RISK In his book Reasons and Persons, Oxford philosopher Derek Parfit advanced an influential argument about the importance of avoiding extinction: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: (1) Peace. (2) A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world’s existing population. (3) A nuclear war that kills 100%. (2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is very much greater. ... The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history. The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second.65 In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a nuclear war that kills 99% of the population would eventually be able to recover civilisation without long-term effect. As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought experiment, the point stands. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is that they would “destroy the future,” as another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts it.66 This future could potentially be extremely long and full of flourishing, and would therefore have extremely large value. In standard risk analysis, when working out how to respond to risk, we work out the expected value of risk reduction, by weighing the probability that an action will prevent an adverse event against the severity of the event. Because the value of preventing existential catastrophe is so vast, even a tiny probability of prevention has huge expected value.67 Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.68 Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument. In some areas, government policy does give significant weight to future generations. For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste storage, governments have considered timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.69 Justifications for this policy usually appeal to principles of intergenerational equity according to which future generations ought to get as much protection as current generations.70 Similarly, widely accepted norms of sustainable development require development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.71 However, when it comes to existential risk, it would seem that we fail to live up to principles of intergenerational equity. Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations less than the current generations; it would give them nothing. Indeed, reducing existential risk plausibly has a quite low cost for us in comparison with the huge expected value it has for future generations. In spite of this, relatively little is done to reduce existential risk. Unless we give up on norms of intergenerational equity, they give us a strong case for significantly increasing our efforts to reduce existential risks. 1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY In spite of the importance of existential risk reduction, it probably receives less attention than is warranted. As a result, concerted international cooperation is required if we are to receive adequate protection from existential risks. 1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in There are several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be underinvested in. Firstly, it is a global public good. Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided. The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries thus have strong incentives to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest. Secondly, as already suggested above, existential risk reduction is an intergenerational public good: most of the benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process. For these goods, the problem is temporal free riding: the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future generations bear the costs. Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available. Cognitive biases also lead people to underestimate existential risks. Since there have not been any catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to politicians and the public.72 This is an example of the misapplication of the availability heuristic, a mental shortcut which assumes that something is important only if it can be readily recalled. Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of existential risk is scope neglect. In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, the size of the benefits had little effect on the scale of the preferred response. People become numbed to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get too large. 74 Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential risk because the numbers at stake are so large. Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude. A wide range of other cognitive biases are likely to affect the evaluation of existential risks.75

### Consequentialism Good

#### Refusing to assume responsibility for the consequences of their [ontological/epistemological/whatever] starting point enables political disaster—their args about ontological entanglement with the rest of the world prove this

Zanotti 17

Associate Professor Department of Political Science, Virginia Tech (Laura, “Reorienting IR: Ontological Entanglement, Agency, and Ethics,” International Studies Review, January 13, 2017

In this article, I have argued that in order for IR to remain politically relevant and critical, we must rethink and reflect on the ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions of the discipline. I then explored how onto-epistemologies, ethics, and political agency are interlinked. Ontologies of entanglement tend to embrace complex conceptualizations of causality and the morphogenetic properties of what exist. In a quantum world, ontological cuts happen in practices. This worldview invites a reconsideration of the way we justify and address political decisions and ethical action beyond the universalism supported by atomistic ontologies and the stifling limits imposed by substantialist-structuralism. As Nick Onuf has argued, “In a straightened world, as in a world in turmoil, talk of universal principles rings hollow… In such a world, positional ethics is the best we can hope for” (Onuf forthcoming, quoted with permission). A quantum reconceptualization of our being in the world and our relation to matter calls for a profound sense of modesty, as well as for the central role of responsibility for taking political decisions. In an entangled world that is not governed by theoretically detectable, linear, and immutable laws of history, but instead by intra-agential processes, the conditions of possibility for political agency are rooted in the morphogenetic properties of practices. Taking responsibility for critically questioning what exists without the hubris of assuming our ability to ordain outcomes displays an affinity with Foucault’s methodological and political project. In this vein, ethical guidelines may not be grounded on abstractions stemming from the solitary ruminations of an individual’s mind. Prudence, responsibility, and practices of cultivation of the self offer pathways to overcome the limitations of the Kantian categorical imperative by which universal prescriptions are the main way of validating ethical choices. As Patomäki has shown, universalism may elicit exclusionary and violent practices. Moreover, as Connolly has argued, the nostalgia for a slowly moving world regulated by linear relations of causality and characterized by certainty and stability may be the root of fundamentalism. Furthermore, if we accept Barad’s position that we are “of the world” and not above the world, theorizing looks more like a practice endowed with performative political effects than a quest for the discovery of the “true nature” of what exists. Therefore, intellectual undertakings are a form of political agency and come with great responsibility. Such responsibility requires the need for exercising prudence in making truth statements about what is universally good or naturally inevitable. Assumptions about linearity of causal relations, universal laws of history, or ontological properties of entities yield two problematic effects. On the one hand, they may stifle political imagination; on the other hand, they could encourage actions based upon abstract prescriptions rather than upon careful diagnosis of the forces that obtain in the situation at hand. In an entangled world, there are no externalities. Arguments that divert responsibility by basing political choices upon abstract principles or aspirations and, as a result, that treat what happens on the ground as “unintended consequences” or “collateral damage,” are ethically thin and politically dangerous. In fact, unintended consequences may well be the result of irresponsible political decision-making that does not include a competent assessment of the practical configurations that constitute the context of action and the means necessary to achieve stated goals. Such attitudes, Amoureux and Steele (2014) have suggested, have led to disastrous initiatives, such as the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq. Likewise, Kennedy (2006) has shown that the bland rhetoric of jus in bello that provides standardized criteria regarding the number of acceptable civilian casualties (conveniently called collateral damage) produces the effect of diverting responsibility from those who conduct war while assuaging their consciences concerning the injuries and deaths their choices are inflicting. Kennedy (2004) has also shown that as a result of the preference for universal normativity, the human rights profession (which he calls “the invisible college”) is more concerned with protecting abstract norms than with acting politically so as to devise viable solutions to specific problems. Universal norms and bureaucratic routines play a major role in prescribing and justifying UN peacekeeping interventions. As Jean Marie Guehénno argued more than a decade ago, strategies of international intervention based upon assumptions of causal linearity and invariance may amount to hubris. Norms and rules can also offer grounds for appeasement. The massacres that occurred in Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990s provide examples of how, by uncritically following institutionalized rules, United Nations peacekeepers permitted atrocities. UN employees are not cold-blooded monsters or extremely callous individuals. They follow norms and rules, key examples of which include the principle of “impartiality,” Security Council mandates, and “rules of engagement.” By doing so, however, they have often fallen short of considering the possible consequences of decisions in specific situations. The United Nations’ failure to take action to prevent the Rwanda and Srebrenica genocide testifies to the fact that following universal norms (i.e., the imperative to preserve impartiality) and bureaucratic reasoning (i.e., the rules of engagement prescribing not to intervene to disarm any party of the conflict) set the stage for avoiding a careful assessment of what was at stake on the eve of the massacres. These ways of reasoning also appeased consciences for not making decisions accountable to the people in danger (Zanotti 2014). Significantly, the lack of prudence that derives from broad overgeneralizations and reliance on abstractions, rather than careful consideration of what the case demands, threatens more self-defeating outcomes in peacekeeping and international politics. This is why a careful reflection of the ways our political choices are validated ontologically and epistemologically is of paramount practical importance. Seven decades ago, Carr (1946) advocated the need for conceptualizing political agency and ethics in a way that addresses both the limits of the idealist illusion regarding the possibility to transform reality through acts of will as well as the realist persuasion about the inescapable subordination of actors to external conditions. Both of these positions, Carr pointed out, lead to self-defeating outcomes and stifle political imagination because they focus on general abstractions, failing to take into consideration what conditions and political opportunity actually obtain in specific historical configurations. Here I have proposed that an ontology of entanglement fosters an ethic of engagement and activism along the lines suggested by Foucault and opens up possibilities for political action. In this ontological horizon, what qualifies as meaningful agency is not stifled by the structuralist commitment to the stabilizing effects of structures (like in Waltz’s) or by the inescapable features of an oppressive and alienating social order that dispossess subjects of their humanity and reduces them to “bare life” (as in Agamben). Instead, micropolitical interventions, parrēsia, and the cultivation of a particular kind of character, while not revolutionizing the status quo, may be relevant to triggering social change. Importantly, ontologies of entanglement also raise the bar for adjudicating the ethical validity of political choices. Radical assumption of responsibility drastically limits what is acceptable as “unintended consequences.” This is important for the way international organizations make decisions regarding international peacekeeping interventions and for the way politicians decide to wage war. Ethically and politically sound decision-making cannot be based mainly upon the apodictic recognition of universal rules of behavior, abstract aspirations, or overarching theories of the functioning of society. They must also include careful analysis of how clusters of causes may generate effects in the specific contexts at hand and take responsibility for the ontological cuts our initiatives operate and for the morphogenetic processes they may set off.

## Links

### NATO Good – Gendermen

#### No link—NATO’s WPS agenda has disrupted gender hierarchies

Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz 19

Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “NATO, women, and gendermen.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 95-96. LJS

And yet, engaging in gender work can offer opportunities for a more ‘genderconscious’ masculinity to develop (Hurley, 2018a). In Chapter 1, we highlight how change in institutions of hegemonic masculinity is, at least theoretically, possible. In her discussion of change in hegemonic masculinity, Duncanson (2013, 2015) highlights the dangers of dismissing any form of positive change in the way men construct, understand and enact their masculinities as simply the ‘flexibility of the machinery of rule’ (Duncanson, 2015: 232). Positive change is not always co-option, and as Connell and Messerschmidt (2005: 840) argue, the concept of hegemonic masculinity was never meant to mean a ‘toxic assemblage’ of negative traits: though, as we have discussed, co-option and hybridisation can be ways in which particular forms of masculinity retain their hegemonic status (Messner, 2007; Demetriou, 2001). Duncanson argues that positive change and the ‘unravelling of hegemonic masculinity’ is possible and that it must begin with men being encouraged: not so much to change their ways as to change the way in which they negotiate their identities in relation to others. Rather than forge their identities through relations of opposition or domination, men and subjects in general need to construct their identities through recognition of similarity, respect, interdependence, empathy and equality with others. (Duncanson 2015: 233, emphasis in original) There was evidence of this (re)negotiation in the accounts of NATO’s gendermen. Those with whom we spoke to articulated a great deal of respect for their colleagues. Witnessing the mutual admiration and respect the men and women of the Executive Committee of the NCGP had for each other whilst working together to advance gender issues within NATO was further testament to this. Yet, doing gender work and putting on your gender glasses (a point returned to in Chapter 5) also afforded an opportunity to increase mutual respect between men and women both inside and outside of NATO: In the armed forces as well as in civil society, it is not just a matter of having the same salaries, having the same access to work; it is having the same mentality. Once you get this mentality, especially in men, seeing life with your gender glasses, I think the lives of many people will change … you apply the gender glasses to everything and your level of respect for the other gender is much better. Interview with NATO Official, 2012 in Hurley (2018) In addition to the fostering of respect, there was also a sense of empathy, both for women within NATO and those external to it, those affected by war and conflict that was articulated:96 NATO women and gendermen We try to find believers [in gender] and you find believers everywhere, they don’t need to be women, most of them are women. I can tell you, unfortunately, because I feel really alone in this world. I feel the same as when women joined the armed forces and they were just one or two and it is really hard, I can tell you, it is really hard. You have to behave because they are watching you … they are watching you, they are paying attention to what you do because you are, let’s say an alien in their world. You have to introduce this issue, but in a serious way. You have to explain to them basic gender concepts, very basic gender concepts, but you have to go deeper. It is not just: ‘What is gender mainstreaming?’, ‘What are gender perspectives?’ It is more. It applies to people suffering the effects of wars and operations. You have to listen to them, understand how they feel, how the operations affect them and in which ways; ask how you can help them. Interview with NATO Official, 2012 in Hurley (2018) As highlighted above, gendermen are in a distinct position within NATO, they find themselves in a minority position vis-à-vis women when working on gender. Doing this work makes men highly visible and this brings with it feelings of being out of place; this can prompt a form of empathy with women who occupy a minority position vis-à-vis men within NATO writ large (Hurley, 2018a).

### NATO Good – Gender Advisors

#### NATO’s WPS agenda proves state action can be good—Gender Advisors materially improve the lives of marginalized people globally

Wright 22

Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK. “Challenging civil society perceptions of NATO: Engaging the Women, Peace and Security agenda.” Cooperation and Conflict. April 2022. LJS

NATO’s own external presentation of the work of its Gender Advisors is largely extremely positive.52 The most comprehensive reviews of their work have been upbeat overall. Egnell, Hojem, and Berts’ presented Gender Advisors’ as having ‘made a gender perspective a real and permanent feature of Swedish contributions to international operations’53 We asked Gender Advisors what they felt had been their key successes. Their responses are scrutinized in two directions: first, internal: in terms of changing mindsets within their military structures as regards women and the relevance of gender (an aspect of regendering, discussed above) and changing their colleagues’ working practices; second, external: in terms of impacts upon communities – improving security for women and men, and increasing women’s participation. Changes in Military Practice and Mindsets Overwhelmingly, Gender Advisors tended to describe their success in terms of ‘institutionalization’ and ‘integration’ of procedures to include gender perspectives. The Gender Advisors generally conveyed a sense of slow but steady progress in acceptance of the relevance of gender to militaries, and processes to facilitate consideration of it in military operations. Lackenbauer and Langlais’ 2013 review had found that ISAF Gender Advisors had little structure for their work, having to decide on their own focus and tasks. The more recently deployed Gender Advisors we interviewed described established processes for Gender Advisors’ engagement in planning, identification of goals and indicators; more access to command; and fuller staffing of Gender Advisor posts. Those who been involved in the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, which commenced in January 2015, described gender as integrated in the Mission’s indicators and reporting mechanisms; operational plans and standard operating procedures; facilities, activities, budgets; and focusing not only upon women but upon influencing men. Some Gender Advisors describe a key mark of progress as the recognition by the command that integrating gender perspective is their responsibility, advised and supported by their Gender Advisor, rather than the responsibility of the Gender Advisor. When it started in 2008 … they put a lot of responsibility on the Gender Field Advisor. And then it was very easy to criticise the work because it’s very difficult to be successful if you’re, like, alone and … no one really knows what is this about … now the organisation has a full understanding and acceptance of this, and that is that the work of integrating a gender perspective should always be the Commander’s … So absolutely, absolutely it has evolved. (Agnes) Another ISAF Gender Advisor recounted being in a senior staff meeting in which the commander asked who was going to a conference organized by Afghan women. When eyes slid to the Gender Advisor, the commander said, ‘I am on board. We will push this button. And if I do it, you have to do it too’ (meaning they all had to go to the conference). Although describing gender as a ‘button’ raises questions, the Gender Advisor interpreted this as the commander reiterating the importance for all parts of the Mission of engaging with Afghan women. As evidence of institutionalization through the headquarters or operation, a number of Gender Advisors described colleagues independently including gender in planning documents or analyses. Many highlighted changing their colleagues’ mindset as regard the relevance of gender. Security and Women’s Empowerment A number of Gender Advisors gave examples of how their advice had been used to mitigate the harm that NATO’s own activities might pose to women. Some mentioned using a gender perspective in analysing intelligence so as to mitigate ‘collateral damage’ in NATO targeting. One described broadening consultation with local communities to include women, so to understand what roads they used, to be able to avoid them. One spoke of ‘prevent[ing] an American General killing some women’ by advising on how funding might be provided to community projects without inflaming local rivalries. Gender Advisors, however, most often described their successes as hoped-for impacts of their individual contacts with local women: having facilitated their coming together, inspiring them to join the security forces, motivating them. The first thing I wrote was a zero … [but] I met Afghan women and would see them six months later with burkhas off, talking to soldiers, trying to negotiate for funds … maybe a little drop that fills up the bucket, for me, that is enough. (Workshop participant) I hope that I have motivated one woman to not give up and keep fighting for women’s rights. (Workshop participant) A number of Gender Advisors had worked to support Afghan security forces in integrating women, and felt that their advocacy with the Afghan authorities to emphasize the importance of women’s participation had been successful. One talked about directly supporting female police through helping them to set up their own network; another about Gender Advisors’ support to centres and protection units dealing with gender based violence. Others talked about being role models for Afghan women to join the security forces. We noticed that, although the description of a Gender Advisor’s role in Bi-Strategic Directive 40-1 refers to gender analysis and collection of data, none identified progress by reference to measured changes in, for example, prevalence of acts of violence or community perceptions of security.54 They did not claim systematic positive impacts upon the lives of communities affected by conflict or by NATO operations; rather small wins and hopeful signals.

### NATO Good – A2 Imperialism

#### NATO’s engagement is not unidirectional imperialism, but a collaborative process with members and allies—UNSCR 1325 proves

Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz 19

Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “The long view Situating NATO’s engagement with women, peace and security.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 53-54. LJS

UNSCR 1325 has proven a useful diplomatic tool for NATO’s EAPC partners to further their engagement and influence at NATO, incommensurate with status. The role of partner states in NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 has challenged assumptions that NATO partnerships are (solely) a means through which NATO can influence the aspirations of non-members by setting the parameters of the relationship. This challenges assumptions that NATO partnerships are (solely) outward-facing and that NATO sets the parameters of the relationship (Holmberg, 2011: 534; Webber, Hallams and Smith, 2014: 776; Simón, 2014: 18; Wallander, 2000: 729). For example, the NATO/EAPC Policy calls for NATO partners to be involved in the development of the Military Concept (what would become Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40–1), ‘to the maximum possible extent’ given ‘their important contributions of Partner nations to NATO-led operations’ (NATO, 2007). This has demonstrated that norm sharing can be a multi-directional process with NATO partners having had a significant role in putting UNSCR 1325 onto NATO’s agenda and in continuing to support it. This challenges understandings of NATO partnerships as unidirectional, both as a means through which NATO can influence the aspirations of non-members by setting the parameters of the relationship (Wallander, 2000: 729) and as a ‘functional tool for burden sharing’ (Hallams, 2013: 119). This is significant given the widening and broadening of NATO partnerships, including into Asia and the Middle East, necessitates a reassessment of the value of partnerships (for NATO and partners), even if NATO has yet to fully resolve the purpose of partnerships (Moore, 2012: 57). As this chapter goes onto discuss, the broadening of the actors involved within NATO’s engagement with WPS has strengthened both the latest iterations of the NATO/EAPC Policy on UNSCR 1325 applicable to the civilian structure and the accompanying military Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40–1. The actors involved include, but are not limited to, NATO Officials, member states, partner states, civil society, NATO Special Representative on WPS, IMS Office of the Gender Advisor, NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives and most recently Angelina Jolie. The alliance’s engagement with WPS has created new gender policy machinery in the form of the NATO Special Representative and the recreation of the IMS Office of the Gender Advisor and NCGP. It has also garnered attention from external actors who were not present and did not contribute to NATO’s initial engagement with WPS (civil society, Angelina Jolie). So, while the role of NATO partners, namely Austria and Sweden, and the Friends of 1325, was crucial in putting WPS onto NATO’s agenda, we need to consider if these new actors have influenced the ideas and practices underpinning WPS at NATO.

### Liberalism Good

#### The perm is best --- the alt fails alone but combining strategies provides meaningful routes for change

Paris, 10 – (Roland, Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding,” February 17, 2010, <http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~rparis/Saving_Liberal_Peacebuilding_FINAL.pdf>) // kt \*\*modified for ableist language

If there is no realistic or preferable alternative to broadly liberal approaches, what can be done in the face of the current “crisis” of liberal peacebuilding? The first step is to question the extent to which this crisis is real or imagined. In this article, I have attempted to show that some of the most sweeping critiques of liberal peacebuilding have rested on dubious claims and logic, including the conflation of post-conquest and post-settlement peacebuilding; unnuanced analogies of peacebuilding and colonialism or imperialism; definitions of the liberal peace that are too broad; mischaracterizations of the peacebuilding record; and oversimplifications of the moral complexity of peacebuilding. Considered in this light, the purported crisis of liberal peacebuilding appears to be less severe and less fundamental than some have claimed. The challenge today is not to replace or move “beyond” liberal peacebuilding, but to reform existing approaches within a broadly liberal framework. This enterprise has both conceptual and policy elements. Peacebuilding remains ripe for theoretical treatments that shed light on the meaning and effects of these operations. In other words, the peacebuilding literature need not, and should not, be limited to narrowly policy-oriented or “problem solving” analyses. In the 1990s, most of the peacebuilding literature was preoccupied with practical policy issues and paid little attention to the relationships between peacebuilding and larger phenomena in international politics. The rise of more critical analysis since then has been part of a welcome broadening of the field, which now places greater emphasis on exploring the theoretical underpinnings and implications of these missions. The great strength of critical approaches has always been their focus on exposing and dissecting widely held assumptions and orthodoxies. But critical scholarship can lose its intellectual and empirical moorings if it fails to be self-reflective and self-critical – that is, if its logic, evidence and implications are not themselves subject to scrutiny and challenge. Nothing in the recent critical literature offers a convincing rationale for abandoning liberal peacebuilding, rather than reforming it. If anything, the rise of what I have called hyper-critical scholarship – and particularly its dubious yet seemingly ritualized rejection of liberal peacebuilding – has served to cloud rather than clarify our understanding of what peacebuilding is, and what it does. 38 Of course, there is no single “best” way of analyzing these missions or the broader phenomenon of international peacebuilding. This field of research is – and hopefully will remain – a diverse bazaar of different theoretical and empirical approaches, open to discussion and debate across intellectual traditions and methodologies. This article has sought to contribute to this debate by arguing for a rethinking and rebalancing of liberal peacebuilding critiques. In contrast to the unconvincing hyper-criticism of today, or the irrational exuberance of earlier years, a more constructively critical approach might build on the recognition that: (1) both liberalism and liberal peacebuilding are deeply problematic concepts – in theory and application – and their internal contradictions play themselves out in peacebuilding, sometimes in troubling and destructive ways; (2) liberally-oriented peacebuilding can, in principle, accommodate a great deal of internal variation and adjustment, including many of the specific changes proposed by many critics; (3) scholars who repudiate liberal peacebuilding or call for “alternative” strategies should be expected to reflect carefully on the normative underpinnings of their own arguments, and to clarify the alternatives they may be proposing, including the moral and practical implications of pursuing these alternatives. The third point should be particularly important for those who believe that critical peacebuilding scholarship has an important contribution to make to the field – and that the recent turn towards a reflexive anti-liberalism has diminished the force of these critiques. Adopting a constructively critical orientation does not mean accepting the current practices of peacebuilding. It does not mean that peacebuilding must be “top-down” instead of “bottom-up” – that is a criticism of centralism, not liberalism. It does not mean that peacebuilding should be fixated on formal institutions to the exclusion of informal or customary methods of governance – that is a criticism of formalism, not liberalism. It does not mean that peacebuilders should adopt a “fixed, non-negotiable concept of what the state should eventually look like”117 – that is a criticism of institutional isomorphism, not liberalism. Nor does it mean that peacebuilders should assume that liberalization will necessarily foster peace – that is a criticism of naïve Wilsonianism, one variant of liberalism.118 Addressing all of these real problems may entail probing the internal tensions of liberalism, but it does not require a sweeping rejection of liberal peacebuilding. In fact, there are many recent examples of constructively critical research that raise important theoretical and practical questions, some of which challenge liberal premises without making the mistake of discarding the baby with the bathwater. For instance: What are the sources and dynamics of “legitimacy” in international peacebuilding?119 What obligations, if any, do international actors have in rebuilding societies after conflict?120 What are the limits of external democracy promotion efforts?121 How might “non-elite” populations of host states be included more directly into peace negotiations and post-conflict institutional reform?122 What is the relationship between power-sharing arrangements and peace?123 How might ideas of “local ownership” be developed in a manner that avoids simplistic bromides about the need for greater local ownership or emancipation?124 Other examples include: How do “discursive frames” and organizational procedures shape the design and conduct of peacebuilding in practice?125 How can peacebuilding agencies learn from experiences across missions without falling into the trap of assuming that “technical” knowledge is readily transferrable across diverse local circumstances?126 Why does the UN seem to make peacebuilding commitments that it subsequently fails to fulfill in practice?127 What are the economic impacts of peacebuilding operations?128 What is the relationship between “peace conditionalities” in economic assistance and the durability of the ensuing peace?129 How can economic liberalization be pursued in ways that minimize the dangers of strengthening black markets?130 Under what circumstances should peacebuilding missions end, and how should they “exit”?131 This is just a small sampling of research questions that represent a broad mix of normative approaches. They point to even larger unresolved questions, including the crucial issue of how one should define peacebuilding “success.”132 Many of these research efforts also offer the possibility of making peacebuilding operations more effective, and more just, in the future. Whichever research paths one may chose to follow, those engaged in constructively critical analysis have an immense task ahead of them: peacebuilding is tremendously complex and prone to unanticipated consequences, yet it is also too important to lose or abandon. As long as both scholars and practitioners embrace an open, critical discussion of peacebuilding’s merits and flaws, without descending into unwarranted hyper-criticism, there is still hope of improving both the conception and delivery of international assistance to societies embarking on difficult transitions from war to peace.

#### Liberalism is inevitable and a transition would cause escalating conflict – the alt excludes the aff but the aff doesn’t exclude the alt

Paris, 10 – (Roland, Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding,” February 17, 2010, <http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~rparis/Saving_Liberal_Peacebuilding_FINAL.pdf>) // kt \*\*modified for ableist language

In fact, there seems to be no viable alternative to some version of liberal peacebuilding. Consider, first, the question of whether international peacebuilding should be continued at all. As we saw, some commentators including Jeffrey Herbst and Jeremy Weinstein have suggested that conflicts should sometimes be allowed to burn themselves out, and that large-scale “impartial” intervention (even after a ceasefire agreement) risks locking in conditions that are not sustainable or compatible with long-term peace. There is some logic to this approach, since wars ending in military victory may produce longer-lasting peace than those ending in negotiated settlements. But this strategy could also involve huge risks and costs: The victors might decimate the losers, or alternatively some wars might grind on for years or decades without resolution, all the while producing humanitarian crises before one side finally achieves victory. In the meantime, conflicts could spread to neighbouring territories, as several have done in Africa in recent years. On balance, then, failing to provide assistance when it is possible to do so, and when it is requested by local parties, would seem a short-sighted and dangerous solution to the shortcomings of these operations; just as suspending the practice of post-conflict peacebuilding would be a significant overreaction to the various problems that these missions have experienced and caused. Nor is there any sign of declining demand for new operations, given the increased trend for civil conflicts to end in negotiated settlements in recent years.97 But why, in this case, must peacebuilding be liberal? The simple answer is that alternative strategies – that is, strategies not rooted in liberal principles – would likely create more problems than they would solve. One approach, for example, might be for international agencies to establish permanent trusteeships over war-torn states – that is, externally run governments that have no intention of ceding their authority to local actors. This option is not unlike the formula proposed by Stephen Krasner, who called for direct international governance of dangerously fragile states “for an indefinite period of time.”98 The main problem with this approach is that it would come very close to colonial-type control – indeed, much more so than even the most longlasting and interventionist post-settlement missions that have been conducted to date. Maintaining such an arrangement over the long term would likely require permanent suppression of domestic political activity within the host state. As David Edelstein points out, even when foreign military deployments are made at the invitation of local parties, they face a problem of an “obsolescing welcome” whereby elements of the local population tend to grow increasingly resentful of a powerful external presence in their society.99 Continuing to embrace the objective of transferring full sovereign powers to local actors may thus be the single most important strategy for addressing this problem and for widening the “window” of time available for peacebuilders to assist in strengthening domestic institutions within the host state. By contrast, establishing permanent foreign rule would reduce the time available for peacebuilders to do their work before local resentment begins to build and the peacebuilding mission becomes an obstacle to, rather than a facilitator of, consolidating a stable peace. A second alternative to liberal peacebuilding might be for international agencies to identify local leaders who could rule as undemocratic strongmen over their society. This would, at least, provide a means for peacebuilders to scale back their presence quickly, as long as they continued to offer various types of support (financial, material, etc.) to the ruling person or party. Indeed, this was roughly that strategy that the United States and Soviet Union pursued with their respective patrons in many parts of the world during the Cold War. However, one of the practical problems with this approach is that authoritarian regimes created and sustained by external parties have often turned out to be more fragile than they appear, in part because they tend to lack domestic legitimacy and therefore remain in power only by repressing or buying off their internal rivals. This was one of the lessons learned at the end of the Cold War, when a reduction or cessation of immense flows of superpower assistance led to the collapse of authoritarian regimes in Somalia, Zaire/Congo and elsewhere, followed by a violent scramble for power. Furthermore, in a country just emerging from civil war, where two or more factions were engaged in large-scale killing, a postconflict “strongman strategy” would risk alienating unrepresented groups that might choose to resume violence rather than living under the new regime. Some measure of power-sharing, or at least a reasonable prospect of gaining power through an unrigged political process, generally helps to mitigate this danger.100 A third alternative to liberal peacebuilding might be to rely on traditional or indigenous practices of peace-making and governance, rather than elections and other accoutrements of liberal democracy. Roger Mac Guinty has usefully highlighted the limited space provided for such approaches in existing peacebuilding models, which tend to be “highly standardized” and rooted in a sense of the “superiority of Western approaches to peace-making.”101 In contrast to the more formalistic and legalistic approaches, traditional and indigenous methods tend to focus on “consensus decision-making, a restoration of the human/resource balance, and compensation or gift exchange designed to ensure reciprocal and ongoing harmonious relations between groups.”102 Because they reflect local customs, he adds, these techniques may “hold the potential to achieve a grass-roots legitimacy that may be lacking from more technocratic ‘alien’ forms of dispute resolution that form the mainstay of Western-funded and designed peacesupport programs and projects.”103 While Mac Guinty makes a strong case for adapting policies to local conditions and traditions (using examples such as Afghanistan’s Loya Jirgas, or tribal assemblies, which played an important role in that country’s initial transition from Taliban rule), he does not recommend relying exclusively on such techniques. On the contrary, he wisely warns of the danger of romanticizing traditional or indigenous practices – not least because they may serve to reinforce “the authority of existing power-holders” and to impose “social conformity,” sometimes in brutal ways.104 Tanja Chopra’s analysis of local peacebuilding initiatives in Kenya offers cautionary tale illustrating these dangers. Efforts to tap into traditional conflict-resolution techniques through community-level “peace committees” in Keyna have shown some success, but in some cases they have also served to “deepen existing rifts between communities” and “reinforce divisions” while also undermining concurrent efforts to strengthen respect for the rule of law at the national level.105 Traditional and bottom-up approaches, in other words, should be part of peacebuilding, but they are no panacea. There are other reasons to be cautious before embracing traditional governance methods. Those who believe that doing so will eliminate or reduce the intrusion of foreign peacebuilders in the domestic affairs of the host state fail to recognize that peacebuilders will still need to make crucial choices, whether they wish to do so or not. No society has a single, unambiguous set of governance structures (traditional or otherwise) that can be automatically activated. Consequential decisions must therefore be made to privilege some structures and not others – and, as much as peacebuilders might view themselves as referees in such decisions, in fact they will always be “players” simply by virtue of their relative power in the domestic setting of a wartorn state.106 In any event, some measure of external influence may be necessary and desirable: if the post-conflict society could organize its own governance arrangements without international assistance, there would have been no need or demand for peacebuilding in the first place. Given all this, consider the implications if international agencies were to adopt a general policy of relying on indigenous governance structures in post-conflict countries. Very likely, any political outcomes of this process would be questioned and contested due to perceived international “interference,” no matter how well-meaning and diligent the peacebuilders were in seeking to remain neutral. Further, in cases where one individual or group dominated such a process, the result could be the equivalent of the second alternative to liberal peacebuilding discussed above – strongman rule – with all the problems associated with that option. These are all real concerns that counsel caution, but in spite of the risks and complexities, experience in Afghanistan, Cambodia and elsewhere suggests that much more research attention needs to be devoted to the topic of hybrid arrangements in countries recovering from conflict, or approaches those that blend formal, informal, modern and customary methods of governance and conflict resolution.107 It is also interesting that Mac Guinty argues that one of the benefits of customary arrangements could be to enhance “political participation,” while he also warns against the dangers of authoritarianism. Such arguments suggest that Mac Guinty, like other commentators discussed above, is less concerned with the liberal orientation of current peacebuilding approaches than he is with their relative rigidity and lack of adaptability to local conditions. In fact, there is nothing in the idea of the “liberal peace” or “liberal peacebuilding” that mandates such inflexibility. Liberal polities come in many different styles and forms, from group-based “consociational” proportional representation arrangements to Anglo-American-style plurality systems, and there is nothing to prevent liberalism from accommodating new models. Nor does support for liberal political principles stand in the way of pursuing any number of complementary initiatives and goals, including those focusing on post-conflict reconciliation,108 social welfare and justice,109 extensive public deliberations at the national and local levels,110 or the empowerment and inclusion of women and other marginalized groups.111 The key principles of liberalism – individual freedoms, representative government, and constitutional limits on arbitrary power – offer a broader canvas for institutional design and creative policymaking. Without clear alternatives, some version of liberalism therefore remains the most sensible foundation for post-conflict peacebuilding. The overarching goal of such missions should be to create the conditions for representative self-government, not only because such an outcome is the least morally objectionable goal for peacebuilding, but also for the practical purpose of facilitating the eventual departure of peacebuilders through the restoration of domestic sovereignty over the territory. Further, while the importance of elections alone should not be exaggerated, they remain a crucial tool for populations to constitute their own governments, not only during the period of peacebuilding, but on an ongoing basis.112 While it is true that encouraging elections itself involves an external intrusion in the internal affairs of the host state, surely we can differentiate between more and less acceptable intrusions – including the fact that elections are meant to facilitate the society’s ability to shape its own destiny and exercise self-government, so that the peacebuilders themselves can leave. Elections alone cannot achieve this goal, nor do elections equal democracy. But of all the possible ways in which international actors can influence the domestic politics of a country, the idea of promoting self-government is one of the least morally objectionable – and, from the standpoint of not overstaying an “obsolescing welcome,” it may be a pragmatic necessity. Similarly, while certain economic liberalization strategies can be destabilizing,113 is there really an alternative to some version of market-oriented reform in states emerging from war? The second half of the twentieth century demonstrated that centrally planned and state-dominated development strategies – including not only Soviet-style communism but also import substitution strategies pursued in many parts of Latin America and Africa – generally produced lower levels of economic growth than market-oriented development strategies. Debates continue about the appropriate balance between the market and the state in economic development, including greater regulation of financial institutions and the like, but there is near-universal agreement today that non-market-oriented economic policies (or those that do not give the market a primary role in allocating scarce resources) are too inefficient to generate sustained economic growth. Most of those who have criticized the economic dimensions of liberal peacebuilding (including this author) have called for less aggressive adjustment strategies in order to reduce the destabilizing effects of rapid marketization, but have not rejected the idea of economic liberalization itself – in part because economic growth is important to the long-term success of peacebuilding.114 Although there is no guarantee that states pursuing market-oriented development policies will become richer, there is a near guarantee that those pursuing nonmarket-oriented strategies will stay poor. There is no universally-applicable, market-oriented model appropriate for all peacebuilding cases. Rather, there are countless variations of liberal economic policies that can be explored and pursued,115 but all share one thing in common: a primary orientation toward markets as a foundation for long-term growth. If existing economic policies have been ill-suited to the needs of war-torn states, it is not because these policies have been “liberal” or market-oriented in the broad sense of these terms, but rather, because they have paid too little attention to the particular vulnerabilities of countries just emerging from destructive and divisive conflicts, including the potentially destabilizing effects of “shock therapy” adjustment policies.116 Addressing such problems primarily involves altering and customizing, not abandoning, the economically liberal elements of peacebuilding.

### Policy Good

#### Policy reforms have created meaningful changes to NATO’s gender initiatives

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Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “The long view Situating NATO’s engagement with women, peace and security.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 55-58. LJS

Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40–1 (Bi-SCD 40–1) represents NATO’s military structure’s engagement with WPS. Here we consider Bi-SCD 40–1 as an integral part of NATO’s gender architecture and a key moment in NATO’s initial engagement with UNSCR 1325 and later WPS. It was adopted in 2009 and has since been revised twice, in 2012 and most recently in 20175 (NATO, 2009, 2012a). The latest version represents a significant development in the sophistication of NATO’s understanding of WPS and gender perspectives, it also outlines a clear line of accountability. In a move away from previous versions, the Commander is clearly identified as the responsible person for its implementation, with gender advisors providing support and advice and gender focal points acting as a facilitators (NATO, 2017b). As Chapter 5 will go onto argue, examining these policies demonstrates both the changes in NATO’s understanding of the value of a gender perspective, but also the continuities. Here, we provide an important context for this discussion and consider the institutional actors responsible for shaping it. Following the call in the 2007 NATO/EAPC Policy for NATO’s Military Authorities to lead on its implementation, Bi-SCD 40–1 was adopted in 2009. As we go on to highlight in Chapter 5, the NATO Strategic Commands – Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) – jointly drafted Bi-Strategic Command 40–1 ‘Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspective into the NATO Command Structure’, with the aim of providing ‘guidance for the integration of Resolutions, Conventions, Protocols and gender perspective into the planning and conduct of NATO-led operations’ (Colao, 2013: 19). The document is binding on all International Military Headquarters and any entity under the ACO or ACT chain of command, which includes partner states. This represents another way in which NATO acts as a ‘teaching machine’ (Enloe, 1981; Wright, 2016), with both member and partner states deployed on NATO operations learning the value Bi-Strategic Command 40–1 ascribes to the WPS agenda. Bi-SCD 40–1 is not military doctrine (doctrines are approved by the nations in the Military Committee), but rather the core document for implementing a gender perspective in NATO military operations. Bi-SCD 40–1 integrates UNSCR 1325 and Related Resolutions as well as a gender perspective in the NATO Command Structure, including measures for protection during armed conflict. It is founded upon the three UNSCR 1325 ‘P’s’: prevent disproportionate impact on women and children in armed conflict; protect women and children; and foster the participation of women in all aspects of operations and levels of command. The directive introduces standards of behaviour and concepts inherent in EU and UN policy (e.g. gender advisors, incorporating gender perspectives in operational planning development). The integration of gender into Allied Joint Doctrine is now the responsibility of the Gender Advisors at ACO and ACT (NATO ACT, 2015). Bi-SCD 40–1 contributes to standardising operations and establishing common ways of accomplishing military tasks between different military actors under the Allied Joint Doctrine version 1 in respect to gender perspectives and WPS (NATO, 2017a). We return to Bi-SCD in Chapter 5 where we consider what a ‘gender perspective’ means for NATO. Institutional actors: supporting WPS at NATO In 2009, the Committee on Women in NATO Forces was renamed the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP) and its remit expanded to provide advice on gender issues, including the implementation of UNSCRs 1325 and 1820 and future related UNSCRs under the remit of WPS. We discuss the role of the NCGP in further detail in the following chapters, including its important role in supporting NATO’s engagement with WPS. Here, our focus turns to the other institutional actors who have supported UNSCR 1325 at NATO, particularly in NATO’s political structure. This provides important context for understanding how the NCGP has supported WPS and how NATO’s engagement with gender issues transgresses across the military and political structures. In 2013, UN Women commissioned a Global Review of 1325 to mark the 15th anniversary of since the adoption of UNSCR 1325 in 2015. In the subsequent report, NATO’s Secretary General’s Special Representative on WPS was identified as an example of good practice for the implementation of the agenda because the position was high profile and reports directly to the Secretary General (Coomaraswamy, 2015). The Special Representative has since been invited to address the UN Security Council, and regularly meets with counterparts in the EU, OSCE and AU and works with civil society on the issues. The position has been held by two career diplomats Mari Skåre (2012–14) and Marriët Schuurman (2014–17) and in 2018, Clare Hutchinson, a highly experienced and accomplished gender advisor, took over the role. The creation of the role has provided an important cornerstone of NATO’s engagement with WPS, yet it was not a foregone conclusion that it would be created and considering how NATO came to have such a position is important for understanding how NATO functions as a gendered institution. The creation of the post of NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for WPS was approved at NATO’s 2012 Chicago Summit (WIIS, 2012) and marked a watershed moment in the implementation of UNSCR 1325 at NATO. The move to appoint an individual to support NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 stemmed from the 2007 NATO/EAPC Policy, which called for consideration to be given to the appointment of a gender advisor at NATO HQ (NATO, 2007). However, a Special Representative was a far more senior role, whose position has the potential to support the advancement of the WPS agenda at NATO. In considering the significance of the appointment of a Special Representative on WPS it is important to distinguish such a role from that of a gender advisor. A gender advisor acts as a means through which to incorporate a gender perspective and in this sense can come to represent an institution’s gender expertise. In operational situations and organisational departments, a gender advisor can provide a useful means for incorporating a gender perspective, in particular where specialised knowledge is required. Nevertheless, at a wider organisational level, a gender advisor would symbolise an institution’s gender expertise and this would be likely to hinder attempts to mainstream a gender perspective throughout the organisational structure, particularly where they lack the seniority to report directly to the top of the organisational command. For example, the appointment of a gender advisor within the EU External Action Service has been criticised because the position does not report directly to the High-Representative and as such lacks sufficient authority (Guerrina and Wright, 2016). A high-level Special Representative on the other hand provides institutional leadership and is able to hold the organisation account for the implementation of WPS. This is why NATO’s creation of the post of Secretary General’s Special Representative on WPS has been recognised as an example of best practice for regional organisations. The Global Review of UNSCR 1325 recommended that regional organisations follow NATO’s best practice and appoint high-level WPS representatives in order to drive the implementation of the agenda (Coomaraswamy, 2015: 409).

### Women Participation Good

#### Women are participating in political processes around the world – that engagement is critical to combat instability

UN Women, 17 – (UN Women, September 14, 2017, "Editorial spotlight: International Day of Democracy 2017," <http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2017/9/compilation-democracy-day>) // kt

Democracy, sustainable peace and conflict prevention cannot be achieved if women—half of the population—are left behind. This year's International Day of Democracy (15 September) theme, “Democracy and Conflict Prevention”, calls for “strong leadership to support democracy, strengthen civil society, empower women and uphold the rule of law”. [infographic omitted] See infographic on women in leadership » Democracy goes hand in hand with women’s rights Despite women’s leadership and their right to participate in democracy, there is still a wide-underrepresentation of women in politics and decision-making around the world, with women accounting for only 23.4 per cent of parliamentarians around the world and less than one-third of women holding senior and middle-management positions. Laws affecting women’s rights and women’s bodies are being made in Parliaments dominated by men. Women should have an active voice in policies that affect them, and their leadership is indispensable for preventing conflicts and building resilient societies. UN Women is working with countries to end discriminatory laws, policies and attitudes that are holding women and girls back. Women leading political progress Despite slow progress, across the world women are working hard to change the political landscape. In the African continent this year, hundreds of women are running for office. Coumba Diaw grew up hearing women couldn’t run for elections. Today, she is the only women Mayor in the Louga region of Senegal. Read more » “I understand the issues in my electoral district— we don’t have many teachers; the roads are damaged and our healthcare system is poor. I know how to convince my constituents that working together, we can derive better solutions when I am elected to represent them.” In October 2017, Liberians will head to the polls to vote, as President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Africa’s first elected female Head of State, completes her second and final term tenure this year. Thirty-seven-year Christine Juah Settor Dennis is running for a parliamentary seat. Read more » “I am going door to door, campaigning to urge women and youth to vote for me. Our time is now or never.” In Kenya, women ran for county elections, and UN Women and partners worked to change the attitudes of the traditional leaders. When Abdia Gole, 33, first announced her decision to run for political office, people in her community ridiculed her. The Council of Elders, who are the traditional leaders of the community and have the ultimate say in such matters, also disapproved Gole’s intentions. Read more » The new Tunisian Constitution for the first time includes a clause guaranteeing women’s rights, an unprecedented milestone for gender equality. Among the people who brought this Constitution to life was women’s rights activist Mehrezia Maïza Labidi. “I chaired a majority of the plenary sessions on Tunisia’s new constitution. It was my first time in politics, and I ended up writing a constitution!” “Women in politics are still women,” says Ms. Labidi . “We can laugh and be joyful and still be in politics. We do not want to be like men, we want to be ourselves and still engage effectively in politics.” Read more » In Europe and Central Asia, women have been scaling-up their political participation from the local to the national level. “I hope that [women] will be part of decision-making, fight for more policies for women’s economic and social empowerment, and not remain mere numbers in the new Parliament!” In the recently concluded national elections, Albania reached a new milestone with 28 per cent of women parliamentarians. Albanian Member of Parliament Albana Vokshi has been elected for the third consecutive time, and is a strong advocate for women shaping policies and decisions. Read more» Nuriya Temirbek kyzy, a 40-year-old mother of three from Naryn, in central Kyrgyzstan, used to be a housewife. Although she worked all day, taking care of her family, she had less decision-making power since she didn’t earn an income. Today, she has been elected as a member of the Ak-jara village local council, where she actively advocates for women’s rights. Read more » In Asia and the Pacific, women are breaking gender stereotypes and making democracies stronger. Barbara Garma Soares, from Suku Sau, is one of 21 women elected Xefe Suku (Village Chief) in local elections in Timor-Leste. Photo credit: UN Women/Corinne Roberts “It’s vital to shift community opinion, to show people that women are not just wives and mothers, but capable leaders at all levels.” In Timor-Leste, despite never having a woman lead their community as Village Chief before, the villagers of Suku Sau were won over by Barbara Garma Soares. Read more » A woman in Nepal speaks up at an event contesting local polls. Photo: UN Women “I am contesting the upcoming election with my headscarf on, duly following the advice of my mother-in-law. But I have offered my full support to my daughter-in-law to contest the polls without the scarf” In Nepal, women contested for leadership roles to put an end to socio-economic and cultural discrimination against women. Read more » In Latin America, women’s leadership and political participation is combating machismo and building peace. Lucía del Socorro Basante “I was scared to become a candidate, despite all my years of experience as a lawyer. The fear that male councillors will raise their voices, the fear of not being capable, of being in men’s territory. More is demanded of us [as women]” Colombia has made headlines in the last year for the implementation of the peace agreement with the FARC, slowly putting an end to more than half a century of conflict and instability. But achieving gender equality is central to sustainable peace. Lucía del Socorro’s story tells us how she overcame the societal barriers impairing women running for office.

### Reforms Good

#### Legal reforms challenge essentialist notions of gender

Williams, 13 (Dr. Juliet A., associate professor in the Department of Gender Studies at UCLA, "Girls can be anything...but boys will be boys: discourses of sex difference in education reform debates," Nevada Law Journal, Vol. 13, 5-17-13, scholars.law.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1472&context=nlj)

\*In this context the “gender essentialists” that Williams is talking about are those who think that masculine behavior is innately tied to their biological sex. Meaning that she is arguing we need to challenge notions that boys are and will always be aggressive, etc. She is also talking about sex stereotyping in the context of promoting single gender education environments\*

Law has an important role to play in opening up space to contest gender essentialism. One way this may happen is through rigorous application of the still-evolving anti-stereotyping principle in constitutional equal protection analysis. The determination of whether a classification constitutes stereotyping generally has been understood to pivot on the question of whether an overbroad generalization is at play. As a result, the judicial account of sex difference has been characterized as a form of “sexual realism.”67 As Katherine Franke argues, in constitutional jurisprudence, “the wrong of sex discrimination is premised upon a right of sexual differentiation, that is, a fundamental belief in the truth of biological sexual difference.”68 From this perspective, “[d]iscrimination occurs when false or stereotypical differences are mistaken for real differences.”69 More recently, however, legal scholar Cary Franklin has demonstrated that the anti-stereotyping principle is being applied even in cases in which a biological sex difference is recognized. 70 Reflecting on the significance of the 1996 decision U.S. v. Virginia, in which the Supreme Court found the male-only admission policy at a state-supported military college unconstitutional, Franklin finds growing judicial support for the view that “equal protection law should be particularly alert to the possibility of sex stereotyping in contexts where ‘real’ differences are involved, because these are the contexts in which sex classifications have most often been used to perpetuate sex-based inequality.”71 In other words, the anti-stereotyping principle is now invoked to engage the question of the social meaning attributed to sex differences by a classification. In so doing, anti-stereotyping analysis thrusts the social construction of masculinity to the fore, a development that creates critical leverage for future challenges to essentialist pedagogies in court. The evidence rallied to support sex segregation must be carefully reviewed to ensure that sex stereotyping does not take the place of meaningful education reforms.72 Responding to legal challenges, proponents of “gender-friendly” educational initiatives portray their detractors as feminist ideologues unwilling to accept the simple facts of nature. But rhetorical warfare is no substitute for a fair and impartial review of existing evidence. Indeed, an important legacy of feminist legal reforms of the past several decades has been a progressive strengthening of the anti-stereotyping principle in sex-discrimination law.73 The vigorous application of a robust anti-stereotyping principle in law has played a critical role in defeating essentialist justifications for policies that promote the subordination of girls and women.74 But in the case of boys and men, essentialist discourses are proving more resilient. No doubt law once again has a central role to play in challenging essentialist policies that insist we accommodate rather than interrogate the basis for masculine behavior. VI. GIRLS CAN BE ANYTHING . . . BUT BOYS WILL BE BOYS After two decades of concerted gender advocacy in the United States, girls’ advocates and boys’ advocates are sharply divided when it comes to questions of gender difference. Building on legal reforms of the 1970s that were designed to curtail sex discrimination and gender bias in the classroom, advocates for girls traditionally have emphasized the need to challenge social attitudes and practices that stand in the way of girls’ success. Where at one time the dominant social view of girls emphasized inherent limitations, there is now a flourishing discourse of possibility and “the sky’s the limit” thinking about girls.75 The same cannot be said in the case of gender advocacy for boys, where essentialist claims have risen to the forefront. Indeed, among boys’ advocates, there is a growing demand to adjust educational environments and expectations to accommodate boys’ innate capacities and interests. What emerges, then, is a divergent discourse about kids, one which simultaneously proclaims that girls can do anything but boys will be boys.76 In this way, contemporary gender discourse in education suggests a striking shift in what anthropologist Sherry Ortner has called the “underlying logic of cultural thinking” about sex and gender.77 In a now classic essay, Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture?, Ortner declared “the secondary status of woman” to be “one of the true universals” of human societies.78 Ortner attributes this “stubborn” fact to the universal association of woman with nature and man with culture, an attribution derived from “woman’s greater bodily involvement” with reproduction.79 But the message emerging from boys’ advocates today suggests a significant reversal in the familiar terms of gender discourse. In contemporary education reform debates, it is in discussions of girls that we most often encounter a transcendent rhetoric of possibility. In contrast, we are much more likely to be warned of the damaging effects of pushing boys beyond biologically-determined cognitive and emotional limits. One should not presume, however, that this shift indicates a reversal in the gender hierarchy, for the appropriation of an essentialist discourse by boys’ advocates may in fact serve to reinforce male privilege. Today, appeals to nature function as an implicit rejoinder to the suggestion that boys’ troubles emanate in practices of gender socialization that reward aggression and discourage the expression of emotional vulnerability in boys and men. Indeed, in the education-reform debates, the assertion of boys’ fixed and immutable nature has emerged as a powerful tool to subvert interrogation of masculinity. From this perspective, among the most important items of unfinished business for feminism today is a more serious reckoning with the effects of essentialized masculinity.80

### A2 No Policy W/O Activism

#### NATO’s adoption of WPS was independent of activists—top-down politics solve

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Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “The long view Situating NATO’s engagement with women, peace and security.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 49-50. LJS

The eight WPS resolutions, which make-up the WPS agenda, each have their own strengths and weaknesses, but it is clear that the greater engagement there was with the NGO Working Group, the better the outcomes in terms of aligning with feminist goals. The continued feminist engagement with the resolutions is evidenced in the strengthening of the feminist content in the WPS resolutions. The adoption of the WPS resolutions has had a number of positive effects, including challenging the Security Council’s conservative approach to gender (Otto, 2010: 98). The WPS agenda embodied in the resolutions has created a ‘snowball effect’ on institutional activity backed by the power of the Security Council (Otto, 2010: 103). Many parts of the UN structure have become involved in the implementation of the WPS agenda, for example, the InterAgency Network on Women and Gender Equality (IANWGE) established a task force on WPS to coordinate the mainstreaming of WPS into the UN bureaucracy (Otto, 2010: 103). The WPS agenda has utility for a range of actors and settings beyond that envisaged by those who supported the passage of UNSCR 1325 through the Security Council. For example, McLeod’s (2012: 137) research on Women in Black in Serbia finds that after learning about UNSCR 1325, the group conceived ways in which the Resolution could be used strategically to support their existing goals. Prior to their engagement with the WPS agenda in 2005, Women in Black did not articulate ‘security’ as one of their core values. The use of ‘mainstream’ language on security to express feminist goals therefore became a strategy to achieve their pre-existing objectives. In understanding WPS as a ‘travelling concept’ we see how it has moved from transnational feminism to formal acceptance by the UN Security Council, to national and local engagement by grassroots civil society actors. NATO’s adoption of the WPS agenda adds an additional dimension to this journey. NATO did not engage with the WPS as a response to pressure from feminist civil society nor did it formally consult civil society until the 2014 iteration of the NATO/EAPC Policy. Despite the initial NATO/EAPC Policy on WPS adopted in 2007 calling for civil society consultation, this did not occur formally until seven years later. Rather, NATO’s initial engagement was the result of state-level advocacy of the issue which framed WPS as part of NATO’s existing concern with the status of women in the military, as a tool to increase operational effectiveness and also to engage partner states. This journey served to remove WPS from a direct link to feminist advocacy. This leaves open the possibility that NATO’s interpretation of UNSCR 1325 has shaped the WPS agenda itself. This is something we consider further in Chapter 5 where we discuss how the concept of a ‘gender perspective’, initially articulated in UNSCR 1325, has travelled to and been embraced by NATO.

## Perms

### Perm Do Both – WPS

#### Perm do both—NATO’s Women Peace, Security agenda proves traditional policy analysis and feminist analysis are not mutually exclusive—WPS can be expanded into cybersecurity

Mhajne, K.C, and Whetstone 21

Anwar, Assistant Professor of Political Science and the Head Faculty Fellow for the Center for the Study of Race, Ethnicity, and Social Justice at Stonehill College; Luna, Postdoctoral Researcher on Women Peace and Security (WPS) - Research Network, Center for International Peace and Security Studies, McGill University; Crystal, Assistant Professor at Sam Houston State University's Political Science Department. “A call for feminist analysis in cybersecurity: highlighting the relevance of the Women, Peace and Security agenda.” Centre for Women, Peace, and Security. 9/17/2021. LJS

So far, cybersecurity, defined as “the preservation – through policy, technology, and education – of the availability, confidentiality, and integrity of information and its underlying infrastructure to enhance the security of persons both online and offline,” has been a key focus for policymakers and defense institutions. Weaponising a civilian space has enormous implications for human rights, especially for women who are already disadvantaged in conflict settings. While national security matters, we suggest that cybersecurity needs to take human rights seriously by centering people’s empowerment and well-being. We see a need to extend the WPS agenda, including 1325 National Action Plans (NAPs), to the cyber realm to achieve sustainable peace. The WPS agenda promotes human security by encouraging the participation of women in peace and security governance. We envision 1325 as protecting women, girls, trans, queer, and other sexual and gender minorities from online GBV and ensuring equal access to cybersecurity both in terms of access to cyber technologies and participating in cybersecurity governance. The WPS agenda could be used in cyberspace to: • Ensure women from diverse backgrounds are in decision-making positions in cybersecurity governance and expanding the number of women in cybersecurity across the board, as well as women’s equal access to cyber technologies. As Brown and Pytlak explain, participation in cyber is critical to representation. Without women’s full and equal participation, their perspectives are unlikely to be represented within cyber policy or their perspective taken seriously in cyber policy.• Provide for the application of a feminist intersectional approach regarding cyberspace to understand how women, girls, and diverse gendered categories experience cyberspace differently. Cyberspace is not equal, and a one-size-fits-all policy does not work for everyone, particularly, women and girls in conflict-affected contexts, who might face unique challenges while using the cyber realm due to weak cyber laws. • Launch gender-disaggregated data collection on cyber-space tools and resources countries and businesses in the private sector (Facebook, Twitter, Tok-tok) are creating and utilising to make cyberspace safer by protecting the data privacy and security of marginalised groups, including women and girls as well as trans, queer, nonbinary and other sexual and gender minorities face in cybersphere. • Promote training for cybersecurity professionals, scholars and policymakers on gender-specific issues in cybersecurity and recognise that achieving sustainable peace requires achieving a safe cyberspace. We build on recent work by Feminist IR scholars who have made a case for using 1325 and the WPS agenda beyond conflict settings. For instance, Laura Shepherd argues that since no country is violence-free or full of gender equality, there is a need to apply 1325 beyond war and postwar contexts. Similarly, in this piece, we try to expand the scope of application for the WPS agenda to include cyberspace in all contexts, with a focus on conflict-affected countries. To do so, more feminist analysis is needed to help us understand how complex social identities in the cyber realm shape users’ experiences and their interaction with power structures. Feminist analysis can shed light on how gender and other inequalities operate in cyberspace and impact human rights and uniquely impact women and other marginalised groups living in conflict-affected countries. We see the WPS agenda as a starting point for scholarly and policy-focused feminist cyber engagement.

### Perm Do Both – Critical Friend

#### Perm do both—the aff acts as a critical friend to NATO which is key to nuanced understandings that change institutions and avoid co-optation

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Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “Introduction.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 5-6. LJS

Much to the benefit of the feminist IR, there are numerous critical engagements and conversations between feminists on approaches to the study of security, war and the institutions that wage them. Sylvester (2013) and Duncanson (2013) acknowledge a tension between what can be broadly described as an ‘anti-militarist’ feminism and what Sylvester calls ‘new’ feminist war studies that seek to centralise the accounts of women as agents within institutions of war (2013: 49) (see also Lobasz and Sjoberg, 2011: 574). Sylvester notes unease between women who self-identify as feminists but depart from common advocacy of peaceful conflict resolution, or a strident anti-militarism. Similarly, Duncanson (2013) identifies a tension between feminists who view militaries as useful in the pursuit of peace (Olsson and Tryggestad, 2001; Kaldor, 2012; Kronsell, 2012) and those who are much more sceptical about the role and place of militaries and militarism (Whitworth, 2004); between those whom she calls ‘feminist sceptics of military intervention’ and ‘feminist sceptics’ (Duncanson, 2013: 2). This tension becomes acute when considering sites of feminist research and the role of feminist researcher: as Sylvester (2013: 39) notes: ‘Gender and war is a very fraught coupling and the men and women who join the institution of war or work within it can put observers in a conundrum: to support them, take no position, look the other way?’ What Sylvester is commenting on is the notion that by centralising institutions of war and the individuals that choose to work within them as a site of feminist analysis, this somehow promotes, reinforces and legitimates those structures. Yet, Kronsell (2005, 2006, 2012) highlights how solely focusing on women at the ‘margins’ of International Relations, on those ‘outside of hegemonic institutions’ such as the military, tends to underestimate the significance of the transformative work of those women who work ‘inside’ such organisations (Kronsell, 2005: 289). In advancing a ‘revitalised’ standpoint theory, Kronsell (2005: 289) also argues that a reluctance to engage with women within hegemonic institutions perpetuates certain assumptions about them: Women within such institutions have been perceived as either co-opted or too few to be representative of women’s knowledge or standpoint. Standpoint theory’s tendency to emphasise knowledge generated by women only in particular ‘women’s spaces’ has led to the implication that an occasional woman with power is either a male in disguise or a mere token. It is not our intention to promote, reinforce or legitimate NATO as an international actor through this book. But it is our intent to offer a feminist critique of its gendered institutional norms, practices and structures by centralising the experience of those women who have worked and continue to work within it. We see our role as ‘critical friends’. In introducing this concept of a ‘critical friend’ we build on the work of Rech et al. (2015: 56). They contend that the study of the military, of militarism, and of processes of militarisation, should not be undertaken solely for its own sake, but should also be guided by the possibility of engagement with the forces and institutions responsible, and should not be bashful about doing so. This is because such institutions are ultimately accountable to the civilian world, and understanding how they function is necessary to critique them (rather than dismiss them) (Enloe, 1993; Rech et al., 2015: 56). Being a ‘critical friend’ means rejecting problem-solving approaches which ‘takes the world as it finds it’ and aims ‘to makes these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble’ (Cox, 1981: 128–9). Rather, it means adopting a critical approach which calls these institutions into question and accounts for the possibility of their change. In so doing it opens up the possibility for research to be normatively guided (Cox, 1981: 129–30). Being a ‘critical friend’ to military institutions therefore entails engaging in complex and nuanced arguments and situating these in broader political considerations and in more nuanced ways than simplistic ‘pro-military’ or ‘anti-military’ positions are able to accommodate (Rech et al., 2015: 56). It means a commitment to praxis, which necessities engagement. Military institutions are often secretive, complex and contradictory, this means critical agendas can be vulnerable to co-option (as we discuss in Chapter 4). Researchers as ‘critical friends’ therefore need to engage in an ongoing process of reflexivity from the outset of any project.

## Impacts

### A2 Extinction

#### Gender is not the root cause of violence or ontological and cant explain the case -- violence is constructed by many axes of oppression

Olena Hankivsky 12, Professor in the School of Public Policy, Simon Fraser University, June 2012, Women’s health, men’s health, and gender and health: Implications of intersectionality, Social Science & Medicine, http://www.sciencedirect.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/science/article/pii/S0277953612000408

Using an intersectionality framework, researchers have noted the explanatory limitations of single axis designs centered on sex and gender. Cole (2009) has warned that analyses that focus on gender are problematic because they often “implicitly assume a host of other social statuses that usually go unnamed in American culture: middle-class standing, heterosexuality, able-bodiedness and White race” (p. 173). Others have explicated similar limitations. For example, studies in the field of violence (Bent-Goodley, 2007; Craig-Taylor, 2008; Crenshaw, 1995; Nixon & Humphreys, 2010; Sandelowski, Barroso, & Voils, 2009) show that violence against women is not only a matter of gendered power relationships but is co-constructed with racial and class stratification, heterosexism, ageism, and other systems of oppression, some of which may be more salient within such interactions. Research on cardiovascular disease (CVD) (Brister, Hamdulay, Verma, Maganti, & Buchanan, 2007; King, LeBlanc, Carr, & Quan, 2007; King, LeBlanc, Sanguins, & Mather, 2006) shows that focussing on sex and gender often obscures the fact that CVD is disproportionately experienced by racial ethnic and low-income groups whose lives are shaped by intersecting processes of differentiation along the lines of age, sex, ethnic group affiliation, socioeconomic class, and geography. Finally, HIV/AIDS research (Dworkin, 2005; Elford, Anderson, Bukutu, & Ibrahim, 2006; Jackson & Reimer, 2008; Meyer, Costenbader, Zule, Otiashvili, & Kirtadze, 2010; Young & Meyer, 2005) demonstrates that gender and sexuality cannot be separated from other axes including race, class, age, religious affiliation, and immigration status and the structural economic, political, and social processes that shape them. For example, in her analysis of surveillance categories for HIV, Dworkin (2005) argues that pushing beyond a singular sex/gender system to explore the simultaneity of race, class, and shifting gender relations is vital to the future of the HIV epidemic and in particular, for making visible bisexual and lesbian transmission risks. Emerging research thus demonstrates that there are many groups which “do not necessarily identify gender oppression as the primary frame through which they understand their lives” (Nixon & Humphreys, 2010, p. 150). In Canada, as in many other jurisdictions, this is especially apparent with growing immigrant populations whose health is primarily affected by dislocation, isolation, loss of identity, culture, and meaningful employment and Aboriginal/Indigenous populations whose health and well-being is largely determined by unresolved colonial injustices and ongoing experiences of racism and poverty (Alfred, 2005; Waldrum, Herring, & Young, 2006).¶ Further, the emphasis on gender (and sex) often leads to a focus on differences between women and men. This helps to explain why so much data continues to be collected, organized, and presented solely around sex and gender differences even when similarities between women and men are demonstrated (e.g. Hyde, 2005; Petersen, 2009), differences among women and among men are often as significant if not more than between women and men (Crawshaw & Smith, 2009; Varcoe, Hankivsky, & Morrow, 2007), and men are sometimes subordinate to some women and some women exercise power over some men (Pease, 2006). Nevertheless, numerous reviews of sex based and gender differences continue to be produced (Gochfeld, 2010; Read & Gorman, 2010). Moreover, even in some frameworks that seek to include considerations of both sex and gender, as in the sex and gender based analysis (SGBA) tool developed in Canada (e.g. Clow et al., 2009), proposed guides construct lines of interrogation that prioritize examinations of similarities and differences between women and men. As Clow et al. (2009) state, “SGBA reminds us to ask questions about similarities and differences among women and men, such as: Do women and men have the same susceptibility to lung disease from smoking? Are women at the same risk as men of contracting HIV/AIDS through heterosexual intercourse? Are the symptoms of heart disease the same in women and men?.” (p. 1). Within this type of construct, differences that are shaped and formed by factors outside of sex and gender are treated as secondary in importance, if at all.

## Alt

### Fails – Policy Key

#### Alt fails – privileges abstraction and distances theory from practice – materiality is not reducible to discourse.

Hudson 15

Heidi, Professor of International Relations and Director of the Centre for Africa Studies at the University of the Free State, “(Re)framing the Relationship between Discourse and Materiality in Feminist Security Studies and Feminist IPE,” POLITICS & GENDER, 11 (2) (2015)

While feminists usually try to ground the meanings that they study, theorizing the mundane or the everyday may very well represent a detour —or even a dead end—if bread-and-butter issues related to the security and economic well-being of ordinary women and men are ignored. What value does feminist theorizing (even if it draws from women’s lived experiences) have in war-affected contexts where meeting immediate needs is paramount? At what point does the theorizing of the body under such circumstances become a means to satisfying intellectual fetishes? Theorizing the everyday is messy because it has to contend with the immediate social setting in which popular culture is inseparable from the economic materiality of the conditions of oppression. In response to this dilemma, my aim is to argue for a productive rather than a reductive relationship between Feminist Security Studies (FSS) and Feminist (International) Political Economy (FPE), achieved through a reframed relationship between discursive subjectivity and a structure-centred materiality. I argue for a more systematic feminist analysis that reunites FPE and cultural FSS critiques. This analytical synthesis is based on an understanding of the co-constituted agency of discourse and materiality underpinned by a postcolonial-feminist attention to the politics of space. After the Cold War, security became a catch-all concept for critical variants of IR, but instead of working against disciplinary fragmentation, “security has settled into each new camp in particularistic ways” (Sylvester 2013, 618). For FSS the main concern is to underscore the conceptual necessity of gender to understanding security. Although scholars have also emphasized the theoretical and methodological diversity of FSS, I contend that there is an implicit hierarchy of sorts when it comes to which critical tradition matters more theoretically or epistemologically—with a subtle but distinct privileging of the discursive as evidenced by the influential contributions of, among others, Judith Butler (1993), Karin Fierke (2013a), Lene Hansen (2006), and Laura Shepherd (2008). FSS thus tends to focus on the gendered, discursive construction of forms of violence with less attention paid to materialities of economic insecurity. In contrast, FPE tends to avoid the security frame and its discursive implications and concentrates more on gender as a social relation of inequality and the gendered effects of capitalism or economic globalization. Poststructuralist scholarship in FSS insists that the discursive is not privileged over the material and that objects in the material world and human subjects both take their forms and agencies relationally, as they are embedded within particular locations. Similarly, gendered and embodied security is theorized to be the outcome of relational processes —performed in, by, and through those relations. Theory thus makes practice (Foucault 1972). Yet, thinking about our bodies as cultural constructs, produced as objects in security discourse, has a high level of abstraction. Before we can analyze discourse about bodies, shouldn’t we first make the bodies from “other worlds,” rooted in everyday struggles of human insecurity, feature in IR? How is attention to contextualized discourses of individuals or groups without considering their basic needs different from what liberal feminists are doing, namely treating those whose security is at stake as abstract, silent, rights-bearing individuals with no culture? Moreover, for all this talk about interactions between language and matter (as if they were equal), “language” remains the star of the show, as evidenced in Karin Fierke’s claim that “embodied security is . . . fundamentally bound up in the interaction between humans and their material environment, both of which are constituted in and through language” (Fierke 2013b, 16). Theoretically, materiality should gain agency through the fact that it cannot ontologically be separated from discursive forces but in practice discourses treat material practices (bodies) as effects (objects) rather than causes (subjects), and consequently maintain agency (Wilcox 2012). A subtle hierarchy is therefore imposed. Reversing the starting point of the inquiry may succeed in troubling dualistic thinking but does not transcend it. We may have thrown the baby out with the bathwater when we privileged the effects of cultural constructions of gender difference at the expense of the material effects of bodies, economic justice, and security (see Fraser 2013). There are clearly limits to discursive analysis, especially when it comes to connecting physical insecurity and the materiality of insecurity linked to structures. We must therefore look to the so-called “new materialisms” on posthumanist agency (Connolly 2013), material feminisms (Hughes 2013), and Feminist IPE. Feminist IPE as a diverse body of scholarship studies structures, social practices, and the meanings of the global political economy (Griffin 2010; Peterson 2007). The emphasis falls on specifically gendered bodies while also foregrounding differences that are based upon material and structural inequalities as well as intersectional relations of disadvantage (e.g., gender, institutionalized racism, or ethnicity). In this regard, FPE may find itself closer than FSS to a radical definition of human security as everyday life experiences embedded in global structures of inclusion and exclusion and can keep FSS honest by guiding it back to a concern with everyday (economic) insecurities.

### Turn – Gender Essentialism

#### Traditional feminist understandings habitually entrench wester notions of gender

Underwood 16— B.A. International Studies, The Ohio State University (Jasmine, “FEMINIST INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND “EPISTEMIC BLANK SPOTS”: ENTRENCHING HEGEMONY?,” Wright State University Graduate School, https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send\_file?accession=wright1484344418762762&disposition=inline)

The basic task of dismantling and decentering the current theoretical paradigms of mainstream IR by challenging its “western” origins served as the foundation to call into question the supposed objectivity of knowledge developed within the boundaries of this discipline (Sign Systems, and Knowledge). This ultimately leads to deconstruction of the masculinities, and consequently, the femininities derived from mainstream IR, which challenges the universalism of its principles. These principles are the basis under which knowledge is disseminated within the field and they dominate the ways in which we think about the world. Thus, to deconstruct and challenge these principles then “problematizes” all of the concepts and practices derived from them. When considering how feminist IR challenged and problematized development, this served as the basis for the building tasks of practices and politics. While international relations and the international system advocate for development as benevolent, in practice, this concept has been enacted (at times) with various self-interested outcomes by those in positions of power. Tickner pointedly referred to development as a “western project” and other theorists critiqued the western frame of development models and practices. Furthermore, if one thinks about the politics of development, this concept is complexly used to withhold social goods such as foreign aid or development assistance.¶ The buildings tasks of relationships, identities, and connections are closely intertwined and dependent upon each other, especially in feminist IR. The literature also challenged, developed, and weaved together the various aspects of identity of women around the world. Challenging the views of women in the developing world also involved challenging how women in the developed world view their own status and position. Take, for example, the concepts of complicity and insider/outsider identities. The feminist IR literature strongly asserted that through actions such as underpaid household labor or unfair labor practices used to produce 57 globally-shipped goods (e.g. buying items produced in sweatshops) women have participated in aspects of patriarchy that disadvantage others. Another example is “femocrats” or women in power who condone—or even advocate—certain policies that are steeped in hegemonic masculinity, such as war. These are women that have upheld certain aspects of patriarchy because it is beneficial to maintaining their own power. Thus, it forces women in the developed world to think about their relationship and connection to their counterparts in developing countries, particularly in ways that do not create them as abstract figures. If these women are oppressed, if they are “third world”; if they are disadvantaged, then, those in the “first world” are not disconnected from their position. This oppression did not—and does not—happen by coincidence. Women in the First World/developed countries/Global North bear some responsibility, whether implicitly or explicitly, in maintaining the disadvantaged social status of those outside the west.¶ Furthermore, an interesting aspect of this analysis of feminist IR literature was not in how these pieces talked about women in developing countries or the “Third World,” but in how these women weren’t spoken about. Not in terms of making them invisible, but in not attempting to describe them; not attempting to speak for them, but straying away from one-dimensional or homogenized views of their lives. It seemed that the goal was simply to “trouble” the existing images and ways in which we think about these women and their lives. The task was not necessarily to describe, but instead, to deconstruct. Perhaps, this was a method to counter existing, problematic narratives, but without co-opting the stories of marginalized women for scholarly purposes.¶ The previously identified themes and categories will be carried forward to the second part of the discourse analysis on policy literature. The purpose of the next chapter is to see if any of 58 these objects in feminist IR literature have influenced and/or appear in the discourse of international women’s development policy.¶ Summary When looking at the overall discourse of feminist IR literature, the not only stresses the idea of adding women to IR, but which women are added and whose voices are heard. This is disruptive to the discipline because of its agendered assumptions. The texts repeatedly and purposefully situate gender and international relations within a western context, to serve as a reminder that the international system has a specific sociocultural frame. This creates situated identities within this frame that may have been imposed upon individuals, particularly women in the “Third World”/ “Developing” world/ “Global South.” By giving examples of women’s agency, particularly in reference to women’s movements and civil society, it serves to uncover and build an image of these women separate from “western” created concepts. Often, images of marginalized individuals are depicted in relation to those in power, highlighting the (hierarchical) differences. Telling a plurality of stories decenters the singular frame in which one can see the world.¶ Despite these attempts at disruption, the use of dichotomies shows the power of language and that one can only exist so far “outside the system” (even when aware of its pitfalls). This “discursive slippage” is a result of unconscious, habitual, and inherited language (Hooper, 2001; Runyan & Peterson, 2010). The continued use of western-imposed, hierarchical dichotomies means that uncovering new ways to view international relations requires new language to speak about international relations. Otherwise, feminist IR will disrupt discourse in one context, while entrenching it in another.

#### Feminist international relations impose the idea of “gender” being based upon the “heteronormative binary”.

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The field of feminist security studies highlights how “security” is interrelated to issues of gender and sex in many important ways (Wibben and Stern 2014; Hudson 2011, 586; see also Sjoberg 2009; Sjoberg and Martin 2010). Although feminist security studies strongly challenges the dominant, repressive, and invariably patriarchal ways in which national security, international security coalitions, foreign policy priorities, and defence mechanisms are conceived, it is a considerably “restrictive” field. Publications in journals such as Politics and Gender demonstrate that the near-totality of contributors are cis, white, able-bodied women in Western academia. Feminist security studies focuses invariably on the gender binary, thereby limiting its brand of feminism to cis (and largely white) able-bodied women. It is a field that seldom accommodates a diversity of perspectives or includes voices of women of color, Indigenous women, or Trans and queer feminist scholars and activists. This approach to feminist security studies perpetuates a cycle of exclusion and exceptionalism, adjudicating on who gets to articulate what in the field, and who gets academic credence as a “feminist.” Concluding an article on feminist security studies, Hudson (2011, 589) calls upon fellow academics in that research area to avoid inflicting unto others what has been done unto them in the past in the form of exclusionary practices and in defining the boundaries of feminist security studies to say who is in and who is out. In terms of theorizing, critical voices on the potential of feminist security studies to engage with and destabilize gendered power relations are receiving increasing scholarly attention (see, e.g., Åhäll 2016). Yet even such critical voices take a considerably cisgender feminist turn, with subjective and restrictive interpretations of what is implied by “feminist.” In Practice: The Gender Binary as the Status Quo in International Politics The consequences of mostly whitefeminist theorizing of international relations and security studies can be observed in the agendas and targets of supranational organizations, regional bodies, and powerful governments. The UN’s gender policies and strategic goals, as well as those of powerful governments, are structured in a way that perpetuates gender-related conservatisms and norms, which, to borrow from Ahmed (2016, 23), are also heteronorms. The UN’s concept of gender mainstreaming involves ensuring that the goal of gender equality is made central to all activities—policy development, research, advocacy, legislation, resource allocation, planning, implementation, and monitoring of programs and projects (UN Women, n.d.). Many scholars of feminist IR have explored challenges and inconsistencies in the way in which gender mainstreaming is perceived by the UN and other supranational bodies (see, e.g., Youngs 2008; Daly 2005; Rees, 2005; Walby 2005; Perrons, 2005; Beveridge and Nott 2002; Hafner-Burton and Pollack 2002; True 2003, 2009, 2010). Gender mainstreaming, as it is practiced by the international community, persistently interprets “gender” around the “heteronormative binary” (see Zalewski 2010, 21–22) and consequently regularly ignores interfaces between race, sex, gender, nationality, ethnicity, sexuality, and power (25; see also Jauhola 2010). Today, UN bodies have begun to pay increased attention to Transgender issues through their emphasis on sexual orientation, gender identity/expression, and sex characteristics (SOGIESC), especially in collaboration with platforms such as the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex Association (ILGA). However, the overall ethos of such engagements continues to be somewhat inconsistent, in that they fail to acknowledge the salient reality that anti- Trans discrimination—if not discrimination against gender identities that do not fall within the binary—is inherently linked to misogyny, patriarchal oppression, and inequities that are at the heart of gender-related oppression, which especially take their toll on underprivileged cis women of color in the Global South, Indigenous peoples across the world, and also women from ethnic minorities in the West.10 In a similar vein, the UN’s women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda is also essentially founded not only upon a narrow and restrictive understanding of gender(s) fixed on the gender binary, but also on the basis of stereotyping (cisgender) women as the vulnerable “other.” Even when discussing women affected by armed conflict, WPS resolutions locate the (cisgender) male soldier as the ultimate referent (Jansson and Eduards 2016, 12). A fast-growing body of work examines the rationale and problems of implementing WPS resolutions (Olonisakin, Barnes, and Ikpe 2011; Gizelis and Olsson 2015; Farr 2011; Barnes 2011; Harrington 2011; Reeves 2012; Adrian-Paul 2012). Scholars of feminist security studies have also critically engaged with the WPS agenda (Pratt and Richter-Devroe 2011; Schnabel and Tabyshalieva 2012; Boyd 2014). Critics highlight that Resolution 1325 does not confront the structural roots of gender inequalities, including entrenched understandings of patriarchy, masculinity, and militarized power (Barnes 2011). Resolution 1325 and the subsequent WPS resolutions (including Resolution 2122 of 2013) largely perceive women through a prism of wartime victimhood (see, e.g., Meger 2016). This logic locates the cis male soldier as the agent of preventing violence against women, and, as scholars have repeatedly pointed out, legitimizes military activity once sexual violence against women is addressed. In sum, the UN’s conception of gender equates cis women and cisnormative femininity with peace and is entrenched in cisnormative gender stereotypes (Shepherd 2008). This reading of women in contexts of armed conflict fails to identify patriarchy as the primary cause of violence against women, which prevents UN resolutions from consistently addressing the exclusion of women and gender-plural people from conflict management initiatives. It also prevents supranational bodies (and governments) from focusing on a logic of addressing the visceral excesses of patriarchal attitudes and developing a consistent logic of women’s empowerment, especially in post-war contexts in the Global South. The problems inherent in the WPS agenda and gender mainstreaming primarily stem from the fact that the very authority that drafts these policy guidelines is also one that is largely spearheaded by influential states with power acquired through centuries of colonization, and by white settler-controlled authorities that are squarely responsible for the human, socioeconomic, cultural, and linguistic genocide of First Peoples, especially women and gender-plural peoples of Turtle Island and elsewhere. Since its inception, the UN has proved to be incapable of addressing atrocities committed by these powers upon non-white peoples. Western superpowers have carte blanche on the international sphere, often justifying their military aggressions and violence in foreign lands on the basis of protectionist discourses along (cis)gender faultlines, such as the often-repeated “objective” of protecting “women and children,” echoing a discourse of masculinist protectionism built upon a patriarchal and hence patronizing understanding of democratic citizenship and world politics. In the face of such discourses, the UN has been conspicuously silent and partaking in the agendas of Western powers. This calls into question the UN’s capability, in its present form, of addressing the challenges facing women/gender minorities in contexts of armed conflict and natural disaster. An effective strategy must be grounded in the recognition of a broader understanding of gender beyond the binary, and a decolonizing logic of empowering cis and Trans women and all other gender-plural people. Most importantly, such an approach must profoundly challenge the logics of warfare as articulated by powerful states and ensure that women and gender-plural people occupy frontline roles in all aspects of conflict management and resolution initiatives. It is in articulating a policy perspective of this nature, with decolonizing, equity, justice, and empowerment at the center, that a Transfeminist approach to IR will gain prime significance. As outlined below, key ideas in Transfeminism, when applied to IR, provide a promising avenue to develop a strongly intersectional, feminist, Global South(s)-focused and decolonizing twenty-first-century perspective on world politics.